Showing papers on "Fixed price published in 1992"

Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases

Abstract: We analyz personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tnder oifer With the exception of Dutch auction offer, managers tade their firm5s shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside infomation to outsiders Prior t fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover-relatd events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of thir firm's shares Prior t repurchases that follow takeover-rlated events, only a decrease in seling is foud No abnoral trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers STOCK REPURCHASES BY TENDER offer typically lead to an increase in share price that pers'sts beyond the expiration of the offer1 Most interpret the sustaned increase in share value as evidence that repurchase announcements lead tock market participants to infer that share price is too low As a result, market participants revise their forecasts of the firm's prospects

The gold standard as a rule

Abstract: In this paper, we show that the monetary rule followed by a number of key countries before 1914 represented a commitment technology preventing the monetary authorities from changing planned future policy. The experiences of these major countries suggest that the gold standard was intended as a contingent rule. By that, we mean that the authorities could temporarily abandon the fixed price of gold during a wartime emergency on the understanding that convertibility at the original price of gold would be restored when the emergency passed.

Market Stabilization and the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy

Abstract: I solve numerically for stationary rational-expectations equilibria of a two-country, non-linear model of a storable commodity. With constant tariffs, price volatilities in both countries increase with an increase in the tariff rate of one country or with an increase in the storage cost in one country. When one country (`the EC') uses a variable import levy and export subsidy to defend a fixed price floor, increases in the floor (a) increase mean price and decrease price volatility in the EC and (b) decrease mean price, increase volatility and increase private stockholding in the rest of the world. The volatility of farm incomes in the EC are relatively insensitive to increases in the floor.

Commodity selling system

Abstract: PURPOSE:To enable a customer to purchase the required quantity of a commodity by measuring the weight of a weighing commodity, issuing a label recording commodity data and registering the weighing commodity. CONSTITUTION:A commodity display rack 2a for displaying various fixed price commodities, a weighing sales corner 2b in a commodity display area of various weighing commodities, a check-out device 3 for executing the registering/ adjusting processing of various commodities, and a lapping work board 4 are arranged in a shop 1 and plural pricing electronic balance 6 are arranged in the corner 2b so that each customer can weigh and price a weighing commodity. A label indicating the weight and price of the commodity is stuck to the commodity, and when the labeled commodity is carried to the device 3, the weight is measured by a weighing device and commodity data recorded in the label are read out by a reader. Consequently, the customer can purchase the weighing commodity only by required quantity or required price.

An economic analysis of alternative market scenarios for wheat in south africa

Abstract: The marketing of wheat has been controlled by the Wheat Board since 1935 and wheat is currently marketed through a one channel fixed price scheme In this paper various market scenarios for wheat in South Africa are simulated with the use of a regional linear programming model which incorporates negative-sloping demand functions, substitution in demand between wheat and maize, and income risk The model is used to predict changes in product prices, production levels, location of production and welfare transfers under the different market scenarios A free market simulation showed a distortion in production patterns of the major crops caused by the price support policy The domestic free market equilibrium price of wheat was predicted to be about 15 per cent lower than the mean fixed price Owing to the strong price relationship between wheat and maize there is no significant decrease in the wheat price in a free market for winter cereals only and when maize is the only crop marketed under a fixed

Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information

Abstract: An independent private values model of trade with m buyers and m sellers is considered in which a double auction sets price to equate revealed demand and supply. In a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, each trader acts not as a price-taker, but instead strategically misrepresents his true demand/supply to influence price in his favor. This causes inefficiency. We show that the amount by which a trader misreports is 0(1/m) and the corresponding inefficiency is 0(1/m^2). By comparison, inefficiency is 0(1/m) for a dual price mechanism and 0(1/m^1/2) for a fixed price mechanism. Price-taking behavior and its associated efficiency thus quickly emerge in the double auction despite the asymmetric information and the noncooperative behavior of traders.

A mathematical model for fixed-price-incentive-firm contracts

Abstract: : This research focuses on a mathematical model for Fixed-Price- Incentive-Firm (FPIF) type contracts. The model revolves around the concept of a balanced trade-off among different options available to the user. At one extreme, the model develops a FPIF arrangement that gives the contractor a strong incentive to underrun costs, but strict penalties if he overruns. At the other extreme, the model develops a FPIF arrangement that gives the contractor minimal incentive to underrun, yet significant protection against an overrun. The mathematics of the model uses integral calculus to balance each of the options such that both the expected profit for the contractor and the expected cost to the Government do not change as the user selects different options. In this computation, the subjective probability density function for the cost is assumed to remain constant. This process attempts to accommodate the contractor based on his composite attitude toward risk and utility, yet does not obstruct the Government's objective to minimize cost.

Contracting Theory with Coincidence of Interest

Abstract: In the standard models of principal agent theory, the relationship between the principal and agent is adversarial in the sense that the objective of the agent is to maximize monetary income and minimize effort without regards for the objectives of the principal In the real world, however, agents often have a personal stake in their contractual responsibilities Furthermore, standard approaches to optimal contracting involve explicit monetary transfers, thereby excluding from analysis the case of non-profit agents This paper presents a contracting model--the cooperative model--distinguished from standard models by the following three properties: first, the principal contracts with a non-profit agent for the provision of some commodity; second, the interests of the principal and agent coincide to the extent that their utilities are both increasing in the quality of the commodity provided; third, the using a suitable reformulation of the standard moral hazard variable, the optimal contract for the case of quasi-linear preferences has an extremely simple form After the cooperative model is formalized, cost-plus and fixed price contracting are defined and compared, the form of the optimal contract is determined for the case of quasi-linear preferences, the suboptimality of cost-plus and fixed price contracting is demonstrated, and the possibility of decentralizing the optimal contract through a menu of linear contracts is explored Finally, a standard model--the adversarial model--is presented for the purposes of comparison, along with a general model in which subsumes both models as special cases Starting with the adversarial model and altering it in each of the three ways outlined above, it is possible to trace the ramifications of the assumptions underlying the cooperative model