Showing papers on "Judgement published in 1971"

Knowledge for Social Work

Abstract: Carved along the side of the college to which I belong is the inscription: 'get riches, get knowledge but with all thy getting, get understanding'. This is a useful starting point. For we cannot take knowledge as a good without first examining the doubt and the ambivalence which surrounds the notation and the limitations inherent in it. The Oxford dictionary defines knowledge as 'intellectual acquaintance with, or perception of, fact or truth'. Understanding, however, is 'having knowledge and judge ment'. The uses made of knowledge are not simply derived from the values of the profession. 'Understanding', introducing as it does the concept of judgement, suggests a process by which knowledge is made a part of one self, internalized as a dynamic element in activity. However, doubts about the use of the word knowledge are not centred solely upon its limitations. The dictionary of quotations has many extracts which illustrate the abuses as well as the uses of knowledge. Job1 referred to the man 'who multiplieth words without knowledge'—a warning which I fear the social sciences must take very seriously. It is some years now since I wrote of my wish for paper rationing in the U.S.A. Now I wish it could be rationed here too.

Moral Judgement From Childhood To Adolescence

Abstract: 1. The Study of Moral Judgement 2. The Patterns of Development 3. The Research Project 4. The Value of Life 5. Reciprocity and Conscience 6. Cheating 7. Stealing 8. Lying 9. Specificity and Generality in Lying 10. Written Tests 11. Statistical Analysis

Self-determination Re-examined

Abstract: The principle of client self-determination has been accorded a special place in nearly every consideration of the values underlying social casework practice. Various writers in their attempt to give the concept practical application have chosen alternative terminology, namely, client self direction, and client self-responsibility, yet the subject remains contro versial. Why should this be ? The reason seems to lie in the fact that the gulf between the theoretical definitions and their application in practice is often wide, and rife with inconsistencies. My aim is to show that the con cept has so many limitations that a serious re-examination of its position in professional social work ideology is essential. Biestek defines the principle of client self-determination as 'the practical recognition of the right and need of clients to freedom in making their own choices and decisions in the casework process'.1 One activity which he considers to be at variance with the principle is that of manipulation, by which he means the manoeuvring of the client 'to choose or decide modes of action in accordance with the caseworker's judgement in such a way that the client is unaware of the process ; or if he is aware of it, he feels "moved about" against his will'.2 Florence Hollis, to whose work on casework theory I shall make special reference, prefers the term 'self-direction' which, she says, denotes not the absolute independence implied by self-determination but rather 'the capa city to guide oneself through the maze of interactions that make up the pattern of life. This is the capacity that the worker seeks to enable the client to increase.' Hollis qualifies, as do most other writers, that self determination is a relative, not an absolute value: 'If the client is en dangering others or himself, it must be superseded by another, namely, the worker's responsibility to prevent suffering.'2 The basis of her view is in keeping with that of other writers and is concerned with the client's right to make his own choices. Except in extreme situations this right to self direction should not be interfered with by the caseworker.4 This emphasis on self-determination—implying the converse of a purely

A Great Love

Abstract: A roman-a-clef, based on Lenin's love affair with Inessa Armand. The author writes of emotional dependency, the need to love, the desire to live one's own life. This novel explores loneliness, vulnerability, the power of the sexual appetite to distort judgement and the tragic element of love.

Charles Booth: Moralist or Social Scientist?

Abstract: T THIS note is prompted by Dr Brown's article 'Charles Booth and Labour Colonies, I 889-I 905' which appeared in a recent issue of this journal.1 That article is, in the words of the author, "concerned with one aspect of Charles Booth's work, his ideas on unemployment ... [and] More generally, it is an attempt to describe and explain some of the neglected moral assumptions behind the discussion of policy."2 The article is also "intended as a contribution to a necessary revaluation of the climate of opinion in which the great social legislation of the I 905 Liberal government occurred'.3 The essence of the article, as I understand it, is that late Victorian and Edwardian social policy was not, as is usually assumed, based upon non-doctrinaire empirical investigation; that in fact the investigations of Booth, and of those he influenced, are compromised by their unawareness of their own preconceptions and therefore they lapsed into moral attitudes which influenced their analyses of the problems under investigation. "This", writes Dr Brown, "has largely escaped the attention of historians, who tend to ignore problems surrounding the role of value judgements."4 It is this neglected question of "value judgements", particularly with reference to Booth, that is to be considered here. I contend that Dr Brown fails to make the necessary distinction between "value" and "moral" judgements; that Booth is remarkably free from moral judgements; and that his suggestions on labour colonies are firmly rooted in his scientific approach. Nevertheless, by suggesting that Booth was not biased by unconscious moral assumptions one is not committed to denying that "Edwardian social legislation was moulded by very distinctive moral assumptions."5 Far from it: it merely underlines the point that social scientists and politicians are subject to different pressures. Social scientists are free to suggest schemes on their supposed merit; politicians are obliged to consider the opinions of both pressure groups and the electorate. The continued "Poor Law" bias is not a mark of the influence of the social scientist over legislation, but the lack of it. As the distinction between "moral" and "value" judgements is a philosophical one, one wishes to treat it as briefly as possible. Briefly, "moral" judgement must assume, or imply, a genuine choice of action, whereas a "value" judgement need not. To state that someone is socially worthless is a value judgement; for one may blame the environment, poor health, or even insanity for his condition, and not condemn the person morally at all. "Free will" is an essential component of moral responsibility. Value judgements become moral judgements only when it is assumed, or implied, that the persons concerned are in their condition through choice, and that they have rejected a better mode of life out of some form of deliberate perversity.

Is Political Equality Possible

Abstract: The relation between fact and value, between description and evaluation, is generally accounted one of the central problems of moral philosophy, but it also arises in important ways in political and social philosophy. A number of philosophers have asserted that an unbridgeable logical gap prevents us moving validly from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ and in discussions about equality we are often warned that no collection of alleged facts about human nature or about human capacities can yield the conclusion that equality of treatment is desirable. Similarly, if it is right to say that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, that no judgement to the effect that a particular action ‘ought’ to be performed is valid unless it is possible to do it then the ideal of equality must be set against what it is possible to achieve. As James Burnham has written, ‘A goal must be possible before there is any point in considering it desirable.’1

The Objectivity of Value-Judgements

Abstract: In the first chapter, I set out an assumption, that what is good in human action and disposition has a great deal to do with what contributes to human happiness and fulfilment, and tends to minimise human misery and frustration.1 The arguments of the intervening chapters have largely depended on this assumption, which will now be justified in the face of some sophisticated philosophical objections which have been raised against it. The principal objection may be summarised as follows. To say that an action or disposition tends to promote happiness or to minimise misery is to make a judgement of fact about it; to say that it is good or bad is to make a value-judgement. But there is no valid inference from any set of merely factual judgements to any judgement of value.