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It is interesting that the pending release of economic or market information plays little role in determining when to announce earnings.
It advances our understanding on the PF earnings reporting behaviour.
Our study documents a systematic timing pattern of annual report disclosures, which is useful for investors to predict future earnings, especially in anticipating bad news in China's emerging market where information about future earnings is very limited.
Firms with higher litigation risk tend to issue earnings forecasts earlier if they have bad news but not so when they have good news.
I show that there is a kink in the distribution of reported earnings located close to but to the left of the earnings forecast.
We also find that the future earnings response coefficient of earnings reported under Chinese GAAP continues to increase, indicating that the timeliness of recognition of earnings reported under Chinese GAAP worsened after a series of harmonization and convergence with IFRS in China.
This provides direct evidence that the 'kink' in the distribution of earnings arises from earnings management.
This study provides direct evidence relating discontinuities to earnings management by comparing the distribution of restated earnings to originally-reported earnings among firms that settle accounting-related securities litigation and restate earnings from the alleged GAAP violation period.
Our analyses of short-window abnormal returns and revisions in analyst' one-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts indicate that pro forma earnings are more informative and more permanent than GAAP operating earnings.
Results indicate revisions to preliminary announcements when filing the 10-K report would have been 35% lower during 2005 if the historical frequency of issuing earnings releases after the audit report date had not changed.
The results indicate that lower (higher) actual earnings relative to forecasted earnings are most likely to be released to the public later (earlier) than expected.
Using novel earnings calendar data, we show that firms’ advanced scheduling of earnings announcement dates foreshadows their earnings news.
We document a growing disparity in earnings disclosure mechanisms.
The results confirm the earnings management hypothesis.
Results indicate that investors discount evidence of earnings management at the disclosure date when supplementary information is disclosed.