Showing papers on "Foreign exchange market published in 1969"

International Financial Management

Abstract: Part One: Foundations of International Financial Management Chapter 1: Globalization and the Multinational Firm Chapter 2: International Monetary System Chapter 3: Balance of Payments Chapter 4: Corporate Governance Around the World Part Two: The Foreign Exchange Market, Exchange Rate Determination, and Currency Derivatives Chapter 5: The Market for Foreign Exchange Chapter 6: International Parity Relationships and Forecasting Foreign Exchange Rates Chapter 7: Futures and Options on Foreign Exchange Part Three: Foreign Exchange Exposure and Management Chapter 8: Management of Transaction Exposure Chapter 9: Management of Economic Exposure Chapter 10: Management of Translation Exposure Part Four: World Financial Markets and Institutions Chapter 11: International Banking and Money Market Chapter 12: International Bond Market Chapter 13: International Equity Markets Chapter 14: Interest Rate and Currency Swaps Chapter 15: International Portfolio Investment Part Five: Financial Management of the Multinational Firm Chapter 16: Foreign Direct Investment and Cross-Border Acquisitions Chapter 17: International Capital Structure and the Cost of Capital Chapter 18: International Capital Budgeting Chapter 19: Multinational Cash Management Chapter 20: International Trade Finance Chapter 21: International Tax Environment and Transfer Pricing

Adequacy of International Means of Payments

Abstract: It has been argued recently that the size of the holdings of foreign exchange by commercial banks provides a better measure of the adequacy of international means of payments than the size of official reserves.' At first glance this appears obvious for it is these commercial holdings of foreign exchange which are used directly for financing international exchange while official reserves are used only to finance imbalances in countries' balance of payments which result from the maintenance of relatively fixed exchange rates. The argument becomes less clear, however, when one stops to question what is meant by the adequacy of international means of payments. Within a free market context, what does it mean to say that commercial holdings of foreign exchange are inadequate? The commercial interests involved clearly can not feel that their foreign exchange holdings are inadequate (apart from a desire to have higher wealth positions in general) for otherwise they would simply exchange domestic for foreign currency until their foreign currency holdings were no longer inadequate. In other words, from the point of view of commercial banks and traders, "inadequacy" at any point in time would merely mean a temporary disequilibrium situation. If traders on both sides of the market felt their foreign currency holdings to be inadequate then they would in effect merely swap currencies with one another (a practice now common between central banks). If the size of the desired swaps did not match on each side of the market, then under flexible rates the price of the relatively scarce currency would be bid up until desired holdings equalled actual holdings, i.e., until foreign currency holdings were adequate. As Yeager has put it, "If no authority concerned itself with gold and foreign exchange, and if private persons, firms and dealers such as banks, found their holdings inadequate, they would bid for additional amounts, thus depressing the home currency on the exchange market, stimulating exports relative to imports, and making available the quantity of foreign exchange desired at the new level of exchange rates." 2 Under a "fixed" rate system the increased demand for foreign currency would be reflected in official reserve losses. In either case, observed foreign currency holdings would always reflect desired or adequate holdings except for the effects of transitory disequilibrium. We could, however, meaningfully speak of inadequacy in terms of a discrepancy between desired and actual holdings if a free market does not exist. In other words, where exchange controls, etc. effectively prevent traders from satisfying their demands for foreign balances then we could unambiguously say that observed holdings were inadequate. As is brought out in Heller's figures,3 the rapid expansion of holdings of foreign currencies by banks in industrial Europe as postwar exchange controls were loosened suggests that there was considerable inadequacy at the beginning of the period. If one accepts the argument put forward here that one can meaningfully speak of an inadequacy of commercial holdings of foreign exchange only where traders do not face free markets for foreign exchange, then inadequate commercial holdings of foreign exchange are themselves a reflection of an inadequacy of official reserves (at least from the point of view of the country in question). In other words, inadequacy of commercial holdings of foreign exchange is a reflection of impediments placed on the foreign exchange market which in turn reflect that the government of the country in question feels that its official reserve holdings are below their desired level, i.e., that they are inadequate. At first glance Heller's figures would seem to contradict this argument. Over the 1951 to 1966 period the global ratios of official reserves to imports and banks' foreign exchange holdings to imports show quite different trends, the former falling by almost one half while the latter almost tripled. Hence, Heller's conclusion that, while according to

Forward exchange and currency position

Abstract: THIS PAPER PRESENTS a non-mathematical, integrated model of the forward exchange market. It is based upon concepts which are applied to all foreign exchange market participants rather than upon an assigned role for each participant (speculator, arbitrager, trader). The latter approach has been nearly universal among previous non-mathematical treatments. We abstract from the influence upon the foreign exchange market of the demand and supply conditions for imports and exports, and of the forces which determine the quantity of long term capital flows. The spot rate is taken as given and changes in these forces are simply considered to be exogenous disturbances to the financial equilibrium described in the model. Analysis of the forward exchange market has traditionally been conducted within an arbitrager-speculator format where it is assumed that pure speculators and pure arbitragers are the only participants in the forward exchange market. Only pure speculators assume exchange risk by dealing only in forward exchange. In contrast, arbitragers never expose themselves to exchange risk; they only conduct simultaneous and exactly offsetting spot and forward transactions. Hence, the following aggregate relationship must hold for any twocurrency model.'