Showing papers on "Funding liquidity published in 2007"
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity and traders' funding liquidity, i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding, to explain the empirically documented features that market liquidity can suddenly dry up, has commonality across securities, is related to volatility, is subject to flight to quality, and comoves with the market.
Abstract: We provide a model that links an asset's market liquidity - i.e., the ease with which it is traded - and traders' funding liquidity - i.e., the ease with which they can obtain funding. Traders provide market liquidity, and their ability to do so depends on their availability of funding. Conversely, traders' funding, i.e., their capital and the margins they are charged, depend on the assets' market liquidity. We show that, under certain conditions, margins are destabilizing and market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to liquidity spirals. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up, (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) is subject to “flight to quality¶, and (v) comoves with the market, and it provides new testable predictions. Keywords: Liquidity Risk Management, Liquidity, Liquidation, Systemic Risk, Leverage, Margins, Haircuts, Value-at-Risk, Counterparty Credit Risk
3,638 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a model that links a security's market liquidity and traders' availability of funds, showing that reductions in market liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to a liquidity spiral and that the Fed can improve current market liquidity by committing to improve funding in a potential future crisis.
Abstract: We provide a model that links a security's market liquidity - i.e., the ease of trading it - and traders' funding liquidity - i.e., their availability of funds. Traders provide market liquidity and their ability to do so depends on their funding, that is, their capital and the margins charged by their financiers. In times of crisis, reductions in market liquidity and funding liquidity are mutually reinforcing, leading to a liquidity spiral. The model explains the empirically documented features that market liquidity (i) can suddenly dry up (i.e. is fragile), (ii) has commonality across securities, (iii) is related to volatility, (iv) experiences "flight to liquidity" events, and (v) comoves with the market. Finally, the model showshow the Fed can improve current market liquidity by committing to improve funding in a potential future crisis.
939 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the GM and Ford downgrade to junk status during May 2005 caused a wide-spread selloff in their corporate bonds, which generated significant liquidity risk for market-makers, as evidenced in the significant imbalance in their quotes towards sales.
Abstract: The GM and Ford downgrade to junk status during May 2005 caused a wide-spread sell-off in their corporate bonds. Using a novel dataset, we document that this sell-off appears to have generated significant liquidity risk for market-makers, as evidenced in the significant imbalance in their quotes towards sales. We also document that simultaneously, there was excess co-movement in the fixed-income securities of all industries, not just in those of auto firms. In particular, using credit-default swaps (CDS) data, we find a substantial increase in the co-movement between innovations in the CDS spreads of GM and Ford and those of firms in all other industries, the increase being greatest during the period surrounding the actual downgrade and reversing sharply thereafter. We show that a measure of liquidity risk faced by corporate bond market-makers - specifically, the imbalance towards sales in the volume and frequency of quotes on GM and Ford bonds - explains a significant portion of this excess co-movement. Additional robustness checks suggest that this relationship between the liquidity risk faced by market-makers and the correlation risk for other securities in which they make markets was likely causal. Overall, the evidence is supportive of theoretical models which imply that funding liquidity risk faced by financial intermediaries is a determinant of market prices during stress times.
105 citations