Open AccessBook
The world in depression, 1929-1939
TLDR
In this paper, the authors present an explanation of the 1929 Depression Bibliography Index and present a table-based approach to the analysis of the stock market crash and the subsequent depression.Abstract:
List of Text Figures List of Tables Foreword Preface 1. Introduction 2. Recovery from the First World War 3. The Boom 4. The Agricultural Depression 5. The 1929 Stock-Market Crash 6. The Slide to the Abyss 7. 1931 8. More Deflation 9. The World Economic Conference 10. The Beginnings of Recovery 11. The Gold Bloc Yields 12. The 1937 Recession 13. Rearmament in a Disintegrating World Economy 14. An Explanation of the 1929 Depression Bibliography Indexread more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Comparing GATT and GATS: Regime creation under and after hegemony
TL;DR: In this paper, a comparison between the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), which came into force in 1995, and the GATT of 1947 is made, showing that the shift from a dominant power to a multipolar power structure has affected both the form and content of GATS, as compared to GATT.
Posted Content
Can Great Depression Theories Explain the Great Recession
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors compare the current financial crisis similar to the Great Depression by examining the theories that commonly explain the depression and discuss if they are applicable to the current crisis.
Dissertation
Régimes et changements structurels : essais d'économie historique
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an approach for the analysis of the evolution of economic systems in the context of the history of the Internet and the development of the digital economy in general.
Journal ArticleDOI
Monetary Policy and Expectations: Market-Control Techniques and the Bank of England, 1925–1931
TL;DR: The Bank of England depleted its open-market portfolio by secretly sterilizing large gold inflows, and interest rates were influenced by manipulating reported gold flows as mentioned in this paper, which supports Peter Temin's view of interwar central bankers as nonstabilizers and enforcers of a dysfunctional classical orthodoxy.