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Ontological Relativity and Other Essays
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The article was published on 1969-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 2239 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Fundamental ontology & Ontology.read more
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Diseases as natural kinds.
TL;DR: It is argued that from the point of view of natural properties, induction(s), and participation in laws, at least some of the ill organisms dealt with in somatic medicine form natural types in the same sense in which the kinds in the exact sciences are thought of as natural.
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Quine's Argument from Despair
TL;DR: For Quine, the first philosopher's quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language is a mistake, there is no science-independent perspective from which to validate science as discussed by the authors.
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Russell, logicism, and the choice of logical constants.
TL;DR: It is here argued that Russell's Principles of Mathematics contains an intriguing idea about how to demarcate logical concepts from nonlogical ones, and implication and generality emerge as the two fundamental logical concepts.
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Rational Justification and Mutual Recognition in Substantive Domains
TL;DR: This article argued that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for rational justification in empirical knowledge or morals, is in fundamental part socially and historically based, although this is consistent with realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and with strict objectivity about basic moral principles.
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Revaluing the behaviorist ghost in enactivism and embodied cognition
Nikolai Alksnis,Jack Reynolds +1 more
TL;DR: It is argued that once the behaviorist dimensions are clarified and distinguished from the straw-man version of the view, it is in fact an asset, one which will help with task of setting forth a scientifically reputable version of enactivism and/or philosophical behaviorism that is nonetheless not brain-centric but behavior-centric.