Showing papers on "Linguistic turn published in 1992"
Book•
01 Jan 1992
TL;DR: The Linguistic Turn as mentioned in this paper provides a rich and representative introduction to the entire historical and doctrinal range of the linguistic philosophy movement, and Rorty shows how his book was shaped by the time in which it was written and traces the directions philosophical study has taken since.
Abstract: The Linguistic Turn provides a rich and representative introduction to the entire historical and doctrinal range of the linguistic philosophy movement. In two retrospective essays titled "Ten Years After" and "Twenty-Five Years After," Rorty shows how his book was shaped by the time in which it was written and traces the directions philosophical study has taken since. "All too rarely an anthology is put together that reflects imagination, command, and comprehensiveness. Rorty's collection is just such a book."--Review of Metaphysics Richard Rorty is University Professor of Humanities at the University of Virginia.
296 citations
Book•
22 Nov 1992
TL;DR: The Linguistic Turn in Jewish Philosophy Part I Buber and the Narrative Theologians as discussed by the authors Part II Constructing a Buberian Hermeneutic Theory Part II Narrative and the Philosophy of I and Thou VI. oAutobiographical FragmentsO: Becoming Self through the Other VII. Narrative Biblical Theology: Responding to the Eclipse of God VIII.
Abstract: Preface: The Linguistic Turn in Jewish Philosophy Part I BuberOs Hermeneutics I. Romanticism, Dilthey, and BuberOs Early Hermeneutics II. I and Thou and the Dialogical Hermeneutic Method III. BuberOs Biblical Hermeneutic Theory IV. Constructing a Buberian Hermeneutic Theory Part II BuberOs Narrative Theology V. Narrative and the Philosophy of I and Thou VI. oAutobiographical FragmentsO: Becoming Self through the Other VII. Narrative Biblical Theology: Responding to the Eclipse of God VIII. Conclusion: Buber and the Narrative Theologians Notes Bibliography Index
35 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that the systematic semantics that Frege developed and that Carnap refurbished is not intensionalism at all, and that the failure to recognize such an alternative has led to the acceptance of criticisms of the intensionalist position which, in fact, are only criticisms of Fregean intensionalisms.
Abstract: From the beginning of the linguistic turn in this century to the present, philosophical discussions of language have consistently assumed that intensionalism, the doctrine that expressions of natural language have sense as well as reference, can only be Fregean intensionalism. In earlier papers (Katz 1986 and 1990a), I argued that this widespread assumption is false because there is another form of intensionalism fundamentally different from Frege's, and, further, that the failure to recognize such an alternative has led to the acceptance of criticisms of the intensionalist position which, in fact, are only criticisms of Fregean intensionalism. Since then I have come to think that the assumption is false for a different and deeper reason, namely, that the systematic semantics that Frege developed and that Carnap refurbished is not intensionalism at all. In this paper, I want to explain why I now think this. In the process, I hope to provide a new perspective on the linguistic turn in twentieth century philosophy and a new conception of the relation between the analytic and the necessary and a priori.
12 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that attribution theory constructed its own version of F. Heider's starting position and that the limitations of this construction are only now becoming apparent, and that linguistic turn prevalent elsewhere in the social sciences is now showing up the weaknesses in attribution theory's conception of people as explainers.
Abstract: Argues that attribution theory constructed its own version of F. Heider's (1958) starting position and that the limitations of this construction are only now becoming apparent. The linguistic turn prevalent elsewhere in the social sciences is now showing up the weaknesses in attribution theory's conception of people as explainers, and offers a new way forward with the conception of people as discourse-users.
5 citations