Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 1985"

The U.s. Intelligence Community

Abstract: Intelligence National Intelligence Organizations Defense Department Intelligence Organizations Military Service Intelligence Organizations Unified Command Intelligence Organizations Civilian Intelligence Organizations Imagery Collection, Interpretation, and Dissemination Signals Intelligence Measurement and Signature Intelligence Space Surveillance Human Intelligence Open Sources, Technical Surveillance and Emplaced Sensors, and Materiel Exploitation Intelligence Sharing Analysis and Production Counterintelligence Covert Action Management and Direction Managing Intelligence Collection and Covert Actions Managing Information Access and Analysis Issues and Challenges

Coping With the Unexpected: Great Britain and the War in the South Atlantic

Abstract: : Soldiers, sailors, and airmen must always think, plan, and practice for the unknown. No matter how realistic the conduct of exercises and training, it is impossible to simulate combat. Wars invariably expose deficiencies in peacetime planning. Before World War I, most soldiers planned and practiced for a war of maneuver and the offensive, yet the Western Front rapidly evolved into a static battle of attrition. Prior to 1914, admirals planned and trained to fight massive and decisive fleet actions on the model of Trafalgar and Tsushima; four years of conflict witnessed only one such action--the Battle of Jutland-- and it did not prove decisive. New weapons systems--aircraft, warships, and fighting vehicles--continually enter inventories. Escalating costs have led to the extensive modification of weapons systems to maintain fighting effectiveness. Sometimes peacetime 'fixes' can be found in innovative tactics and operational concepts. Actual combat compresses the adaptive process. Britain's experience during the South Atlantic War perhaps illustrates this process at its most extreme. Literally overnight, Britain was faced with a war for which it had no plans. Failures in the British intelligence community had led to a total lack of strategic warning. Britain's military forces were mainly configured to fight in Europe in conjunction with powerful allies.

Targeting Air Interdiction in Support of Airland Battle.

Abstract: : Under Airland Battle, the new fighting doctrine of the US Army, deep attacks against enemy follow-on echelons will be a key feature of any operational plan against Soviet forces. However, since the range of its organic assets is limited, the Army will have to rely on tactical air support to conduct many of these deep attacks. This essay describes how the Air Force will provide responsive air interdiction in support of deep attack requirements of Airland Battle despite the fact that AirLand Battle has not been adopted as Air Force doctrine. Functions and responsibilities of the Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) and the Army Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) are defined. Coordinating procedures used by the TACC-BCE to plan and execute air attacks against Army nominated targets are described in detail. The impact of emerging technology in the form of advanced sensors, automated intelligence processing equipment and new control facilities is outlined, as is the plan for capitalizing on these new capabilities to allow synchronization of air and land weapon systems against important, high payoff targets in real time.