Showing papers on "Jewish state published in 1987"

Israel: Conflict, War and Social Change

Abstract: The case of Israel may serve as an example of the contention that conflict and war bring about creation, modification and change, transformation or destruction of social formations. It seems probable that the longer lasting, the more comprehensive and intensive the conflict, the more salient will be its effects upon the social structure. Israel is thus an example, one of a few in modern history, of a permanent war society.

Law and religion in Israel

Abstract: Among the Western-style modern democracies, there is no other country which experiences more intensely the problem of religion's place in the state than Israel. Inside Israel itself the issue contrary to many predictions-seems in recent years to have gained renewed impetus, arousing passions and emotions in public life rivalled only by most central political concerns, such as war and peace with the Arabs. Moreover, even these latter fundamental concerns are not completely divorced from the religious dimension. On the Israeli political, social and legal scene many conflicts related to the religious phenomenon bear unique features which are rooted in the particular background of historical Judaism. But, even those general problems of state and religion which appear to have counterparts in most modern countries-such as freedom of religion and religious establishment-cannot be understood properly without previous knowledge of the ideologies adhered to by the central groups confronting each other over the various issues. It is, therefore, vital for a deeper understanding of the complex reality-replete as it is with profound dilemmas and internal contradictions-to expound the specific background of law and religion in the Jewish State. This general background will have to be divided into a number of different aspects, each contributing to the actual pattern of the relationship between law and religion. In view of the complexity of each single aspect and the restricted scope of this paper, the description will be summary and succinct, a brevity which will be achieved at the expense of some inevitably simplistic generalizations. The notion of law in the present context is based upon the legal system of the State of Israel as enacted by its legislative organs and enforced by its official agencies. Religion is understood to refer mainly, but not exclusively, to Orthodox Judaism as established by the Rabbinic tradition and practiced by the majority of believing Jews in Israel. In this respect, the contrast between law and religion is more one of form than of essence. The view which would see an

Zion and State: Nation, Class, and the Shaping of Modern Israel

Abstract: This study explores the struggle between left-and right-wing factions within the Zionist movement, tracing the emergence of modern Jewish nationalism from its origins in the mid-19th century, through the vision of Theodor Herzl, and up to the first 15 years of Israeli statehood. Concentrating on the 1920s and 1930s, Mitchell Cohen discusses the victory of the Zionist Labour movement over the right-wing revisionists, and shows how the growing dominance of Labour in the 1930s made the birth of the Jewish state possible. He shows how Labour's long-term policies were self-defeating, helping to foster a political culture that was more open to individuals on the right, such as Menachem Begin, and made it vulnerable to the more strident nationalism of the 1970s. When the Israel Workers' Party could not win a plurality in the World Jewish Congress after 1933, it formed coalitions with religious and bourgeois parties, which transformed it into a party that considered class, nation and state as separate entities.

Biased Judgments of Media Bias: A Case Study of the Arab-Israeli Dispute

Abstract: Since the birth of the Jewish state in 1948, hundreds of commentaries on media coverage of the Arab-Israeli conflict have been driven by a desire to demonstrate unfair media bias-either against Israel or against the Arab states. This paper presents a brief overview of these articles; it differs from prior literature reviews inasmuch as it focuses upon the charges of partisan critics. The paper's goals are (1) to review, categorize, and evaluate these accusations, (2) to distinguish between the normative, conceptual, and empirical issues involved in judgments of media bias, and (3) to suggest an overall vantage point from which we may most usefully view the debate over media unfairness with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Among other things, the paper argues that: 1. The media ought not rely upon "evenhandedness," "balanced content," or "middle-of-the-road politics" as guidelines for coverage of the conflict.

After the catastrophe II: the Arabs in Israel, 1948–51

Abstract: At the close of the period of the British Mandate over Palestine, at the end of 1947, the population of the country numbered 1,970,000 persons. Twothirds of them were Arabs, and one-third Jews. The great majority of the Arabs (86 per cent) were Muslims, and almost all of the remainder were Christians. ' Continuing clashes between Jews and Arabs intensified following the United Nations vote on 29 November 1947 on the partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. They grew more serious during the succeeding months, and with the invasion of the newly proclaimed state of Israel by armies of neighboring Arab countries on 15 May 1948, local fighting turned into a general conflict. During the same period the great and significant change began in the composition of the population which lived in that part of Mandatory Palestine which subsequently became the state of Israel. Palestinian Arabs began to leave their homes. Some of them went to other towns and villages within Palestine, and others left the country in order to find temporary refuge from the growing violence. During the first months after the United Nations vote the initiative for leaving came primarily from the Arabs themselves. Following the capture by Jewish forces of Haifa and of Jaffa in April 1948, the number of instances grew in which the Jewish forces encouraged the Arabs to leave their localities, or simply expelled them. After Israel declared its independence on 14 May 1948, the expulsion of Arabs increasingly became a definite policy of the fighting units. Residents of many Arab villages, who had not fled when their villages were captured, were expelled by the Israeli occupying forces. The flow of fleeing and expelled Arabs became a flood. The government of Israel permitted few to return to their homes, or to resettle in other localities. At the end of the 1948 war only 20 per cent of the Arabs who were living there in November 1947, remained within the borders of Israel. There were two major changes which affected the Arab population of Palestine with the termination of the British Mandate and the establishment of Israel. First, the Arab population in that portion of the mandated territory which became the state of Israel was transformed from a community possessing economic and political power, and the potential for expanding this power within the framework of the Mandate or the states which were to have been established under the partition plan, into a community dependent on the governing institutions of an overwhelmingly Jewish majority. Second, the change in the socio-economic and political position of the Arab population was accompanied by a change in its size and thus in its opportunity to become again powerful in Israel. Not only did the number of Arabs remaining in Israel decline greatly, but the hostile relations existing after 1948 between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries prevented the latter from exerting any significant influence on Israeli policy towards the Arabs who remained in the

Origins of the 1950 tripartite declaration on the Middle East

Abstract: In view of the fact that Acheson, perhaps more than anyone else, was the moving spirit behind the Declaration, it is somewhat surprising that he fails to recall the considerations which underlay its formulation. Perhaps the blatant failure of the Declaration in 1956 when the United States lined up with the Soviet Union to condemn its European allies prompted Acheson to disclaim any undue measure of responsibility for the document.3 However, the newly opened archival sources in London and Washington provide fresh insight into the critical elements which entered into the making of this historic document. The archival papers reveal a divergency of motive which goes far to explain why the Declaration never emerged as an effective instrument for restraining the tempests of war in the Middle East.. The starting point for tracing the origins of the Tripartite Declaration is Israel's growing concern in mid-1949 over the emergence of a Middle East arms race. In the early part of the year Israel and the Arab states had concluded armistice agreements which put an end to the 1948 conflict.4 However, to Israel's chagrin, these agreements were not, as was widely expected, harbingers of peace. In fact, voices were increasingly heard in Arab capitals calling for a 'second round' of fighting to eliminate the Jewish state. Arab governments seemed bent on obtaining mass quantities of arms which, given their offensive nature and number, could not be intended for any purpose other than a new military campaign against the state of Israel.5 Despite the ominous sounds emanating from Arab capitals, the United Nations acting-Mediator, Ralph Bunche, recommended to the Security Council on 21 July 1949 that, with the conclusion of the armistice agreements, the role of mediator be terminated6 and the restrictions imposed on the parties by Security Council resolutions be removed. Those resolutions included a prohibition on the import of arms. Already on 10 June, fully a month earlier, the Egyptian government had turned to the United States with a request for arms.7 On 25 July the request was repeated,8 and five days later Syria submitted its own shopping list of weapons.9 Throughout 1948, the year of Israel's struggle for independence, the

The Ruling Class of Judaea: The Origins of the Jewish Revolt against Rome, A.D. 66–70

Abstract: 1. Introduction: (i) The problem (ii) The conventional explanations (iii) Civil war, the ruling class and revolt Part I. The Ruling Class AD 6-66: 2. The new ruling class AD 6 3. Problems facing the ruling class: economic and social 4. Problems facing the ruling class: religious ideology 5. Why the ruling class failed Part II. Faction Struggle within the Ruling Class: 6. Reactions to failure: the ruling class AD 6-66 7. The outbreak of revolt 8. The independent Jewish state AD 67-70 9. Trends in faction politics AD 50-70 Part III. The Aftermath of the Revolt: 10. The Roman reaction.

The Arabs of Palestine 1947–48: military and political activity

Abstract: On 29 November 1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed the UNSCOP's majority recommendation and voted for the Partition of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The Arab community in Palestine and its leadership were totally unprepared to cope with the political and military challenges that were introduced by that resolution. This article intends to examine the reasons for that state of affairs: the internal development within Arab society in Palestine, its inter-relations with the neighbouring Arab countries and its attitude towards the Jewish community. The article also seeks to study& the scope of the Palestine Arab political and military effort and the way it had functioned in 1947/48 in spite of the lack of preparation.

Britain and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948

Abstract: At midnight on 14 May 1948 the British High Commissioner for Palestine with all his staff left Palestine, and 28 years of British responsibility for the territory came to an end. As Rees Williams, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, told the House of Commons: ‘On the 14th May, 1948, the withdrawal of the British Administration took place without handing over to a responsible authority any of the assets, property or liabilities of the Mandatory Power. The manner in which the withdrawal took place is unprecedented in the history of our Empire’.1 What were the reasons behind the inexcus­ably abrupt and reckless fashion by which the British government chose to divest itself of the Mandate for Palestine? Very different answers are given to this question by the two nations most directly affected by the British decision. On the Jewish side the predominant view is that Britain walked out in the full knowledge that the surrounding Arab countries would immediately attack the fledgeling Jewish state. Zionist historiography is riddled with suspicions of dark plots hatched during the twilight of British rule in Palestine. A typical example is Jon Kimche’s claim that the Foreign Office, the Chiefs of Staff and the Palestine Administration wanted to see the physical destruction of the Jewish National Home and encouraged the Arabs to carry it out.2 Richard Crossman lent his authority to this Zionist charge: Once it had been decided … to end the mandate, Bevin’s aim, apparently, was to ensure that Abdullah’s Arab Legion should over-run most of Palestine, leaving a rump Jewish state, so weak that it would throw itself at the mercy of the British Government.3