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Showing papers on "Diplomacy published in 1997"


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: The Psychology of International Conflicts Observed at Close Range is discussed in this article, where anwar el-Sadat goes to Jerusalem and describes the psychology of international conflicts observed at close range.
Abstract: * Deadly Distinctions: The Rise of Ethnic Violence * Ethnic Tents: Descriptions of Large-Group Identities * Anwar el-Sadat Goes to Jerusalem: The Psychology of International Conflicts Observed at Close Range * Chosen Trauma: Unresolved Mourning * Ancient Fuel for a Modern Inferno: Time Collapse in Bosnia-Herzegovina * We-ness: Identifications and Shared Reservoirs * Enemy Images: Minor Differences and Dehumanization * Two Rocks in the Aegean Sea: Turks and Greeks in Conflict * Unwanted Corpses in Latvia: An Attempt at Purification * A Palestinian Orphanage: Rallying Around a Leader * Ethnic Terrorism and Terrorists: Belonging by Violence * From Victim to Victimizer: The Leader of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) * Totem and Taboo in Romania: The Internalization of a Dead Leader and Restabilization of an Ethnic Tent * Experiment in Estonia: Unofficial Diplomacy at Work * Afterword: Psychoanalysis and Diplomacy

523 citations


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: The Road to Breakdown from Declaration to Recognition: The EC and Yugoslavia June-Dec. 1991 Peacemaking, Peacekeeping The EC as discussed by the authors and UN, Jan-July 1992 UNPROFC Aug. 92-Jan 94 The Major Players The Failure of Military Intervention and Political will
Abstract: The Road to Breakdown From Declaration to Recognition: The EC and Yugoslavia June-Dec. 1991 Peacemaking, Peacekeeping The EC and UN, Jan-July 1992 UNPROFC Aug. 92-Dec. 93 Joined Forces: London and Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Aug. 92-Jan 94 The Major Players The Failure of Military Intervention and Political Will.

213 citations


Book
08 Dec 1997
TL;DR: In this paper, an inside look at how the crisis originated, escalated and was diffused is presented, drawing upon in-depth interviews with policy-makers from the countries involved, revealing the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission and the diplomatic deal of October 1994.
Abstract: In June 1994, the USA went to the brink of war with North Korea. Withj economic sanctions impending, President Clinton approved the dispatch of substantial reinforcements to Korea and plans were made for attacking the North's nuclear weapons complex. The turning point came in an extraordinary private diplomatic initiative by former President Carter and others to reverse the dangerous American course and open the way to a diplomatic settlement of the nuclear crisis. Few Americans know the full details or realize the devastating impact such an event could have had on the US's post-Cold War foreign policy. This book offers an inside look at how the crisis originated, escalated and was diffused. It begins by exploring a web of intelligence failures by the US and intransigence within South Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency, paying particular attention throughout to an American mindset that prefers coercion to co-operation in dealing with aggressive nations. Drawing upon in-depth interviews with policy-makers from the countries involved, the author discloses the details of the buildup to confrontation, American refusal to engage in diplomatic give-and-take, the Carter mission and the diplomatic deal of October 1994.

155 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, Bill Clinton tried to elucidate his foreign policy agenda by offering up the concept of "democratic enlargement" while campaigning in 1992, Clinton had outlined what was to become President Harry Truman's strategy of "containment" as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: ver since Foreign Affairs published George Kennan's seminal article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which outlined what was to become President Harry Truman's strategy of "containment," succeeding administrations have sought to coin a phrase that encapsulates their foreign and defense policies. From the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look" to Bush-Baker's multinational "new world order," foreign policy monikers have been concocted for the purpose of convincing both America's overseas allies and its domestic electorate that the current administration, far from being caught in the shifting tides of ad hoc diplomacy, had a long-range grand plan. Thus it came as no surprise when on September 27, 1993, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bill Clinton tried to elucidate his foreign policy agenda by offering up the concept of "democratic enlargement." While campaigning in 1992, Clinton had outlined what he con-

130 citations


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: Cooper and Higgott as mentioned in this paper discuss issues, institutions, and Middle-Power Diplomacy: Action and Agendas in the Post-Cold War Era, and present a conceptual overview of the Niche Diplomacy.
Abstract: Acknowledgements - List of Contributors - Niche Diplomacy: A Conceptual Overview Andrew Cooper - Issues, Institutions and Middle-Power Diplomacy: Action and Agendas in the Post-Cold War Era Richard Higgott - Middle Powers as Managers: International Mediation Within, Across and Outside Institutions Alan K. Henrikson - Canada as a Middle Power: The Case of Peacekeeping Geoffrey Hayes - Between Realism and 'Crusader Diplomacy': The Norweigan Channel to Jericho Oyvind Osterund - Addressing Apartheid: Lessons from Australian, Canadian and Swedish Policies in Southern Africa David R. Black - Finding Your Niche: Australia and the Trials of Middle-Powerdom Brian Hocking - Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power? Kim Richard Nossal and Richard Stubbs - Middle Powers and Regionalism in the Americas: The Cases of Argentina and Mexico Louis Belanger and Gordon Mace - Turkey: A Middle Power in the New Order Meltem MYftYler and MYberra YYksel - South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs Peter Vale - Index

121 citations


Book
25 Feb 1997
TL;DR: Ehteshami and Hinnebusch as discussed by the authors showed that Syria and Iran's foreign policies are conventional ones, of "realist" diplomacy with their pursuance of a balance of power and spheres of influence, and their alliance with each other is also closely examined and found to be defensive in nature.
Abstract: It has been the dominant view that both Syria in the 1980s and Iran today have acted as rogue states in the Middle East threatening to upset the stability of the region. In this innovative new study, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch show that these two countries have in fact acted in a rational fashion pursuing the aim of containing Western influence. This book demonstrates how Syrian foreign policy resembles the "rational actor" model and Iran's rational factions in government guide its diplomacy. Syria and Iran's foreign policies are shown to be conventional ones, of "realist" diplomacy with their pursuance of a balance of power and spheres of influence. Their alliance with each other is also closely examined and found to be defensive in nature. Syria and Iran illustrates how these two countries, and their alliance, forms an integral part of the balance of power in the Middle East. It is an exciting contribution to the study of the region, and its application of international relations concepts will be welcomed by those studying this area.

101 citations


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: The War of the Black Heavens as mentioned in this paper describes an unheralded story of success and adds a new interpretation that helps us understand some of the most momentous political events of this century.
Abstract: International diplomacy and a changing global economy did not bring about the fall of the Iron Curtain. Radio did, and it was mightier than the sword. Based on first-hand interviews and documents from the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Michael Nelson shows that Western radio -- principally, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Voice of America -- were unrivaled forces in the fight against communism and the fall of the Iron Curtain. It was a propaganda war in which the Communists had few radio listeners in the West. They did everything in their power to prevent the infiltration of Western thought into their world, resorting to jamming radio signals, assassinating staff, and bombing stations. The Russians decided to stop the mass production of short-wave radios so that their citizens could not hear Western broadcasts. War of the Black Heavens reveals that, due to administrative incompetence, short-wave radio production continued, making worthless many of the billions of dollars spent on jamming. These radio programs introduced a forbidden, exciting culture to millions of eager listeners. Pop music, talk shows, news, and information about consumer goods all relayed a message of the good life, subtly undermining the values of the communist regimes. Western radio presented the concept of a civil society that upheld basic human values; it actively connected listeners with the cultures of Europe and North America War of the Black Heavens describes an unheralded story of success and adds a new interpretation that helps us understand some of the most momentous political events of this century.

97 citations


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: This paper argued that it was trade, diplomacy and financial speculation that defined the development of early maps and globes, rather than disinterested intellectual pursuit of scientific accuracy and objectivity. But they did not consider the role of the map in the early modern world.
Abstract: Offering an account of the status of maps and geographical knowledge in the Early Modern world, this work focuses on how early European geographers mapped the territories of the Old World (Africa and South-East Asia). It contends that the historical preoccupation with Columbus's "discovery" of the New World in 1492 has tended to obscure the importance of the mapping of territories which have been defined as "eastern". The author places the rise of Early Modern mapping within the context of the seaborne commercial adventures of the early maritime empires - the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Ottoman, the Dutch and the English. He explores the ways in which maps and globes were used to mediate in the commercial and diplomatic disputes between these empires, which came to value the map for what it told their power-brokers about their place in the world, over and above its objective depiction of the world. Brotton argues that it was trade, diplomacy and financial speculation which defined the development of early maps and globes, rather than disinterested intellectual pursuit of scientific accuracy and objectivity.

94 citations


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that structural leadership by great powers is no longer the most important source of initiative in the international order of the 1990s, and the introduction of a wider lens is deemed crucial if the processes of reform and change, especially those requiring considerable cooperation and collaboration, in a variety of issue areas on the international agenda for the 1990's are to be fully understood.
Abstract: Amidst the major transformation of the global system after the Cold War, the study of international relations has maintained a predominantly top-down orientation. This apex-centred focus comes out most clearly in the important debates concerning the demise of the Soviet Union and the hegemonic role of the United States of America (USA).1 The same perspective is also evident in the preoccupation in the international relations literature with specific aspects of the post-Cold War settlement, namely German reunification, USA-Japanese and USA-European economic and strategic relations, as well as the questions of leadership in the evolution of regionalism in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.2 Given the marked capacity of the major powers to affect events and structure, this mode of analysis rests on a solid foundation. The rationale of this book, however, is that there is a need to stretch the parameters of scholarly attention away from the restrictive confines of this dominant approach. At the core of this argument is the salience of looking at alternative sources of agency in order to more fully capture the evolving complexity in global affairs. While not suggesting that structural leadership by great powers is no longer the most important source of initiative in the international order of the 1990s, the introduction of a wider lens is deemed crucial if the processes of reform and change — especially those requiring considerable cooperation and collaboration — in a variety of issue areas on the international agenda for the 1990s are to be fully understood. Such a role may be performed by appropriately qualified secondary powers in an appreciably different way than in the past. While readily acknowledging that the term ‘middle powers’ is problematic both in terms of conceptual clarity and operational coherence, this category of countries does appear to have some accentuated space for diplomatic manoeuvre on a segmented basis in the post-Cold War era.

84 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the meaning of legacy in the Ottoman case, the Ottoman administrative legacy and its legacy in modern Middle East and the Ottoman Administrative Legacy and its Modern Middle East, by Carter Vaughn Findley and Roderic H. Davison.
Abstract: 1. The Background: An Introduction, by L. Carl Brown Part 1: Perceptions and Parallels 2. The Meaning of Legacy: The Ottoman Case, by Halil Inalcik 3. The Problem of Perceptions, by Norman Itzkowitz Part 2: The Arab World and the Balkans 4. The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans, by Maria Todorova 5. Yougoslavia's Disintegration and the Ottoman Past, by Dennison Rusinow 6. Memory, Heritage, and History: The Ottomans and the Arabs, by Karl K. Barbir 7. The Ottoman Legacy in Arab Political Boundaries, by Andre Raymond Part 3: The Political Dimension 8. The Ottoman Legacy and the Middle East State Tradition, by Ergun Ozbudun 9. The Ottoman Administrative Legacy and the Modern Middle East, by Carter Vaughn Findley 10. Ottoman Diplomacy and its Legacy, by Roderic H. Davison Part 4: The Imperial Language 11. The Ottoman Legacy to Contemporary Political Arabic, by Bernard Lewis 12. The Ottoman Legacy in Language, by Geoffrey Lewis Part 5: Europe, Economics and War 13. The Economic Legacy, by Charles Issaw 14. The Military Legacy, by Dankwart A. Rustow Part 6: Religion and Culture 15. Islam and the Ottoman Legacy in the Modern Middle East, by William Ochsenwald 16. The Ottoman Educational Legacy: Myth or Reality?, by Joseph Szyliowicz 17 Epilogue, by L. Carl Brown

80 citations


Book
01 Jul 1997
TL;DR: The significance of the 1996 crisis in Taiwan's domestic politics is discussed in this article, where the authors assess the gains and costs of Beijing's coercive exercises and conclude that China's leaders were surprised by U.S. intervention.
Abstract: Acknowledgments Abbreviations 1) The Significance of the 1996 Crisis 2) Taiwan's 'Drifting Away' 3) Taiwan's 'Pragmatic Diplomacy' 4) Beijing's Objections to U.S. Policy 5) The Taiwan Issue in Chinese Domestic Politics 6) The U.S. Visa Decision and Beijing's Reaction 7) Beijing's Probing of U.S. Intentions 8) The December Legislative Yuan Elections 9) The Confrontation 10) Were China's Leaders Surprised by U.S. Intervention? 11) PRC Strategy 12) Nuclear Coercion with Chinese Characteristics 13) The International Effect of the Crisis 14) Appraising the Gains and Costs of Beijing's Coercive Exercises 15) Conclusions Notes Bibliography Index

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The authors explore the limits to marketisation and the prospects for "diplomacy in governance" in British government and explore the differentiated polity in a "centreless society" referred to here as "differentiated polity".
Abstract: * to explore the limits to marketisation and the prospects for 'diplomacy in governance'. British government changes. The tradition of the strong executive encapsulated in the 'Westminster model' founders on the complex maze of institutions that deliver services. Interdependence confounds centralisation. More control is exerted, but over less. Services continue to be delivered, but by networks of organisations which resist central direction. There are plenty of governments which Government can only imperfectly steer. We live in a 'centreless society' (Luhmann 1982: xv and 253-5), referred to here as 'the differentiated polity'.

BookDOI
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: Schreurs and Economy as mentioned in this paper discussed the domestic and international linkages in environmental politics and the domestic institutions and international environmental agendas in Japan and Germany, as well as the reciprocal relationship between the state and the international regime.
Abstract: 1. Domestic and international linkages in environmental politics Miranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth C. Economy 2. Chinese policy-making and global climate change: two-front diplomacy and the international community Elizabeth Economy 3. The domestic politics of global biodiversity protection in the United Kingdom and the United States Kal Raustiala 4. Domestic and international linkages in global environmental politics: a case study of the Montreal Protocol Joanne M. Kauffman 5. The internationalization of environmental protection in the USSR and its successor states Robert G. Darst 6. Domestic institutions and international environmental agendas in Japan and Germany Miranda A. Schreurs 7. Zimbabwe and CITES: illustrating the reciprocal relationship between the state and the international regime Phyllis Mofson 8. The European Union: bridging domestic and international environmental policy making Angela Liberatore.

Book
10 Nov 1997
TL;DR: The CCP and the Cold War in Asia: Mao's "intermediate zone" theory and the anti-American United Front, 1946-1947145Ch. VIIIMao's Revolutionary Diplomacy and the cold war in Asia, 1948-1949161 Conclusion187Notes197Select Bibliography229Index245
Abstract: AcknowledgmentsIntroduction3Ch. IThe Roots of Mao's Pro-Soviet Policy before 193715Ch. IICCP-Moscow Relations during the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-194531Ch. IIIFrom Enemies to Friends: CCP Policy toward the United States before Pearl Harbor57Ch. IVCourting the Americans: The CCP's United Front Policy toward the U.S., 1942-194574Ch. VPostwar Alignment: CCP-Moscow versus GMD-Washington in Manchuria, August-December 194598Ch. VIMao Deals with George Marshall, November 1945-December 1946119Ch. VIIThe CCP and the Cold War in Asia: Mao's "Intermediate-Zone" Theory and the Anti-American United Front, 1946-1947145Ch. VIIIMao's Revolutionary Diplomacy and the Cold War in Asia, 1948-1949161Conclusion187Notes197Select Bibliography229Index245


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the post-cold war period, two trends are evident: increasing institutionalized multilateralism aimed at a stronger international order, either by improving co-operation between states or transcending the need for it; and the tendency to see diplomats in terms of the skills they possess and the jobs they do, rather than whom they represent as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: What or who does the post-cold war diplomat represent? Two trends are evident: increasing institutionalized multilateralism aimed at a stronger international order, either by improving co-operation between states or transcending the need for it; and the tendency to see diplomats in terms of the skills they possess and the jobs they do, rather than whom they represent. Because both developments seem to move diplomats further away from the sovereign state, their traditional source of authority and raison d'etre, a number of writers have raised the possibility that diplomacy's identity as a discrete practice may be subsumed under broader notions of conflict resolution and bargaing.(f.1)This neither is nor ought to be the case. Diplomats and the diplomatic system continue to derive their authority from the claim that they represent sovereign states in their relations with one another and not from some wider notion of international community, of which states are but one expression. Failures of diplomacy in places as different as Maastricht, Mostar, and Mogadishu involved over-ambitious attempts at international management for which no consensus existed in the great powers expected to supply the resources. Either this consensus has to be strengthened, a labour of Sisyphus given recent disappointments, or the ambitions of those who wish to manage the international system have to be scaled back. Otherwise we face more muddle, a further weakening of the trail consensus for maintaining overseas commitments, and even, although this remains a remote prospect as yet, a falling out among the great powers.The paradox of our times is that in international politics, as in domestic politics, there is a high expectation that governments can and should solve problems and a widespread reluctance to pay the price. The result is a dangerous cycle in which governments embark on difficult international projects with inadequate resources because a major mobilization of them cannot be justified. To ease the resource problem, governments collaborate with other governments, adding a host of complications and dangers to already difficult tasks. Failure further weakens the potential for future consensus and co-operation, but the expectations that someone ought to do something are not reduced.To explain this disjuncture between champagne tastes and beer budgets, we must look in part to the need for political leaders to sound optimistic above all else if they are to be elected. They, however, are swift to retreat to mere appearances as soon as their electorates chafe at the costs of an ill-founded international policy. A few dead rangers, disgraced paratroopers, or negative percentage points on the stock market will quickly pull them back. Not so the policy experts. One of the most striking features of the present wave of internationalist ambition is the extent to which it is embraced by the experts who advocate the policies of international order-building and by the professional diplomats whose task it is to carry them out. While diplomats are not immune to the temper of the times, they contribute to the present state of affairs because they have temporarily lost sight of what they represent - sovereign states and the people who live within them as independent political communities existing as ends in themselves. This is a sweeping claim which I hope to substantiate in this article.THE IDEA OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONThe idea of diplomatic representation has had problems throughout the life of the modern diplomatic system. If Michel Foucault was right, medieval thought accepted the idea of direct correspondence, one-for-one, far more readily than we do today.(f.2) The medieval ambassador represented his sovereign in the sense that he was him or embodied him (literally in some readings) when he presented himself at court. Since then, however, representation has come to involve at least three elements: the sovereign; the ambassador as a person; and the ambassador in his representative capacity as the 'sovereign. …

Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: Geremek and Davis as mentioned in this paper discuss the United States' role in the 1989 Warsaw Roundtable Agreement and highlight five ways in which United States lent indispensable assistance during this critical period.
Abstract: Even with the passage of a decade, the events of 1989 have lost none of their capacity to astonish. At the beginning of that portentous year, communist regimes were in power throughout the region. By year's end, all were gone, swept away by revolutionary developments scarcely imaginable a few years before. United States policy clearly did not cause those developments they grew out of very deep historic roots but our efforts did play a role, sometimes a decisive one. Let me begin by recalling a conversation with Bronislaw Geremek, currently Poland's Foreign Minister but then an advisor to Lech Walesa, in May 1989 at Ambassador John Davis' residence. Our previous meeting, a year before, and also in the ambassador's residence, had been at the time of the so-called "anti-crisis pact" between Solidarity and the communist government. In May 1989, these difficult negotiations had produced the historic Roundtable Agreement. I was in Warsaw to prepare the impending visit of President Bush and to see how the United States might support Poland's hopeful steps toward democratizing reform. Let me highlight five ways in which the United States lent indispensable assistance during this critical period. First, we threw US support fully behind Poland and Hungary in early 1989, when those countries were on the threshold of revolutionary change. We elevated East Central Europe to first place on the international agenda and held United States-Soviet relations hostage to Soviet acceptance of self-determination in this region. This stance may look obvious now, but it was not at all obvious in early 1989. There were three choices for United States policy: wait and see, support Gorbachev, or support Poland and Hungary. It is worth recalling that the relevant pressure on President Bush was to support Gorbachev and to help him survive politically and help him "manage" potentially destabilizing developments in Poland and Hungary. To his credit, Bush resisted this pressure. He saw an opportunity that he knew could be fleeting, seized it, and mobilized American foreign policy with a single-mindedness seldom seen in peacetime. It was, in my view, the most important thing the United States did in helping bring about the end of the Cold War. Within the United States administration, our judgment was that if the Polish Roundtable Agreement was implemented fully and faithfully, this was the beginning of the end of communist rule in Poland. And if communism was finished in Poland, it was finished everywhere in Eastern Europe including East Germany, which meant that German unification would leap onto the international agenda. Of course, those were very large "ifs"; our appreciation of the potential for such sweeping changes was by no means a prediction that they would occur, much less that they could occur within a

Book
27 Oct 1997
TL;DR: The idea of an alliance between the Maronites and the State of Israel dates back to the early 1920s as mentioned in this paper and has been studied extensively in the last six decades of the Israeli-Maronite relationship.
Abstract: Acknowledgements - List of Abbreviations - Note on Transliteration - Introduction - The Idea of an Alliance: Israeli-Maronite Relations, 1920-1948 - The Birth of a State and the Rebirth of a Relationship, 1948-1955 - The First Lebanese Civil War - Between the Two Wars: the Emergence of the Palestinian Threat - Disintegration of a State: the Maronites turn towards Israel - The Revival of the Minority Alliance - The Rise and Fall of the Alliance - Illusions and Delusions - Perceptions: The Key to understanding the Alliance - Conclusion: Six Decades of Israeli-Maronite Relations - Bibliography - Index

Book
01 Jun 1997
TL;DR: In this article, distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman describes the fundamental principles of the art of statecraft and the craft of diplomacy and draws on the author's years of experience as a practicing diplomat but also his extensive reading of the histories of ancient India, China, Greece, Rome, Byzantium and the Islamic world as well as modern Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
Abstract: Statecraft, or the art of conducting a state's affairs with other states, is as old as human civilization. So too is diplomacy, the form statecraft takes in time of peace.In this comprehensive treatment, distinguished diplomat Chas Freeman describes the fundamental principles of the art of statecraft and the craft of diplomacy. The book draws on the author's years of experience as a practicing diplomat but also his extensive reading of the histories of ancient India, China, Greece, Rome, Byzantium, and the Islamic world as well as modern Europe, Asia, and the Americas.Among numerous other subjects, the book addresses the role of intelligence, political actions, cultural influence, economic measures, and military power, as well as diplomatic strategy and tactics, negotiation, and the tasks and skills of diplomacy.

Book
25 Sep 1997
TL;DR: Powaski as discussed by the authors argues that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history.
Abstract: For half of the twentieth century, the Cold War gripped the world. International relations everywhere-and domestic policy in scores of nations-pivoted around this central point, the American-Soviet rivalry. Even today, much of the world's diplomacy grapples with chaos created by the Cold War's sudden disappearance. Here indeed is a subject that defies easy understanding. Now comes a definitive account, a startlingly fresh, clear eyed, comprehensive history of our century's longest struggle. In The Cold War, Ronald E. Powaski offers a new perspective on the great rivalry, even as he provides a coherent, concise narrative. He wastes no time in challenging the reader to think of the Cold War in new ways, arguing that the roots of the conflict are centuries old, going back to Czarist Russia and to the very infancy of the American nation. He shows that both Russia and America were expansionist nations with messianic complexes, and the people of both nations believed they possessed a unique mission in history. Except for a brief interval in 1917, Americans perceived the Russian government (whether Czarist or Bolshevik) as despotic; Russians saw the United States as conspiring to prevent it from reaching its place in the sun. U.S. military intervention in Russia's civil war, with the aim of overthrowing Lenin's upstart regime, entrenched Moscow's fears. Soviet American relations, difficult before World War II-when both nations were relatively weak militarily and isolated from world affairs-escalated dramatically after both nations emerged as the world's major military powers. Powaski paints a portrait of the spiraling tensions with stark clarity, as each new development added to the rivalry: the Marshall Plan, the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin blockade, the formation of NATO, the first Soviet nuclear test. In this atmosphere, Truman found it easy to believe that the Communist victory in China and the Korean War were products of Soviet expansionism. He and his successors extended their own web of mutual defense treaties, covert actions, and military interventions across the globe-from the Caribbean to the Middle East and, finally to Southeast Asia, where containment famously foundered in the bog of Vietnam. Powaski skillfully highlights the domestic politics, diplomatic maneuvers, and even psychological factors as he untangles the knot that bound the two superpowers together in conflict. From the nuclear arms race, to the impact of U.S. recognition of China on detente, to Brezhnev's inflexible persistence in competing with America everywhere, he casts new light on familiar topics. Always judicious in his assessments, Powaski gives due credit to Reagan and especially Bush in facilitating the Soviet collapse, but also notes that internal economic failure, not outside pressure, proved decisive in the Communist failure. Perhaps most important, he offers a clear eyed assessment of the lasting distortions the struggle wrought upon American institutions, raising questions about whether anyone really won the Cold War. With clarity, fairness, and insight, he offers the definitive account of our century's longest international rivalry.


Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: The court of Albert and Isabella, 1598-1621 garrisons and empire Spain's strongholds in north-west Germany, 1589-1659 a Spanish project to defeat the Dutch without fighting the Rhine-Maas Canal, 1624-9 Olivares, the cardinal-infante and Spain's strategy in the Low Countries the road to Rocroi, 1635-43 art and diplomacy - Gerard Ter Borch and the Munster Peace negotiations, 1646-8 Spain and Europe from the Peace of Munster, (1648) to
Abstract: The court of Albert and Isabella, 1598-1621 garrisons and empire Spain's strongholds in north-west Germany, 1589-1659 a Spanish project to defeat the Dutch without fighting the Rhine-Maas Canal, 1624-9 Olivares, the cardinal-infante and Spain's strategy in the Low Countries the road to Rocroi, 1635-43 art and diplomacy - Gerard Ter Borch and the Munster Peace negotiations, 1646-8 Spain and Europe from the Peace of Munster, (1648) to the Peace of the Pyrenees, 1648-54 Dutch Sephardi jewry, millenarian politics, and the struggle for Brazil, 1640-54 the diplomatic career of Jeronimo Nunes da Costa - an episode in Dutch-Portuguese relations of the seventeenth century Lopo Ramirez (David Curiel) and the attempt to establish a Sephardi community in Antwerp, 1653-54 the Jews of Spanish Oran and their expulsion in 1669 toleration in seventeenth-century Dutch and English thought William III and toleration England's mercantilist response to Dutch world trade primacy, 1647-74 the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the English revolution of 1688 England, the Dutch and the struggle for mastery of world trade in the age of the glorious revolution Gregorio Leti, 1631-1701 and the Dutch Sephardi elite at the close of the seventeenth century the Dutch republic and the jews during the conflict over the Spanish succession, 1699-1715.

Book
01 Jan 1997
TL;DR: The origins of EC-African Diplomacy, 1957-1971, and the Emergence of Lome and its Institutional Framework, 1973-1978 are discussed in this article, where the EC and economic reform in Zambia are discussed.
Abstract: 1 Introduction 2 Africa and the New International Aid Regime 3 The Origins of EC-African Diplomacy, 1957-1971 4 The Emergence of Lome and its Institutional Framework, 1973-1978 5 Lome, Policy Dialogue and Structural Adjustment 6 Europe and the African External Debt Burden 7 Economic Decline and Policy Choice in Zambia 8 Zambia and Lome Aid Diplomacy 9 The EC and Economic Reform in Zambia 10 Europe and Africa in a Changing World

Book
17 Jan 1997
TL;DR: In this article, the Russian Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead, 1996 Post-Election Epilogue and 1996 Post Election EpILogue.I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS.
Abstract: I. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS. 1. Sources of Russian Diplomacy. 2. The Beleaguered Soviet State, 1917-1939. 3. From Wartime Alliance. 4. The Crumbling of the Empire, 1953-1985. II. DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS. 5. In Search of the Russian. 6. Russia and the Commonwealth. 7. National Security in an Era of Flux. III. GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS. 8. Russia and Europe. 9. Russia in Asia191. 10. Russia and the Third World. 11. Russian Interests in the Middle East. 12. Russia and International Organizations. 13. Russian-American Relations. IV. THE FUTURE. 14. Russian Foreign Policy: Looking Ahead. 1996 Post-Election Epilogue.

Book
26 Aug 1997
TL;DR: Miller as discussed by the authors provided an historical overview of the Persian Gulf War and its aftermath, including the role of the United Nations, United Nations and Collective Security, as well as the personalities behind the crisis.
Abstract: Series Foreword by Randall M. Miller Abbreviations Key Players in the Persian Gulf Crisis Chronology of Events Drama in the Desert: An Historical Overview of the Persian Gulf War War Erupts in a Storm: The Continuation of Diplomacy by Air and on the Ground From Truman to Desert Storm: The Rising Eagle in the Persian Gulf President Bush and Saddam Hussein: A Classic Case of Individuals Driving History The West Arms a Brutal Dictator: Can Proliferation Be Controlled in the Post-Cold War World? The United Nations and Collective Security: Was the Gulf War a Model for the Future? The Impact of the Persian Gulf War: The Operation Was a Success but the Patient Lived Biographies: The Personalities Behind the Crisis Primary Documents of the Crisis Glossary of Selected Terms Annotated Bibliography Index


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: Hutchings as mentioned in this paper presents an insider's report on and analysis of U.S. performance during a crucial turn of world history and brings a scholar's balanced judgment and historical perspective to his insider's view as he reconstructs how things looked to policymakers in the United States and in Europe.
Abstract: As director for European affairs at the National Security Council from 1989 to 1992, Robert Hutchings was at the heart of U.S. policymaking toward Europe and the Soviet Union during the dizzyingly fast dissolution of the Soviet bloc. American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War presents an insider's report on and analysis of U.S. performance during a crucial turn of world history. Hutchings also brings a scholar's balanced judgment and historical perspective to his insider's view as he reconstructs how things looked to policymakers in the United States and in Europe, describes how and why decisions were made, and critically examines those decisions in the light of what can now be known. He assesses the critical support of U.S. diplomacy for the East European revolutions and the unification of Germany-offering fascinating character sketches along the way-and describes how U.S. relations with Moscow were managed up to the collapse of the USSR. Hutchings also discusses the difficulties in forging a post-cold war European order and U.S. failures in dealing with a disintegrating Yugoslavia.



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In this paper, Small examines the central role of domestic politics in the shaping and conduct of American foreign policy from the early republic to the end of the Cold War and concludes that "some critics, including Alexis de Tocqueville, concluded that America's democratic system would cripple the effective and efficient conduct of its foreign policy."
Abstract: From the Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian split over English and French policy in the 1790s to the Republican-Democratic clash over Haitian policy in the 1990s, Americans and foreign observers have been troubled-and often exasperated-by the extraordinary influence of U.S. domestic politics on matters of vital national security. Some critics, including Alexis de Tocqueville, concluded-that America's democratic system would cripple the effective and efficient conduct of its foreign policy. In this first historical overview of the subject, Melvin Small examines the central role of domestic politics in the shaping and conduct of American foreign policy from the early republic to the end of the Cold War.