Second Thoughts: Revoking Decisions Over One’s Own Future

TLDR: In this article, the authors argue that when a voluntary commitment is made, freely, on the basis of principles, and with alertness to the possible consequences which might ensue, it should be honored.

Abstract: In asking questions about a person's right or authority to decide for his or her future self, we are tempted to invoke a Parfitian metaphysic of separate selves. Successive selves here are not merely a useful figure of speech such as Elster and Schelling employ, but a moral guide.' 2 Such thinking invites a rather standard alignment: advance directives are morally binding while traditional notions of personal identity prevail, but when with Parfit we countenance a succession of selves inhabiting the same body, we are drawn to question whether the decision of one self could bind the subsequent action of another.3 Although I would not deny the force of the second of these tenets, I am loathe to accept the first. Exotic metaphysics aside, there are very strong reasons to doubt the moral force of decisions we may make and later reconsider about what we are to be, or to do, at some time in the future. A central expression of autonomy is found in our ability to make a plan for ourselves and adhere to it. Emphasizing this view, Joel Feinberg argues that when a voluntary commitment is made, freely, on the basis of principles, and with alertness to the possible consequences which might ensue, it should be honored.4 He quotes with approval from Arneson, "The root idea of autonomy is that in making a voluntary choice a person takes on respon-