Showing papers on "Exemplification published in 1990"

A Puzzle about Necessary Being

Abstract: In his provocative 'The Ontological Argument',' Stephen Makin defends Anselm's ontological argument for God's existence found in Proslogion 3, which, according to him, is not open to the fatal objection that 'existence is not a predicate'. But since it has been held that the notion of a 'necessary being' makes no sense, Makin felt the need to show that it does. The strategy he used for that purpose was to utilize modal notions involving the exemplification of concepts. His strategy, as I shall try to show, failed to achieve its purpose. Makin begins his argument by pointing out that there are concepts which just happen, as a contingent fact, to be exemplified, e.g. the concept of a lion; and others which just happen not to be exemplified, e.g. the concept of a unicorn. There is nothing about the concept of a lion or that of a unicorn which either necessitates or precludes exemplification. On the other hand there are self-contradictory concepts e.g. being a swan and a non-swan whose nature is such as necessarily to preclude exemplification. Now, continues Makin, if sense can be made of a concept that might be exemplified, and of one that cannot be exemplified, then sense can also be made of a concept that must be exemplified, 'For if one modality makes sense in some application or context then the other modalities will make sense in that application or context too, for all the modalities are interdefinable'.2 Makin is right; I can meaningfully assert that the concept of a unicorn has neither necessary exemplification nor impossible exemplification (i.e. that a unicorn is neither a necessary being nor an impossible being), 'for all the modalities are interdefinable'; but how is this fact supposed to show that 'necessary being' could possibly apply to an existent entity. (In a similar vein I can meaningfully assert that if the smallest conceivable particle were to exist, it would be smaller than any presently existing particle; but it surely would not follow from this fact that a smallest conceivable particle could possibly exist.) For making sense in this latter context is what Makin requires in order to defend Anselm's argument. To put the same matter in other words: what