Showing papers on "Corporate governance published in 1981"
Book•
01 Mar 1981TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review the book "Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy," vol. 3, by Lee E. Preston, and present a review of the book's content.
Abstract: The article reviews the book "Research in Corporate Social Performance and Policy," vol. 3, by Lee E. Preston.
525 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the relative utility of a power theory versus a functional theory of organizational stratification as they pertain to managerial compensation in the large corporation was investigated, and the results confirmed the hypothesis that the remuneration received by a chief executive officer is directly related to his power within the corporation.
Abstract: The research presented here investigates the relative utility of a power theory versus a functional theory of organizational stratification as they pertain to managerial compensation in the large corporation. Concretely, it examines the effects of different types and levels of corporate control, adjusted for the effects of corporate size and performance, on three dimensions of compensation among 218 industrial corporations during 1975 and 1976. In order to assess the power of the chief executive officer in relation to other directors, the analysis employs a hierarchy of control configurations based on the distribution of stock ownerwhip among the members of the board of directors. In general, the results confirm the hypothesis that the remuneration received by a chief executive officer is directly related to his power within the corporation. A major exception to this pattern involves chief executive officers who are also principal stockholders in their corporations and receive dividend income from their s...
118 citations
TL;DR: The authors reviewed the book "Corporate Planning: An Executive Viewpoint, by Peter Lorange" and found that it is a good book to read for all types of planning problems.
Abstract: The article reviews the book “Corporate Planning: An Executive Viewpoint,” by Peter Lorange.
66 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the status of student participation in university governance has been investigated and it was found that students have a much greater voice in academic matters than they did a decade ago.
Abstract: This paper focuses on the status of student participation in university governance. Analyses utilize data from two separate questionnaires sent to all department heads and committe chairs in a large multi-campus system. Findings indicate that students now have a much greater voice in academic matters than they did a decade ago. Students are actively involved and are generally regarded as effective contributors at the department level as well as the college and administrative levels, but less so at the academic senate level. A major implication for effective student participation in governance revolves around its educational potential. Future improvement of student particpation depends on developing new organizational structures that build trust and promote a sense of common enterprise.
64 citations
TL;DR: The authors describes a framework for corporate political planning, and a view of the public policy process in light of advances in the "economics of politics" in the context of corporate political activity.
Abstract: Corporate political activity is on the upswing, and today's manager is often challenged to understand the public policy process, anticipate possible consequences of coming issues, and implement effective corporate political planning. The author describes a framework for corporate political planning, and a view of the public policy process in light of advances in the "economics of politics."
53 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the structural relationship between corporate crime and American corporate capitalism is considered, and it is argued that the real economic impact and the control over information and financial resources which characterizes large corporations grant to them an economic and political power that is great relative to that generally possessed by the victims of corporate crime.
Abstract: This article considers the structural relationships between corporate crime and American corporate capitalism. Large corporations are assumed to pursue profit, growth, and market share expansion subject to constraints imposed by markets and the state. State or legal regulation of corporate behavior is in turn assumed to be constrained by the need to promote capital accumulation and to satisfy diverse economic interests. Discussion of product safety, environmental, antitrust, and antilabor violations allows some insight into the manner of resolution of these conflicts among corporate and state goals as well as some insight into the distribution of the associated private and social costs and benefits. It is argued that the real economic impact and the control over information and financial resources which characterizes large corporations grant to them an economic and political power that is great relative to that generally possessed by the victims of corporate crime. This historical imbalance of power is se...
51 citations
TL;DR: The paper reports the major descriptive results of a study of corporate planning in 48 U.K. companies in the mid-1970s, finding that corporate planners had widened the scope of their plans since the late 1960s, made fairly extensive use of written documents and procedures, and often used a high number of sophisticated techniques for forecasting and evaluation.
Abstract: The paper reports the major descriptive results of a study of corporate planning in 48 U.K. companies in the mid-1970s. Introduction of corporate planning clearly quickened in the 1970s. The number of specialist corporate planners tended to be small and was correlated with company size. Responsibilities of planners varied between operating companies, divisions, and the corporate parent company. Corporate planners had widened the scope of their plans since the late 1960s, made fairly extensive use of written documents and procedures, and often used a high number of sophisticated techniques for forecasting and evaluation, but their use of documents and techniques was far from uncritical. The extent of planning varied between types of companies.
31 citations
TL;DR: The results of a study designed to investigate corporate planning practice in medium-sized companies in the U.K. as discussed by the authors showed that while corporate planning is widespread among medium sized companies, it is not the well-balanced and integrated system envisaged in the literature.
27 citations
TL;DR: A case study of a corporate relationship between a financial firm and a non-financial firm supports the idea of levels of control and power (Pahl and Winkler, 1974), and the notion of power as a relationship and a process.
Abstract: Extensive research and theoretical analyses have been done in an effort to identify the location and source of corporate power. This case study of a corporate relationship between a financial firm and a nonfinancial firm supports the idea of levels of control and power (Pahl and Winkler, 1974), and the notion of power as a relationship and a process (Zeitlin, 1976). Control of capital flows is a fundamental source of corporate power, more important than the ability to vote on the basis of stock ownership, managerial discretion, and corporate board interlocks. Previous research on power relationships, ownership, and control of modern corporations suggests five models of analysis: 1) The managerial model of corporate control argues that wide-spread stock dispersal allows managers to effectively control a corporation by owning or controlling as little as five percent of that firm's stock (Berle and Means, 1967; Burch, 1972; Larner, 1970). It presumes managers and owners have different interests, producing significant differences in the behavior of the firm: firms controlled by managers are expected to seek only moderate profits; those controlled by owners seek maximum profits (Bell, 1973; Berle and Means, 1967; Burnham, 1941; Dahrendorf, 1957; Galbraith, 1967; Gordon, 1945; Kaysen, 1957). Isolating the modern corporation from all other corporations, the managerialist model examines the internal structure of corporations and the role of management, boards of directors, and stock ownership as bases of power. It presumes that the voting rights attached to stocks is a crucial locus of power. Berle and Means (1967) saw the board as the locus of power; later studies thought corporate control was passing to the managers (particularly as Burnham's definition of 'manager' came to mean technocrats and bureaucrats rather than directors and chief executive officers). This suggests outside members on the board (including those representing financial corporations) were little more than figureheads. Inequality and conflict among corporations are not addressed by the managerialist model, which examines only the internal structure of the corporation and assumes that control of the firm is internally generated. 2) The inter-organizational model assumes that corporate power is derived from the right to vote on the basis of stock ownership (Allen, 1974; Herman, 1973; Levine and White, 1960; Litwak and Hylton, 1962; Scott, 1978; Simon, 1957; Thompson, 1967; Thompson and McEwen, 1958). Board members are "symbols to be held accountable" to stockholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:18). As such, they may be fired as scapegoats and replaced by stockholders unhappy with the corporation's performance. However, inter-organizational theorists do not accept the managerialists' restricted focus on the internal structure of the firm. They examine the interrelationships between corporations, both financial (banks and insurance firms) and nonfinancial (industrials, retailers, transportation firms, etc.). They assume equality of power of all participants in a given relationship and the separation of ownership and control. They argue that managers try to achieve only moderate profits because of uncertainties in the environment and within the organization. That is, managers are constrained more than owners because the board and stockholders can hold them accountable. 3) The resource dependence model is a version of the inter-organizational model; it assumes
TL;DR: There appears to be little evidence of a direct pay-for-performance relationship between top executives' compensation and corporate performance as discussed by the authors, which suggests that there is no direct relationship between pay and performance.
Abstract: There appears to be little evidence of a direct pay-for-performance relationship between top executives' compensation and corporate performance.
TL;DR: Cabinet officers and other political executives in the United States are chosen from a pool of potential candidates from various sectors of society: business, the professions, and government, as well as others as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Cabinet officers and other political executives in the United States are chosen from a pool of potential candidates from various sectors of society: business, the professions, and government, as well as others. At the cabinet level those selected are clearly the president's choice but other political executives may be the product of cabinet officer and White House recruitment efforts. There are distinct patterns of recruitment from department to department with differing emphases on economic sectors, geography, and prior political experience. The process and the pool of candidates are distinctive during the middle of an administration, with greater emphasis on persons already in government. This selection system reflects basic American values, political experience, and institutional capabilities. The system has significant implications, both for governance and for the legitimacy of government.
Posted Content•
TL;DR: In this paper, an attempt is made to develop such a framework using existing corporate finance theory and some extensions thereof, which is then used to interpret available data on aggregate corporate financing patterns over the course of the twentieth century.
Abstract: Trends in the financing of the corporate sector have been widely discussed in both business and academic circles. It is frequently argued, for example, that corporations' use of debt financing has increased dramatically in recent years. These discussions have been hampered, however, by the lack of a unified theoretical framework. In this paper, an attempt is made to develop such a framework using existing corporate finance theory and some extensions thereof. This theory is then used to interpret available data on aggregate corporate financing patterns over the course of the twentieth century. It is found that corporations' use of debt has undeniably increased in the post-World War II period. Nevertheless, the relative corporate debt level was unusually low in the 1940's and current debt levels are not unprecedented when viewed in the context of the entire century. The tax system, in conjunction with inflation, has probably played an important role in the postwar increases in corporate debt, but these factors appear insufficient to explain longer-term trends. It is argued, then, that supplies of competing securities, such as federal government bonds, as well as the secular development of the financial intermediary system, may also be important determinants of long-run corporate financing patterns.
01 Jan 1981
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The composition of and roles played by boards of directors will change dramatically in the 1980s as discussed by the authors, and thirty major issues that will shape tomorrow's board will be identified and a creative strategy to cope with the challenges ahead.
Abstract: The composition of and roles played by boards of directors will change dramatically in the 1980s. Here are thirty major issues that will shape tomorrow's board … and a creative strategy to cope with the challenges ahead.
TL;DR: Most administrators approach program reduction as a budget issue; in reality, it is a governance and planning issue of major importance for the 1980s as mentioned in this paper, and it was a major concern for many administrators.
Abstract: Most administrators approach program reduction as a budget issue; in reality, it is a governance and planning issue of major importance for the 1980s.
TL;DR: The article reviews theory undergirding citizen participation in governance and presents several models of governance, finding that most centers did not meet the participant requirements of Public Law 94-63 for broad representation of the catchment area in governance or the functional requirements for decision-making.
Abstract: The article reviews theory undergirding citizen participation in governance and presents several models of governance. A mail survey of 220 community mental health centers revealed that most centers did not meet the participant requirements of Public Law 94-63 for broad representation of the catchment area in governance or the functional requirements for decision-making, nor did boards incorporate other typical approaches to participation. This breakdown in implementation of the law can be interpreted as a twofold problem of organizational adaptation and power redistribution. Policy solutions would need to take both these causes into account. Incremental strategies alone are unlikely to create sufficient impact. Organizational development focused on building new models of governance and direct efforts to mobilize and empower citizens are suggested.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms and showed that such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk.
Abstract: This paper studies the efficient agreements about the dependence of workers' earnings on employment, when the employment level is controlled by firms The firms ' superior information about profitability conditions is responsible for this form of contract governance Under plausible assumptions, such agreements will cause employment to diverge from efficiency as a byproduct of their attempt to mitigate risk It is shown that, if leisure is a normal good and firms are risk neutral, employment is always above the efficient level Such a one-period implicit contracting model cannot, therefore, be used to "explain" unemployment as a rational byproduct of risk sharing between workers and a risk neutral firm under conditions of asymmetric information
TL;DR: The notion of constituent representation plans was introduced by Winter as discussed by the authors as a way to regulate the structure and behavior of corporate management so as to alter the relation of firms to society, and has been applied to the medical care industry.
Abstract: THE belief that the behavior of corporations might be predictably and efficiently regulated by government intervention in the mechanism of corporate governance and control can be traced back at least to 1914, in the Clayton Act's proscription of interlocking directorates among competitors. In more recent times, this idea has been resurrected as part of the movement toward federal chartering of corporations, in that centralized chartering could be made contingent on, among other things, a "proper" balance of affected groups among the corporation's directors. As Ralph Winter describes it, these are "constituent representation plans, which would place representatives of labor, ultimate consumers, commercial consumers, suppliers, and the 'public' on boards of directors," and whose purpose is "to regulate the structure and behavior of corporate management so as to alter the relation of firms to society." 1 In connection with the prominent position that health-care costs and financing occupy on the current agenda of political attention, an application of this novel regulatory concept has been crafted for the medical care industry. The application concerns the role of health insurers in affecting, through their reimbursement practices, the level of payment received by health-care providers.2 More specifically, it concerns the effects of
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Taxation and Corporate Finance and Investment: Taxation and corporate finance and investment as mentioned in this paper, Vol. 12, No. 45, pp. 41-54, 1981; Taxation, Corporate Finance, and Investment.
Abstract: (1981). Taxation and Corporate Finance and Investment. Accounting and Business Research: Vol. 12, No. 45, pp. 41-54.