scispace - formally typeset
Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

The New York City High School Match

Atila Abdulkadiroglu, +2 more
- 01 May 2005 - 
- Vol. 95, Iss: 2, pp 364-367
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
In the first year, only about 3,000 students had to be assigned to a school for which they had not indicated a preference, which is only 10 percent of the number of such assignments the previous year as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract
We assisted the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) in designing a mechanism to match over 90,000 entering students to public high schools each year. This paper makes a very preliminary report on the design process and the first year of operation, in academic year 2003–2004, for students entering high school in fall 2004. In the first year, only about 3,000 students had to be assigned to a school for which they had not indicated a preference, which is only 10 percent of the number of such assignments the previous year. New York City has the largest public school system in the country, with over a million students. In 1969 the system was decentralized into over 30 community school districts. In the 1990s, the city began to take more centralized control (Mark Schneider et al., 2000), and in 2002, a newly reorganized NYCDOE began to reform many aspects of the school system. In May 2003, Jeremy Lack, then the NYCDOE Director of Strategic Planning, contacted one of us for advice on designing a new high-school matching process. The NYCDOE was aware of the matching process for American physicians, the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, 1984; Roth and E. Peranson, 1999). They wanted to know if it could be appropriately adapted to the city’s schools. The three authors of the present paper (and, at several crucial junctures, also Tayfun Sonmez) advised (and often convinced) Lack, his colleagues (particularly Elizabeth Sciabarra and Neil Dorosin), and the DOE’s software vendor, about the design of the match. I. The Prior (2002–2003) New York City Matching Procedure

read more

Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Journal ArticleDOI

Matching with Contracts

TL;DR: In this article, the authors developed a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Boston Public School Match

TL;DR: The Boston Public Schools (BPS) system for assigning students to schools is described in this paper, where the authors describe some of the difficulties with the current assignment mechanism and some elements of the design and evaluation of possible replacement mechanisms.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes

TL;DR: This paper proposed a combinatorial assignment mechanism based on an approximation to competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) in which incomes are unequal but arbitrarily close together, and the mechanism is approximately efficient, satisfies two new criteria of outcome fairness, and is strategyproof in large markets.
Posted Content

Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match

TL;DR: In this paper, the design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI

College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the relationship between college admission and the stability of marriage in the United States, and found that college admission is correlated with the number of stable marriages.
Book

Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis

TL;DR: The marriage model and the labor market for medical interns, a simple model of one seller and many buyers, and Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences are examined.
Journal ArticleDOI

School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach

TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate the school choice problem as a mechanism design problem and analyze some of the existing school choice plans including those in Boston, Columbus, Minneapolis, and Seattle, and offer two alternative mechanisms each of which may provide a practical solution to some critical school choice issues.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory

TL;DR: The organization of the labor market for medical interns and residents underwent a number of changes before taking its present form in 1951, and the record of these changes and the problems that prompt them can be found in this paper.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

TL;DR: In this article, the authors make the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design, and that some of the challenges facing both markets involve related kinds of complementarities.