Populism and the media: cross-national findings and perspectives

TLDR: The role of the media in the dissemination of populism is largely under-explored in the classical research literature dealing with populism (see, e.g., Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000) as discussed by the authors.

Abstract: European media systems have gone through major changes in the last few decades, and these changes have included increased opportunity structures for the dissemination of populist messages. Chapter 12 (‘Switzerland’) rightly states that the disappearance of the traditional party press, increased media ownership concentration, dependence on advertising, and a stronger orientation toward news values have worked in favor of a growing populist discourse. The newly established online media are seen as having a high afnity to populism’s rhetorical persuasion because both aim for the “quick kick/click” with a broad audience. As was stated in Chapter 1 in this volume, the role that the media play in the dissemination of populism is largely under-explored. In the classical research literature dealing with populism (see, e.g., Canovan, 1981; Taggart, 2000), communication and media are not addressed at all. When political scientists make the media their subject, they see the media mostly only as a neutral platform for populist leaders’ appearances and messages. One exception is Mudde (2007), who dedicates at least a few pages to this topic in his book Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (pp. 248-253). He elaborates in particular on the assumption that tabloids and commercial television share a close relationship with populist communication.

Figures

Figure 1.1 The three pillars of populist political communication.

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Introduction
Comprehending Populist Political Communication
Aalberg, T.; de Vreese, C.H.
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Populist Political Communication in Europe
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Communication. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck , & C. H. de Vreese
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Populist Political Communication in Europe
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Populist Political
Communication in Europe
Edited by Toril Aalberg, Frank Esser,
Carsten Reinemann, Jesper Strömbäck,
and Claes H. de Vreese

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1 Introduction
Comprehending Populist Political
Communication
Toril Aalberg and Claes H. de Vreese
Introduction
Although populist politics is a well-known phenomenon in many European
democracies, its communicative aspects have been underexplored or often
ignored. Yet—in light of the current large-scale social, political, and eco-
nomic turmoil of recent populist backlashes against governments, and of
the changing media environment—the study of populist political commu-
nication has never been more important. The purpose of this book is to
provide information and knowledge about the conditions that give rise to
the presence (or absence) of populist political communication and about its
impact in different European democracies.
Over the years, as populist parties have gained electoral success, an
increasing number of researchers have started to study populist parties and
their supporters. To understand populism as an increasingly pervasive phe-
nomenon in European politics, it is crucial to understand the characteristics
and organization of populist parties as well as their electoral foundation.
However, as we will show throughout this book, communication—a key
element of this phenomenon—has mostly been overlooked. Systematic
knowledge is sparse on questions related to populist actors as communica-
tors, to the role of the media, and to the impact of populist communication
strategies on citizens. This sparsity is surprising since the populist zeitgeist,
as signaled by Mudde (2004) more than a decade ago, was in part seen to be
caused by the media’s preference for, and receptivity toward, populist actors.
We believe that it is more important now than ever to map, dissect, and
explicate the phenomenon of populist political communication. As populism
increases over time and space, we need to understand how communication
may be related to populism’s growth. Given that previously marginalized pop-
ulist actors have become a signicant and powerful part of the political scene
in many European countries, an important question is whether their position
is related to the way populists communicate and interact with the media.
Although specic, systematic, comparative research is lacking, several
arguments have been put forward suggesting that communication plays a
signicant role in the rise of populism. Populist parties are said to be more
dependent on the media for communication because they have weaker party
organization compared to the old, traditional parties. Another argument is
that the news media tend to welcome the dramatic headlines that are created

4 Toril Aalberg and Claes H. de Vreese
by populist actors; some scholars therefore claim that the more commercial
media—such as tabloid newspapers and private broadcasters—give increas-
ing attention to populist actors, because the accompanying headlines attract
larger audiences (Mazzoleni, Stewart, & Horseld, 2003). If this association
is true, populism will increase as media systems across Europe become more
commercialized. Thus, we have a striking paradox: Although it is widely
acknowledged that the media and, more broadly, the role of communication
are key to understanding the rise and success of populist leaders, parties,
and movements, research on populist political communication is scant. The
few exceptions that exist are typically scattered across various country-
specic case studies in a variety of languages. We therefore have yet to fully
understand this phenomenon and the challenges that it poses.
This book offers the rst systematic, large-scale, comparativereview of
extant research on populist political communication in Europe. The review
covers research published not only in English but also in the native language
of each participating country. Native-language research is a resource of par-
ticular value, since most of what we know about populism and communi-
cation is based either on the international literature or on only one or two
specic cases. In this rst chapter, we will provide an introduction to the
central debates related to the phenomenon of populist political communica-
tion and offer an outline of the book’s organization and the method behind
the country reviews.
Central Debates
The few studies that have empirically explored populist political communi-
cation highlight the role that communication and the media play in populist
politics. These studies have broken important ground and point to poten-
tially important problems. But they also have signicant shortcomings: they
tend to be single-country studies, to offer very small comparisons, and to
focus on single elections, organizations, or individuals. They do not capture
many of the latest developments or look at populism in an integrated way.
Most research also treats populism as a danger to democracy. Yet a more
neutral and comprehensive understanding that takes populism seriously as
an expression of democratic malaise may be more productive. It might open
our eyes to the conditions that are responsible for making this political com-
municative style currently so popular.
In the study of political communication, the focus typically centers around
three key actors: (a) the political parties, candidates, or movements, (b) the
media, and (c) citizens as voters and audience. One central insight is the impor-
tance of the mass media in widening the appeal of populist political actors.
Many scholars maintain that populist actors need the “oxygen of publicity”,
which is often supplied by the mass media. For instance, in his examination
of European far-right parties, Ellinas (2010) found that the media control
the gateway to the electoral marketplace and that they enable smaller, newer
groups to reach larger audiences than their resources would ordinarily allow

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are some examples of transient-issue entrepreneurs?

In addition, transient-issue entrepreneurs ghting for single causes are on the rise, including the Pirate Party in Sweden and Germany and the 5 Star Movement in Italy. 

Q2. Why are populist parties more dependent on the media?

Populist parties are said to be more dependent on the media for communication because they have weaker party organization compared to the old, traditional parties. 

Q3. What is the role of the media in enabling or retarding the growth of populist politics?

In some countries, the competitive online networked environment may provide populist actors with news opportunities that allow them to “crash” the established media gates. 

Q4. What forces may be causing the media to become more popular?

It may well be that commercialization, growing competition, and the Web weaken the traditional publicizing function of established media outlets, but these forces may also encourage some ratings-driven outlets to pander to populist reactionary political agendas and to adopt populist frames on a range of prescient political issues. 

Q5. What is the purpose of this book?

This book provides insight into populism and populist political communication from current research and public debates in 24 European countries. 

Q6. What is the reason for the sparsity?

This sparsity is surprising since the populist zeitgeist, as signaled by Mudde (2004) more than a decade ago, was in part seen to be caused by the media’s preference for, and receptivity toward, populist actors. 

Q7. What is the important thing to know about populism?

Native-language research is a resource of particular value, since most of what the authors know about populism and communication is based either on the international literature or on only one or two speci c cases. 

Q8. What does the author conclude that populist rhetoric is often emotional?

Looking at actors, the authors conclude that many studies emphasize that populist rhetoric is often emotional and includes blame attribution and scapegoats. 

Q9. What does Mazzoleni et al. (2003) find?

For instance, Mazzoleni et al. (2003) note that the media might be more likely to give coverage to populist actors when certain salient issues dominate the news. 

Q10. What is the main argument for the lack of systematic research?

Although speci c, systematic, comparative research is lacking, several arguments have been put forward suggesting that communication plays a signi cant role in the rise of populism.