Journal ArticleDOI
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Kurt Mandelbaum
- Vol. 2, Iss: 2, pp 317-318
About:
The article was published on 1933-07-01. It has received 532 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Private property & Corporation.read more
Citations
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Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns:
Lex Donaldson,James H. Davis +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical test fails to support agency theory and provides some support for stewardship theory, which argues that shareholders interests require protection by separation of incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO.
Journal ArticleDOI
Understanding and mitigating uncertainty in online exchange relationships: a principal- agent perspective
TL;DR: This study draws upon and extends the principal-agent perspective to identify and propose a set of four antecedents of perceived uncertainty in online buyer seller relationship superceived information asymmetry, fears of seller opportunism, information privacy concerns, and information security concerns which facilitate online exchange relationships by overcoming the agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Posted Content
Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations
Roszaini Haniffa,T. E. Cooke +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the importance of various corporate governance and cultural (race and education) characteristics, in addition to firm-specific factors, as possible determinants of voluntary (non-mandatory accounting and non-accounting information) disclosures in Malaysian listed corporations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
TL;DR: The economic entrenchment of large corporations is studied in this article, where the authors posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entropy.
Journal ArticleDOI
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation, arguing that managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which pay is de-coupled from managers' performance.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns:
Lex Donaldson,James H. Davis +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical test fails to support agency theory and provides some support for stewardship theory, which argues that shareholders interests require protection by separation of incumbency of roles of board chair and CEO.
Journal ArticleDOI
Understanding and mitigating uncertainty in online exchange relationships: a principal- agent perspective
TL;DR: This study draws upon and extends the principal-agent perspective to identify and propose a set of four antecedents of perceived uncertainty in online buyer seller relationship superceived information asymmetry, fears of seller opportunism, information privacy concerns, and information security concerns which facilitate online exchange relationships by overcoming the agency problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Posted Content
Culture, Corporate Governance and Disclosure in Malaysian Corporations
Roszaini Haniffa,T. E. Cooke +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the importance of various corporate governance and cultural (race and education) characteristics, in addition to firm-specific factors, as possible determinants of voluntary (non-mandatory accounting and non-accounting information) disclosures in Malaysian listed corporations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment, and Growth
TL;DR: The economic entrenchment of large corporations is studied in this article, where the authors posit a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entropy.
Journal ArticleDOI
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation, arguing that managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which pay is de-coupled from managers' performance.