Part I. The Universe of Transitional Justice: 1. Athens in 411 and 403 BC. 2. The French restorations in 1814 and 1815 3. The larger universe of cases Part II. Analytics of Transitional Justice: 4. The structure of transitional justice 5. Wrongdoers 6. Victims 7. Constraints 8. Emotions 9. Politics.

https://assets.cambridge.org/97805218/39693/frontmatter/9780521839693_frontmatter.pdf

Negotiating Democracy: THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective

Using the United States as a basis of comparison, this book makes extensive use of roll call data to explore patterns of legislative politics in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. It distinguishes among parties, factions, coalitions and delegations based on the extent to which they are unified in their voting and/or willing to form policy coalitions with other legislative 'agents'. It discusses the voting unity and ballot systems that allow voters to identify an agent, and describes the degree to which those agents have been flexible with regards to the formation of policy coalitions. It also shows that the US parties have exhibited higher levels of unity but less flexibility in recent years, and thus contrast the prevailing pattern in Latin America. The book focuses its explanation for the patterns on the role of candidate nominations, other aspects of the electoral system and the legislators' ideological alignments.

Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States

This article outlines the logic and consequences of the classical theory of electoral governance. By empowering the executive with the administration of elections and the legislature with the certification of the vote tally, the theory expected elected officials to generate widely acceptable election results. This article argues that the classical theory breaks down when the same party controls the executive and the legislature. Developments in several presidential systems offer tentative support for its central hypothesis. Only when parties delegated election governance to an autonomous court system did election conflicts stop promoting political instability. Comparisons between us and Latin American separation of power systems also suggest that political developments in North and South America are much more similar than commonly assumed.

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Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization

In 1979, over two-thirds of Latin America's people were living under military rule. By 1993, however, not a single military regime remained in Central or South America or the Spanish-speaking Caribbean. Elected presidents (even if former generals, as in the case of Paraguay's first post-Stroessner government) and legislatures replaced military dictators and juntas. Foreign observers certified the “fairness” of elections in Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Paraguay — even when outgoing military regimes permitted elections only after certain parties or candidates had been excluded from participation. Political parties and opponents of incumbent governments operated openly. Media censorship declined, and fewer cases of politically-motivated abuses of human rights were reported. “Democratization” seemed to be underway.

“Protected Democracies” and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993*

Though approximately one in four coup attempts takes place during an ongoing civil war, scholars have not yet analyzed how the incidence of civil war affects coup attempts and outcomes. We conduct the first empirical analysis of the relationship between ongoing civil war and coup activity, finding (1) war increases the risk of a coup attempt, though (2) war-time coup attempts are significantly less likely to be successful, and (3) the risk of war-time coup is much higher when states face stronger rebel groups that pose greater threats to the political survival of the incumbent government. We attribute these findings to the pernicious effect of ongoing war on the welfare of the military elites and soldiers who have the greatest capacity to execute a coup attempt. As war diminishes their welfare and creates uncertainty about the future of the state, potential plotters become more willing to accept riskier coup attempts than they might plot during peace-time. Coup motivations are greatest when incumbents are more likely to lose their wars, and this causes coup plotters to attempt more and riskier coups when rebels are relatively strong.

/pdf/the-causes-and-outcomes-of-coup-during-civil-war-286a2kllwa.pdf

Negotiating Democracy: THE CRISIS AND SURVIVAL OF URUGUAYAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Citations

Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective

Patterns of Legislative Politics: Roll-Call Voting in Latin America and the United States

Can Parties Police Themselves? Electoral Governance and Democratization

“Protected Democracies” and Military Guardianship: Political Transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993*

The causes and outcomes of coup during civil war

Related Papers (5)

Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay

Human Rights and Democratization in Latin America

Settling Old Scores Potholes along the Transition from Authoritarian Rule

Constitutional Judiciary in a new democracy : the Hungarian Constitutional Court

Deliberative Democracy: List of Contributors