Journal ArticleDOI
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
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TLDR
The main focus of this paper is on determining the extent to which matching procedures can be designed which give agents the incentive to honestly reveal their preferences, and which produce stable matches.Abstract:
This paper considers some game-theoretic aspects of matching problems and procedures, of the sort which involve matching the members of one group of agents with one or more members of a second, disjoint group of agents, ail of whom have preferences over the possible resulting matches. The main focus of this paper is on determining the extent to which matching procedures can be designed which give agents the incentive to honestly reveal their preferences, and which produce stable matches. Two principal results are demonstrated. The first is that no matching procedure exists which always yields a stable outcome and gives players the incentive to reveal their true preferences, even though procedures exist which accomplish either of these goals separately. The second result is that matching procedures do exist, however, which always yield a stable outcome and which always give all the agents in one of the two disjoint sets of agents the incentive to reveal their true preferences.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
TL;DR: The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951, and the record of these changes and the problems that prompt them can be found in this paper.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
TL;DR: In this article, the authors make the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design, and that some of the challenges facing both markets involve related kinds of complementarities.
MonographDOI
Assignment Problems. Revised reprint.
TL;DR: This book provides a comprehensive treatment of assignment problems from their conceptual beginnings in the 1920s through present-day theoretical, algorithmic, and practical developments and can serve as a text for advanced courses in discrete mathematics, integer programming, combinatorial optimization, and algorithmic computer science.
Journal ArticleDOI
Matching with Contracts
TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
David Gale,Lloyd S. Shapley +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the relationship between college admission and the stability of marriage in the United States, and found that college admission is correlated with the number of stable marriages.
Journal ArticleDOI
Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that any non-dictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation, i.e., an individual can manipulate a voting scheme if, by misrepresenting his preferences, he secures an outcome he prefers to the "honest" outcome.
Journal ArticleDOI
Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
TL;DR: In this paper, the strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, nonnegative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the problem of incentive compatibility for social choice rules in a general setting, where the characteristics of individual agents are not known by the planner a priori.
Journal ArticleDOI
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
TL;DR: The object here is to prove that the algorithm for assigning students to universities gives each student the best university available in a stable system of assignments.