Showing papers on "Finitism published in 2014"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on one of the two available replies to this objection, namely, the claim that actual infinities are not traversed in nature because space, time, and other continuous wholes divide into parts only in so far as we divide them in thought, and thus divide into only a finite number of parts.
Abstract: Many philosophers have argued that the past must be finite in duration because otherwise reaching the present moment would have involved something impossible, namely, the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events. In reply, some philosophers have objected that there can be nothing amiss in such an occurrence, since actually infinite sequences are ‘traversed’ all the time in nature, for example, whenever an object moves from one location in space to another. This essay focuses on one of the two available replies to this objection, namely, the claim that actual infinities are not traversed in nature because space, time, and other continuous wholes divide into parts only in so far as we divide them in thought, and thus divide into only a finite number of parts. I grant that this reply succeeds in blunting the anti-finitist objection, but I argue that it also subverts the very argument against an eternal past that it was intended to save.
12 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that Meillassoux's work has opened up a space for theological discourse, albeit one limited on polarized ends: on the one hand, Meissasoux's rejection of dogmatic pre-critical metaphysics, and on the other, the judgment that contemporary continental philosophy of religion is an historical error based on the faulty reasoning of post-Kantian epistemological finitism.
Abstract: It will be our contention that the religious turn in continental philosophy has little to offer the domain of theology, despite the resurgence of interest in the latter on account of the historical trajectory of the former, and that, consequently, speculative theologians should welcome Meillassoux’s ‘critique of Critique’. We will come to see that Meillassoux’s work has opened up a space for theological discourse, albeit one limited on polarized ends: on the one hand, Meillassoux's rejection of dogmatic pre-critical metaphysics, and on the other, the judgment that contemporary continental philosophy of religion is an historical error based on the faulty reasoning of post-Kantian epistemological finitism. The former pole guards against the vampiric return of classical metaphysical theology, and the latter warns of the dangers associated with various contextual theologies, stemming as they do from the “religionizing of reason”. Our proposal will be that a specific form of theology can find its way through this narrow passage, and that a thorough rapprochement with Meillassoux’s critique of religious and theological thought in After Finitude can be had without completely abandoning theological discourse.
1 citations
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors propose a way to clarify the problem of conceptual change in science from the perspective of the Strong Programme's sociological finitism, and argue that this finitist approach provides an understanding of scientific progress in non-teleological, non- accumulative terms, without resorting to Kuhn's incommensurability.
Abstract: The paper proposes a way to clarify the problem of the conceptual change in science from the perspective of the Strong Programme's sociological finitism. First I present the main aspects of the finitist thesis according to which scientific knowledge is a conventional classification of experience. Then I explain the role of the experience of the individual scientist, the cognitive tradition to which he belongs, and the interests of such tradition for producing and changing knowledge. Finally, in the later part, I argue that this finitist approach provides an understanding of scientific progress in non-teleological, non- accumulative terms, without resorting to Kuhn's incommensurability.
01 Jan 2014
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review a 1992 excursion of Jean Paul Van Bendegem into physics, "How Infinities Cause Problems in Classical Physical Theories", in the light of two later models concerning colliding balls, of Perez Laraudogoitia and of Alper and Bridger, respectively.
Abstract: In this paper we review a 1992 excursion of Jean Paul Van Bendegem into physics, ‘How Infinities Cause Problems in Classical Physical Theories’, in the light of two later models concerning colliding balls, of Perez Laraudogoitia and of Alper and Bridger, respectively. We show that Van Bendegem anticipated the model of Alper and Bridger by six years, but we also argue that his conditions for the avoidance of problems in these models are not entirely adequate. For although a veto on actual infinity seems to be required, allowing a potential infinity remains a viable option.