This paper aims to address the relevance of the natural sciences for transcendental phenomenology, that is, the issue of naturalism. The first section distinguishes three varieties of naturalism and corresponding forms of naturalization: an ontological one, a methodological one (with strong and weak variants), and an epistemological one (also with strong and weak variants). In light of these distinctions, in the second section, I examine the main projects aiming to “naturalize phenomenology”: neurophenomenology, front-loaded phenomenology, and formalized approaches to phenomenology. The third section then considers the commitments of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology with respect to the three varieties of naturalism previously discussed. I argue that Husserl rejected strong and weak forms of epistemological naturalism, strong methodological naturalism, and ontological naturalism. The fourth section presents the argument that Husserl endorsed a weak, conditional form of methodological naturalism. This point is illustrated with Husserl’s proposal of “somatology,” a natural science apt to study the corporeality of the lived body. The final section addresses the complementarity and respective limits of the transcendental phenomenological and the natural scientific frameworks. I argue that, on Husserl’s account, the function of transcendental phenomenology with respect to the natural sciences is to provide them with an epistemological foundation and an ontological clarification. I suggest that certain natural sciences can be understood, within the transcendental phenomenological framework, as “sciences of constitution,” that is, as sciences investigating the contribution of real structures acting as conditions of possibility for the occurrence of certain kinds of comprehensive unities in lived experience.

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays

Naturalizing what? Varieties of naturalism and transcendental phenomenology

And this paper is an attempt to say precisely how, thus addressing a philosophical problem which is commonly taken to be a serious one. It does so, however, in quite an idiosyncratic way. It is based on the account of inductive schemes I have given in (1988) and 1990a) and on the conception of causation I have presented in (1980), (1983), and (1990b), and it intends to fill one of many gaps which have been left by these papers.

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Causal laws are objectifications of inductive schemes

I juxtapose Quine's and Davidson's approaches to naturalized epistemology and assess Davidson's reasons for rejecting Quine's account of the nature of knowledge. Davidson argues that Quine's account of the nature of knowledge is Cartesian in spirit and consequence, i.e. it is essentially first person and invites global skepticism. I survey Quine's response to Davidson's criticisms and suggest that the view that Davidson criticizes may not be Quine's after all. I conclude by raising some questions about Quine's definition of ‘observation sentence’.

Quine and Davidson: Two naturalized epistemologists∗

This thesis is a study of the use of Darwinian evolutionary ideas in business economics and organization studies. Mindful of the explosion of evolutionary rhetoric in the socioeconomic domain over the last three decades and informed by the modern generalized Darwinian perspective, the research has been focused on the evaluation of the precise nature and extent of use of Darwinian ideas in three of the most influential evolutionary accounts in these disciplines. Notably, Nelson and Winter’s Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), Hannan and Freeman’s Organizational Ecology (1989), and Howard Aldrich’s Organizations Evolving (1999). It is a work of comparative theory. Also since 1980, theoretical and conceptual advances in evolutionary theory confirmed the generic nature of Darwinian theory and provided generalized terms for its articulation. Whilst some major criticisms of Darwinism are easily dismissed, significantly scholars have shown that Lamarckian acquired character inheritance must be accommodated within the meta-theoretical framework of Darwinism. This study shows that whilst the damaging rhetoric of ‘Social Darwinism’ continues to discourage widespread active engagement with Darwinian theory, the pervasive implicit or ‘covert’ adoption of Darwinian ideas by social scientists nevertheless clearly endorses its general nature, confirms a Darwinian social ontology and underlines the inevitability of Darwinism in the socio-cultural domain. Following a detailed exposition of general Darwinism, this study presents a forensic comparative evaluation of the evolutionary theories under study, highlighting theoretical gaps and inconsistencies, and demonstrating their resolution within the Darwinian framework. Through the systematic application and dissection of these disparate theories, one of which is labelled ‘Lamarckian’, the analysis shows the deep extent to which they all are Darwinian. And furthermore, underlining the promise of the Darwinian system for yielding further results, the study clearly illustrates the importance of the explicit adoption of modern Darwinian concepts for helping scholars to understand the complex evolutionary processes they seek to explain.

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Darwinian evolutionary ideas in business economics and organization studies

Environmental protection isn't what it used to be. During the 1960s and 1970s, environmentalists enacted a legislative agenda that seems like a dream today: statutes like the Clean Air and Clean Wa...

Ontological Relativity and Other Essays

Citations

Naturalizing what? Varieties of naturalism and transcendental phenomenology

Causal laws are objectifications of inductive schemes

Quine and Davidson: Two naturalized epistemologists∗

Darwinian evolutionary ideas in business economics and organization studies

What Does Environmental Protection Protect

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