Showing papers on "Fare evasion published in 2007"

Fare dodging and the strong arm of the law

Abstract: In this paper we discuss a controlled experiment on the enforcement of sanctioning for fare evasion in trains in the Netherlands. The experiment ran for 2 years, and the extent to which sanctions were effectively imposed was compared for non-chronic fare evaders in two regions. Travellers caught without a ticket who had not paid on the spot were divided into two conditions. In the (regular) control condition, the Dutch railways attempted to recover the cost of the unpaid ticket, plus a small penalty, followed by regular, civil law, debt collection procedures. In the experimental condition, the efforts by the Dutch railways were followed by penalty collection procedures by the Dutch Ministry of Justice’s fine collection agency. The results under the experimental condition were worse than those under the standard procedure. Both conditions have (often lengthy) follow-up procedures entailing criminal prosecution, which are not reported upon here. We discuss the implications and the questions that these findings raise.

Fare Evasion in Light Rail Systems

Abstract: With the increasing cost pressure in public transport systems, productivity gains must be accompanied by efficient measures to combat fare evasion. Indeed, besides the direct revenue losses, high rates of fare evasion trigger a feeling of inequity or insecurity among the paying customers. International surveys have shown that the population’s attitude toward fare evasion in public transport follows a Gauss curve. The majority is willing “to give it a try” if the perceived opportunity “of getting away with it” outreaches the perceived risks. The most efficient strategy against fraud is to control access to the system. This principle can lead to specific measures depending on the chosen mode of transport. Metro systems can be closed or gated easily due to their specific station environment; this can be the case at the initial design stage, or can be implemented as a retrofit. The Metro Committee of the International Union of Public Transport (UITP) is preparing a specific report on the latter aspect. Buses can be operated with the “front boarding” philosophy with little adverse impact on operation and boarding time. Light rail systems offer far less favorable conditions; they operate mostly within an “open space” platform environment and the high patronage requires many doors. This means that the most efficient strategies to keep fare evasion as low as possible are only possible to a limited extent. That was the reason for the Light Rail Committee to perform a specific study on fare evasion. The present report summarizes the results of a survey conducted in 18 cities— Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, Budapest, Cologne, Dusseldorf, Gothenburg, London (Croydon Tramlink), Manchester, Milan, Montpellier, Rouen, Porto, Saarbrucken, Salt Lake City, Stuttgart, The Hague, and Tunis. It also includes discussions held during meetings of a smaller group of operators exchanging views and experience, and during face-to-face interviews.

An experimental evaluation of two different penalty schemes for fare evasion

Abstract: In this paper we discuss a controlled experiment on the enforcement of sanctioning for fare evasion in trains in the Netherlands. The experiment ran for 2 years, and the extent to which sanctions were effectively imposed was compared for non-chronic fare evaders in two regions. Travellers caught without a ticket who had not paid on the spot were divided into two conditions. In the (regular) control condition, the Dutch railways attempted to recover the cost of the unpaid ticket, plus a small penalty, followed by regular, civil law, debt collection procedures. In the experimental condition, the efforts by the Dutch railways were followed by penalty collection procedures by the Dutch Ministry of Justice's fine collection agency. The results under the experimental condition were worse than those under the standard procedure. Both conditions have (often lengthy) follow-up procedures entailing criminal prosecution, which are not reported upon here. We discuss the implications and the questions that these findings raise.