Journal ArticleDOI
The association between the SEC's 1992 compensation disclosure rule and executive compensation policy changes
TLDR
In this article, the authors assessed changes in the structure of compensation committees that followed this rule, as well as the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) pay and firm performance and found that, following the new rule, compensation committees include significantly fewer insiders, meet more frequently, and converge to a moderate size.About:
This article is published in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy.The article was published on 1998-03-01. It has received 62 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Executive compensation.read more
Citations
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Book
Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the managerial origins of institutional divergence in France and Germany, and the myth of the corporatist coalition in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, as well as the noisy politics of executive pay.
Journal ArticleDOI
Board structure and the informativeness of earnings
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined whether the informativeness of earnings, proxied by the earnings-returns relationship, varies with the fraction of outside directors serving on the board and board size.
Dissertation
Mekanisme corporate governance, kualitas laba dan nilai perusahaan
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relationship between corporate governance and earnings quality, earnings quality and value of the firm, corporate governance mechanism and the value of a firm, and whether earnings quality is the intervening variable.
Posted Content
The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance-Based CEO Compensation
TL;DR: In the absence of mandated compensation disclosure, this article found that CEO compensation is likely to be less performance-contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms, and that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely-held firms to increase the extent of CEO compensation that is performance-constraint.
Posted Content
Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present evidence that banks provide some special service with their lending activity that is not available from other lenders, and they find evidence that bank borrowers, not CD holders, bear the cost of reserve requirements on CDs.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Separation of ownership and control
Eugene F. Fama,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: The authors argue that the separation of decision and risk-bearing functions observed in large corporations is common to other organizations such as large professional partnerships, financial mutuals, and nonprofits. But they do not consider the role of decision agents in these organizations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Moral Hazard and Observability
TL;DR: In this article, the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
TL;DR: The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit as mentioned in this paper, which is a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Journal ArticleDOI
Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives
Kevin Murphy,Michael C. Jensen +1 more
TL;DR: For example, the authors estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.
Book
Performance pay and top-management incentives
Michael C. Jensen,Kevin Murphy +1 more
TL;DR: For example, the authors estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate that CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth.