The Foreign Office, Anglo-American relations and the Korean war, June 1950–June 1951

The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished

I w a s there ever a unified communist threat facing the United States during the Cold War? Or did U.S. decision-makers misperceive Soviet and communist bloc ”defensiveness” and ”caution” as expansionist threats? Did U.S. leaders, realizing that the Soviets and their ideological allies posed no security threat to the United States and its allies, create such claims for various domestic political reasons? Such questions have dominated analyses of the Cold War in the United States for the past thirty years. To the surprise of some and the consternation of others, the demise of the Cold War and the resulting flow of new evidence from the East in recent years has reinvigorated many of these arguments over its origins, the primary responsibility for its creation, and US. actions during that era. The Cold War is over, but the controversies surrounding it and its meaning for contemporary scholarship and policy are not.’ The argument over the origins of the Cold War is important not only for historical accuracy but also for the consequences it will have on theoretical questions and therefore on their implications for policy. Since international relations specialists both learn from historical examples and utilize them as illustration and evidence, historical accounts and their relative plausibility directly influence social science theories. As the late William T.R. Fox used to tell his students, good history will not necessarily lead to good theory, but poor

Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism

The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I will concentrate on the theoretical debate and will put forward hypotheses on the functioning of security institutions. This section updates the classical literature on collective security w ith contemporary contributions and original insights and it attempts to shed light on the limits of the current debate between paradigms on the question of international institutions. Chapter 2 will summarize the arguments of the main paradigms. The two main positions -the neorealist/pessimistic one and the liberal/optim istic onewill be analyzed and a new concept of the conditional utility of institutions in international relations will be proposed, attempting to overcome the "all or nothing" deadlock of the current debate. The other three chapters of Part I will concentrate on the central concept of the work. Chapter 3 will introduce the various definitions of collective security and their position within the w ider contest of the theory of international relations. In particular, i t w ill be argued that there are two different conceptions of collective security. A maximalist one defines the concept as a security system replacing all other mechanisms. A minimalist one sees collective security as an international regime which can operate alongside other mechanisms. Chapter 4 will analyze the limits and the shortcomings of the maximalist conception, which is both unrealistic and even counterproductive. Chapter 5 will look at the positive effects of collective security either as an instrum ent for dealing with specific contingencies or as a general framework for facilitating cooperation and improving international standards of behaviour. Part II applies the findings of the first section to the historical record and to three case studies: the Abyssinian crisis, the Korean W ar and the Gulf Conflict The cases were selected because they are the only uncontrovera^l instances in which collective security has been applied and because they are conveniently placed in three different international systems: the multipolar inter-war period, the bipolar Cold W ar and the post-Cold W ar period. Finally, in the conclusion, crucial issues for practitioners will be highlighted w ith special reference to the prospects for a more stable system in the future.

Collective security : theory and practice of an institution for peace in the XX century

When the United States faces loss or defeat in war, it is often loath to negotiate, make concessions to its adversary, and cut its losses. But the presence of allies and international organizations in the US coalition can help to correct this bias against compromise through a combination of simple bargaining, complex bargaining, and political cover. The costs of multilateralism can be considered a premium that is paid when operations are successful, so that the United States has an insurance policy to minimize loss in times of failure. The article contributes to a number of major debates over the costs and benefits of multilateralism and the impact of less powerful allies and international organizations on US foreign policy.

The Foreign Office, Anglo-American relations and the Korean war, June 1950–June 1951

Citations

The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished

Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism

Collective security : theory and practice of an institution for peace in the XX century

Multilateralism: America’s insurance policy against loss

‘Containing America’: Aspects of British foreign policy and the cold war in south‐east Asia, 1951–54