Int.
J.
Middle East
Stud.
12 (1980), 119-137 Printed in
the
United States of America
Miron Rezun
REZA SHAH'S COURT MINISTER:
TEYMOURTASH
The reign
of
Reza Shah characterized
a
difficult and controversial period in the
contemporary history
of
Iran. Properly speaking,
it
may
be
said that
it
repre-
sented
not
only
the
beginning
of
the Pahlavi dynasty which Reza Shah
had
founded
in
December 1925,
but
also what could
be
considered pioneering
ef-
forts designed
to
modernize
a
feudal system in
a
land that had in the past com-
manded
a
venerable culture.
The
scholarly literature dealing with
the
earlier
period
of
Reza Shah's rule has developed almost
in
response
to
continuing in-
terest shown
in
things Iranian, and particularly in the country's recent history.
An examination
of
the existing bibliography shows that both
the
West
and
the Soviet Union have produced an equal share of the studies on Reza Shah.
In
Iran
itself,
however,
due to the
restrictions
and
constraints imposed
on the
study
of
this period by the Pahlavi government, Iranian publications, when the
Shah was
in
power, appeared
to
concentrate
on
studies
of
previous dynasties,
or on subjects other than politics. Writings
of
high caliber by renowned Iranian
historians have nevertheless appeared
-
even
if
sporadically. But
a
large
per-
centage of the books that were published with the political history
of
the coun-
try
in
mind were
- for all
practical purposes
-
either translations
of
carefully
selected material
of
Western scholarly literature,
or
duly recognized
and ap-
proved classical works. In this respect, the National Library in Teheran used
to
publish
an
annual list
of
such books: Kitabhay-i-Iran,
and
periodicals: Inti-
sharat-i-Iran. The Teheran Institute
for
International, Political
and
Economic
Studies, which
was
Mohammed Reza Shah's think tank, dealt with subjects
which
had a
direct bearing
on
contemporary Iranian foreign policy, leaving
little scope
for
questions
of
recent history.
While biographies
of
Reza Shah
-
both old and new
-
are not few
in
number,
they
are at
one
in
depicting
the
Shah
as a
"deus
ex
machina," come
to
save
Persia from
the
throes
of
chaos, feudalism
and
stagnation.
1
This view rein-
forces
the
assumption that
the
apotheosis
of
the first Pahlavi monarch
in the
twentieth century would have
to be in
keeping with
the
greatness associated
with
the
ancient rulers
of
Iran that
had
originated with
the
Achaemenids
and
has become
a
characteristic feature
of
the political tradition
of
the nation.
Further inquiry into
the
Pahlavi mystique, however, should sooner
or
later
illuminate other factors which have hitherto been only vaguely accounted
for.
In fact,
a
more objective reassessment of much of the evidence obtained should
provide some indication that Reza Shah was decidedly
not
the only individual
©
1980
Cambridge University Press
0020-7438/80/020119-19 $02.50
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120 Miron Rezun
acting in Persia. Moreover, it seems difficult to accept the generally held con-
tention that a semi-literate Persian cossack trooper - albeit possessed of a
strong and willful personality - should be exclusively credited with the first,
progressive social changes wrought in the fabric of Iranian society and in the
shaping of its foreign policy, without the assistance of better informed sup-
porters. Research on Iran has led this writer to discover scant reference made
to Reza Shah's Court Minister, Abdul Hossein Khan Teymourtash, the person
responsible for having brought Reza to the throne, and who, until 1932, was the
most powerful personality in Persia next to the Shah. To be sure, passing men-
tion of the Court Minister's contribution to his country has been made; but so
far most of it has been hearsay or undocumented, obviously owing to the mys-
tery surrounding his disgrace and to the events attending his trial, his imprison-
ment, and ultimately his demise.
Yet, sufficient primary and secondary sources have always existed to war-
rant an article, or even a tentative biography of
his
life. This may at least estab-
lish his positive role as a statesman, until further research and a more compre-
hensive study could adduce documentary evidence to prove otherwise.
2
Teymourtash was born into a family of Mongol stock belonging to the Persian
nobility, and inherited extensive lands along the Russian border in the Persian
province of Khorasan. As a young lad he had been sent to St. Petersburg to be
educated at an Imperial Russian Military School.
3
Travelling widely throughout
Western Europe, he had become fluent in several languages,
4
and upon his re-
turn to Persia, which at the turn of this century had been burgeoning with the
constitutional movement, he set out on a political career and was elected, at the
age of
26,
as deputy to the 2nd Persian Majlis.
5
He is reputed to have been the
most cultivated and educated Persian of
his
time, with a thoroughly Occidental
outlook on life. It has been asserted, too, that he was the first to have translated
Turgenev and Lermontov from the original into Persian.
6
His name and aristocratic background presumably helped gather round him
the intellectuals of Teheran, who, issuing from the disintegration brought to
Persia by the First World War, had decided to weld a centrally organized au-
thority with the concurrence of
the
best military formation available in Persia at
that time: the Persian Cossack Brigade. This unit had successfully been
brought under the direction of Reza Khan after its commanding Russian
officers had lost their base of support due to the revolutionary upheaval in
Russia and to the Civil War which ensued there.
7
When Zia-ed-Din had been dismissed from his post as Prime Minister and
subsequently sent into exile, it is probable that Teymourtash was - although it
cannot be proven conclusively - about to fill the prime ministerial post vacated
by Zia-en-Din. When this failed, because Reza Khan took the post himself in
1923,
it is likely Teymourtash supported Reza Khan. In so doing, he quickly
came to exercise two important functions: first as a Minister of Public Works,
8
and second, as a military governor over several Iranian provinces, where the
ever-present recalcitrance of various semi-independent tribes inhabiting the pe-
ripheral regions necessitated their submission to the central authority.
9
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Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymourtash 121
The close collaboration between the two men had proved to be of consider-
able benefit to Reza. It was Teymourtash who had been instrumental in helping
to pass a law in the Majlis providing for the security and defense forces to pass
exclusively under the control of Reza Khan, a move that had made the latter
the supreme Commander-in-Chief of the army.
10
In 1925 Teymourtash again
supported Reza, when, with other Majlis deputies, he drafted an Act, the In-
qiraz, which was subsequently passed in the Majlis on October
31,
by a vote of
80 to 5, legalizing the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty. The Inqiraz had, never-
theless, been hotly debated in the Majlis and - for different reasons - had met
with opposition from some members of the rival factions, notably from men
like Muddaris of the Shia religious leadership, and Mossadeq, who held the
passage of such a bill to be unconstitutional.
11
Towards the end of 1925 Reza was thus able to acquire dictatorial powers
and to proclaim himself Shahinshah of Iran: Teymourtash was appointed Min-
ister of Court, and in 1926 alone directed the formal arrangements with regard
to the coronation.
12
There is no indication, however, that Teymourtash, though
himself
a
constitutionalist, favoured the establishment of a republic in Persia at
this stage in his career; there is, on the contrary, every reason to believe that
his intentions lay in unifying a disparate Persia under the strong leadership of a
new monarch. Whether he ardently believed in the concept of an hereditary
monarchy is an open question. With Reza's consolidation of power in the twen-
ties,
Teymourtash assumed the leadership of the nationalist-oriented intelligent-
sia, and himself brought into being the reforms that were designed to modern-
ize - even if only outwardly - the country along Western European lines.
13
Under Reza's dictatorship the deputies of Parliament were not elected as
members of political parties, but as individuals. To remedy this situation, Tey-
mourtash, at the head of the triumvirate, founded the Iran-i-No, New Iran,
party in July 1927. The party's program was socially progressive, bearing the
motto "loyalty to the Shah and devotion to progress."
14
The move signalled
the appearance of three more parties: Taraqqi, Progressives; Tajaddud, Re-
vival; and Iran-i-Javan, Young Iran; the latter was soon absorbed by Iran-i-No
which became the majority party of the government. But in September of the
same year Reza nipped the life of the party in the bud. In his biography of the
ruler, Dr. Wilber writes:
Iran-i-No actively sought members from among government officials and merchants and
was thought to have anti-foreign sentiments, exemplified in the opposition of its leaders
to the continuation of
the
Millspaugh mission . . . It was suspected that Reza Shah had
felt that a powerful party might agitate for the establishment of a republic, that he
thought that it would give Teymourtash too much power and prestige, or that he may
have yielded to the opposition of the religious leaders.
15
The parliamentary system, a legacy of the constitutional movement, was
hardly more than a facade and servile tool in the hands of the Persian Court.
However, Teymourtash probably did try to introduce parliamentary reforms by
encouraging the formation of political parties within the framework of a consti-
tutional monarchy. Be that as it may, whatever increase in power the Majlis
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122 Miron Rezun
would have gained, Teymourtash was not blind to the fact that the logical con-
sequence of this would have been a diminution of the Shah's supremacy.
On the other hand, the Court Minister also knew that Persia was in large
measure dependent on Great Britain through the long-standing interests of the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company and of the Imperial Bank. In the view of Teymour-
tash, a strong government party, rallying the support of the articulate classes,
might well have served as a pillar of the monarch in his opposition to the British
presence and the elimination of its influence from the country. The need for
such a party was justified if we bear in mind that, however anti-British Reza
Shah may have appeared, he was far too weak to act alone against the British
government or to oppose any of its interests. In fact, it would not be an over-
statement to say that the Persian sovereign was quite at the mercy of the British
in order to remain on the throne. A secret memorandum drafted by Sir Knatch-
bull-Hugessen, and submitted to the Foreign Office two and a half years after
Teymourtash's death, may illustrate this point:
In long periods of disorder and weakness in the past we have had to adopt direct methods
to protect our vital interests ... if regime is suddenly overturned a republican form of
government would never last in Persia, for Iran will never be blessed with an organized
form of government unless it has a strong man at the center . . . our course would not
appear difficult - as soon as we were satisfied that the new Sovereign or President was in
full control we should presumably open relations with him, the Oil Royalties would be
paid in due course to him and things would go on as before. In the event of (chaos) it
might become necessary to take precautionary measures to protect the oil fields but the
Oil Royalties would give us an important hold. None of the aspirants to power would
wish to risk prejudicing the prospects of abundant payments and, on our side, we
should, I presume, be able to have the last word as to who the recipient of the Royalties
should be. In such circumstances it would be most important that a clear understanding
should exist between His Majesty's Gov't and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company that the
royalties should only be paid to the candidate or conqueror approved by his Majesty's
government. I presume this is already assured.
16
The role Teymourtash played in the foreign affairs of Persia can be documented
in greater detail. In addition to a number of studies and personal memoirs on
the subject of Persia, the major part of the essential sources may be gleaned
from foreign policy documents and the archives of those countries which have
had a traditional interest in Persia: Great Britain, the USSR, Germany, and the
United States. No Court Minister since Teymourtash has wielded so much
power, or for that matter, carried as much responsibility in the realm of foreign
affairs. In fact, during his lifetime the office of
the
Persian Foreign Minister was
more or less nominal:
17
at one point it was held by Mohammed Ali Khan Far-
zin, and at another time by Mohammed Ali Foroughi. Yet, it was always sub-
ject to the authority of Teymourtash, and he, as Court Minister, was only su-
perseded by Reza Shah. In this capacity it was possible for Teymourtash to
negotiate treaties and commercial agreements with representatives of foreign
governments, and more often than not, it was he alone who represented Per-
sia's interests abroad.
18
It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain where Teymourtash's political sym-
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Reza Shah's Court Minister: Teymourtash 123
pathies lay. It has been suggested by some that, because of
his
intimate associa-
tion with everything Russian since his youth, his sentiments were naturally
with the Soviets.
19
But this argument must necessarily subscribe to the view
that he had been sympathetic to and welcomed both a proletarian revolutionary
movement and the new order established in Russia following the October Rev-
olution. Such a view would then contradict the upbringing and world outlook
he had acquired at an exclusive Military Academy in Tsarist Russia - unless
Teymourtash later himself became convinced that the seizure of power by the
Soviets in Russia was a turn for the better, and that, as far as Persia was con-
cerned, it was to be emulated. Academic circles in Britain considered him an
Anglophobe, sympathizing with Russia.
20
The Soviets themselves are extremely ambivalent about him, and one Soviet
journalist, residing in Persia at this time, later wrote in his memoirs:
Teymourtash was without any doubt a statesman of
the
first
magnitude. Some people
have tried to portray (Teymourtash) as
a
friend of our country, associated as he was with
Russia's general culture, upbringing and education. These assertions are without foun-
dation . . . Teymourtash wanted the northern frontiers sealed off, he sought to hinder
the flow of information about life in the Soviet Union into Iran, and did not desire the
growth of Soviet power; he was afraid of it.
21
In this context, too, it is noteworthy that in a conversation with the German
Minister, von Bliicher, Teymourtash is quoted as having said: "Russia will
sooner or later become a victim of internal disorders."
22
However, it would not be an exaggeration to conclude that Teymourtash did
possess strong pro-Russian proclivities, at least culturally; and it is likely that
the nature of
his
fondness for things Russian - however distrustful he may have
been of the Soviet political regime - was such that his position in the Persian
government was at times susceptible of being exploited by the Soviet leader-
ship to promote Soviet interests. In support of
this
fact is evidence published in
the West in the early thirties by George Agabekov, the former Resident Chief
of the Soviet OGPU in Persia, who had concurrently acted as official attache to
the Soviet embassy in Teheran.
23
Although official Soviet documents on foreign policy contain no reference to
the Agabekov disclosures, in general it can be safely established from this evi-
dence that, in formaLtalks.with the.Court Minister, Soviet ambassadors contin-
ually pointed to the strategic importance to Persia of the islands of Bahrein, and
especially to their position in the Persian Gulf which could potentially serve as
a British naval base in the event of a collision between Persia and Britain. In-
deed, as early as 1927 and 1928, such moral support from the Soviets definitely
reinforced Persia's persistent claim to the islands throughout this period.
24
Fur-
ther, with the severance of British-Soviet relations in May of 1927, the Soviets
alerted Teymourtash to the possibility of formally liquidating the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company Concession in southern Persia: an act which had been long since
nurtured by both Persian nationalists and Soviet strategists.
25
On the whole, Soviet diplomatic overtures elicited a favourable response from
the Persian Court Minister. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that Tey-
mourtash shared a community of interests with the Soviet leadership, a fact
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