Showing papers on "Coalition government published in 1982"

British War Policy and the Crisis of Liberalism in May 1915

Abstract: The last Liberal government of Britain was terminated by the prime minister, H H Asquith, who called for the resignation of his cabinet colleagues on May 17, 1915 without consulting them, and without resigning himself The king, who was incommunicado aboard the royal train somewhere in the north, was only informed of this extraordinary act as a fait accompli Asquith, known to intend to put the king "in a glass case," had commissioned himself to form a coalition government His colleagues were surprised and annoyed, and there was need of some dramatic explanation This Asquith duly provided in a confidential circular sent round, like the call for resignations, in a cabinet box Personal interviews or explanations were avoided The circular declared that the resignation of Lord Fisher from his position as First Sea Lord at the Admiralty and "the alleged deficiency of high explosive shells" would, "if duly exploited in the House of Commons at this moment, have had the most disastrous effect on the general political and strategic situation" and in particular might have determined Italy's attitude "adversely to the Allies"' This explanation did not convince the Liberal ministers, who attributed the sudden surrender to the idea of coalition as the result of a failure of nerve on Asquith's part in the face of a mounting wave of hostile criticism in the Unionist opposition's newspaper press Such a press campaign was undoubtedly under way prior to the two incidents which gave Asquith his pretext for coalition-the publication of Col C a Court Repington's "shells" dispatch in The Times of May 14 and Fisher's petulant walkout from the Admiralty on May 15 In fact there is evidence that a coalition was agreed on in principle between Asquith and the Unionist leader, Andrew Bonar Law, at a private conference on May 12, and certainly Bonar Law was advised by his party manager, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, to seek a coaliton for reasons elaborated in a memorandum of May 13 These reasons concerned war policy A coalition, Steel-Maitland urged, "could take some I Earl of Oxford and Asquith, Memories and Reflections (London, 1928), 2: 95-96 Also Charles Hobhouse, Inside Asquith's Cabinet, ed Edward David (London, 1977) pp 243-6

Thailand in 1981: The Prem Government Feels the Heat

Abstract: THAI POLITICS IN 1981 were dominated by the disintegration of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond's coalition government and the attempted coup d'etat by a group of young officers commonly known as the "Young Turks." The Prem government survived these body blows, but ended the year in a weakened condition. Moreover, the events of 1981 suggested that Thailand had not developed the political maturity and stability that some observers had hoped for following the installation of a quasi-democratic system of government in 1977. The political parties appeared to put personal and political rivalries ahead of cooperation in dealing with economic and social issues. The army showed that it is unlikely to allow a further civilianization of the government, especially a greater role for the politicians. The army also demonstrated that it remains politicized, factionalized, and is of doubtful value as a military force. The immediate question seems to be whether the Prem government can maintain control until parliamentary elections in 1983 and thus preserve the existing constitutional structure.

General prem survives on a conservative line

Abstract: THOSE WHO HAVE CLOSELY OBSERVED the way Thailand's Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond and some of his cabinet ministers conducted the affairs of state in the past two years agree that his first government faced real administrative and economic problems. The year 1981 was a turbulent year for General Prem, including a cabinet reshuffle, an abortive coup, rifts within the army, and the threat of a noconfidence debate from the Parliamentary opposition. Critics branded Prem as weak and indecisive. He was forced to make cabinet changes twice, one at the beginning and again at the end of the year, resulting in what are called the Prem II and Prem III governments. Nevertheless, Prem survived the year, and his personal integrity, his ability to compromise interests among rival military factions and among political parties in his coalition government, and his fatherly style of leadership contributed to his success. His loyalty to the monarchy was beyond doubt, and all his virtues, rare among government leaders, earned him reciprocal strong support from the Palace. The ability of the Prem government to overcome both political and economic crises resulted from his adopting a conservative line that was acceptable to Thai society. The Prem government has been less subject to criticism on foreign policy than on domestic policy. Prem exerted enormous efforts to encourage the formation of a coalition government among the three major Khmer political factions opposed to Vietnamese military occupation of Kampuchea. His policy on Kampuchea has been consistent since he came to power-to maintain a close link with China and to pursue increasing support from its ASEAN allies and the United States.

The Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea: A Personal View

Abstract: This discussion paper does not attempt to describe and analyse the events leading up to the formation of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.1 Instead, it offers a summary of the ideas in an earlier study on the Cambodian non-communist opposition,2 followed by some tentative, initial observations on their relevance nine months later, in the light of the emergence of a coalition of the Khmer Rouge, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and Sihanouk's Moulinaka (Mouvement de Liberation nationale du Kampuchea). A year ago the principal obstacle to a coalition was the unwilling ness of the People's Republic of China, which was brought into the open at the New York Conference on Cambodia, to agree to the dis armament of the Khmer Rouge at the point of putative, future Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, or alternatively to help build up the armed strength of the non-communist factions to the point where they would be equal to the task of their self-defence against the Khmer Rouge if and when the Vietnamese were expelled. Not only were Son Sann and Sihanouk fearful of the consequences of a coali tion with the Khmer Rouge on terms of military inequality, but the two anti-communist factions each tried to shift the responsibility, and ignominy, of taking the lead onto the other, thereby reviving and exa cerbating animosities of very long standing.3 But Western policy, for its part, seemed generally predicated on an assumption that the non-communists could never achieve military parity with the Khmer Rouge, even with massive aid, which would be * 'money down the drain''. Or was this position partly a rationalization of a desire not to get too closely involved in the Cambodian imbroglio, and of a tendency to defer to Chinese priorities? It did seem as if the survival and stamina of the Khmer Rouge ? however much due to international relief, Thai sanctuary and foreign arms supply ?