Journal ArticleDOI
Settlement negotiations with two-sided asymmetric information: Model duality, information distribution, and efficiency
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In this article, the authors analyze a settlement and litigation game in which both parties possess private information relevant to the value of a claim, and the plaintiff knows the level of damages, while the defendant knows the probability he will be held liable for those damages.About:
This article is published in International Review of Law and Economics.The article was published on 1994-09-01. It has received 92 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Plaintiff & Settlement (litigation).read more
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Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data
Peter Cramton,Joseph Tracy +1 more
TL;DR: This paper developed a private-information model of union contract negotiations in which disputes signal a firm's willingness to pay, and analyzed the union's decision to strike or hold out and highlighted its importance to strike activity.
Journal ArticleDOI
Delay and Settlement in Litigation
Paul Fenn,Neil Rickman +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a version of Spier's bargaining model of litigation and derive directly a functional form for the conditional probability of case settlement, using data from negligence claims against several NHS Trusts.
Journal ArticleDOI
Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a model that subsumes and organizes much of the recent theory in this area, which is worthwhile not only because the models employ different assumptions, but also because they generate different efficiency and distributional implications as well.
Book ChapterDOI
Chapter 4 Litigation
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors survey the academic literature on the economics of litigation and synthesize its main themes, including the following: under what conditions will someone decide to file suit, what determines how much is spent on a lawsuit, when do cases settle out of court, and normative issues.
Journal ArticleDOI
Economic theories of settlement bargaining
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory and discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are more than two litigants with related cases.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
TL;DR: In this paper, a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model was presented, focusing on a strategic approach adopted for the study and details of the bargaining situation used; discussion on perfect equilibrium.
Journal ArticleDOI
Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
In-Koo Cho,David M. Kreps +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.
Book
Theory of cost and production functions
TL;DR: In this article, a unified treatment of cost and production functions underlie the economic theory of production is presented, and the duality between cost function and production function is developed by introducing a cost correspondence, showing that these two functions are given in terms of each other by dual minimum problems.
Journal ArticleDOI
Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
Jeffrey S. Banks,Joel Sobel +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a new solution concept called divine equilibrium is introduced, which refines the set of sequential equilibria by requiring that off-the-equilibrium-path beliefs satisfy an additional restriction.