Showing papers on "Philosophy of biology published in 1978"

A Matter of Individuality

Abstract: Biological species have been treated traditionally as spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. If they are to perform the function which they do in the evolutionary process, they must be spatiotemporally localized individuals, historical entities. Reinterpreting biological species as historical entities solves several important anomalies in biology, in philosophy of biology, and within philosophy itself. It also has important implications for any attempt to present an "evolutionary" analysis of science and for sciences such as anthropology which are devoted to the study of single species.

The embryological origins of the gene theory.

Abstract: The original support for the gene theory of inheritance came largely from the studies of E. B. Wilson, Theodor Boveri, and Thomas Hunt Morgan. Each of these scientists began his career as an embryologist. In this paper, the emergence of the gene theory out of embryology will be seen in the context of these researchers' attempts to solve the problem of which cellular compartmentthe nucleus or the cytoplasmdirected development. Crucial to this transition from embryology to genetics was the discovery of the sex chromosome, a nuclear structure believed to direct sexual development. We shall see that the constant questioning and retesting of the chromosomal theory of sex determination inadvertently formed the basis for Morgan's proof that the genetic factors were physically located on the individual chromosomes. Finally, the research into the chromosomal models of inheritance displays many examples of how the adherence of scientists to older ideas causes them to interpret new data so as not to conflict with previously held assumptions. This conservative tendency is seen the case of McClung, who insisted on the environmental determination of sex even though he had discovered the mechanism for its intrinsic determination, and especially in T. H. Morgan's ten-year refusal to espouse the Mendelian genetics which he would later champion. Morgan's refusal to accept the Sutton-Boveri synthesis of Mendelism and cytology becomes a chief concern in this essay. His arguments against this view are seen to arise from his previous embryological experiences, which convinced him that chemical reactions in the cytoplasm were responsible for development, rather than morphological changes within the nucleus. This view contrasts with other analyses, which relate Morgan's refusal to his \"empirical\" attitude, his dislike for theorizing, or to his \"romantic\" temperament. Wilson's rapid acceptance of the Sutton-Boveri hypothesis is seen to result from his prior conviction that the nucleus controlled development. The reasons for these differences between Morgan and Wilson are traced back to two of Wilson's embryological beliefs which were not

The Philosophy of Progress..

Abstract: Philosophical dialogue is a curious activity. Arguments are expected to be rigorous, but no demand is made that there must be evidence for the premisses. Terminology is expected to be precise, but its appropriateness to the subject matter under discussion can be left unexplored. Officially, nothing is conceded; but, in fact, a great deal is taken for granted. Ad argumentum mingles indiscriminately with ad hominem; and, above all, the evidential warrant for one's philosophical claims is, like the topics of sex and religion to the less enlightened, one of those delicate issues never to be discussed in mixed company.

Darwin's evolutionary philosophy: the laws of change.

Abstract: The philosophical or metaphysical architecture of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is analyzed and discussed. It is argued that natural selection was for Darwin a paradigmatic case of a natural law of change -- an exemplar of what Ghiselin (1969) has called selective retention laws. These selective retention laws lie at the basis of Darwin's revolutionary world view. In this essay special attention is paid to the consequences for Darwin's concept of species of his selective retention laws. Although Darwin himself explicity supported a variety of nominalism, implicit in the theory of natural selection is a solution to the dispute between nominalism and realism. It is argued that, although implicit, this view plays a very important role in Darwin's theory of natural selection as the means for the origin of species. It is in the context of these selective retention laws and their philosophical implications that Darwin's method is appraised in the light of recent criticisms, and the conclusion drawn that he successfully treated some philosophical problems by approaching them through natural history. Following this an outline of natural selection theory is presented in which all these philosophical issues are highlighted.

Systems Theory and the Philosophy of Science

Abstract: In this paper we discuss the status of systems theory We start the discussion by making some remarks about matters of status Then the development of a critical rationalist philosophy of science is dealt with We emphasize the role of metaphysics First Popper’s falsificationism and Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programmes are briefly reviewed, followed by our own view, which has been influenced by Watkins’ ideas of metaphysical research programmes In the remaining paragraphs Bunge’s view of models and methods is described and criticized; the relations between systems theory, mathematics and metaphysics are elaborated; and some recent approaches to systems theory are considered In the concluding remarks we will try to point out some problems which remain to be solved in the methodology and philosophy of science in relation to systems theory

Is a Philosophy of History Possible

Abstract: Charles Taylor: So far we have heard mostly negative statements about the philosophy of history. We have heard, for instance, about assumptions which can no longer form a tenable basis for it. So now, at the end, let us try to answer the positive question: what can the philosophy of history be today? Can there still be such a discipline as a meaningful area of study, as a distinctive and fruitful kind of philosophical inquiry? Or, to put it bluntly, who needs philosophy of history? And what could be the philosophy of history today?

A human studying the sensing of chemicais by bacteria

Abstract: A new frame of reference, which in its fundamental structuring differs radically from the structuring of the familiar western Indo-European viewpoints (logical, mathematical, scientific, philosophical, etc.), already exists. Recently, by the strategem of systematically disallowing a previously unnoticed untenable assumption encoded in the traditional Western symbolic logics, set theories, etc., in particular and in the Western ‘World-View’ in general, this frame of reference has generated its own, entirely non-traditional, formalized language. The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic has accepted for publication a first paper presenting this non-standard formalized language (Hilgartner, 1975).

The biology of ethics or the ethics of biology? The biologist's quest for meaning.

Abstract: The biologist's involvement in value issues concerning the methodology of biological sciences, in establishing the biological basis of ethics and in creating a value system based on biological knowledge is examined. It is proposed that the roots of this involvement are in the conflict of the knowledge-ethic with the established system of values and in the need for metaphysical explanation.

Philosophy of Science and the Systems Approach

Abstract: The Received View of the philosophy of science — in a way still dominating many physical and social sciences, yet already vigorously challenged — is not identical with positivism but emerged in its wake. This view is strongly biased toward the construction of scientific theories by means of axiomatic calculi to which partial observational interpretations are given. As F. Suppe (1974, p. 4) points out: “the positiviste analysis of scientific knowledge erected upon the Received View has been rejected..., but none of the alternative analyses of scientific knowledge which have been suggested enjoy widespread acceptance.”

Philosophy as Analysis of Origins

Abstract: In the preceding chapter we have seen that Husserl’s earliest philosophical publications must be viewed against the background of Brentano’s descriptive psychology. Husserl’s agreement with this form of analysis inaugurated by Brentano was determinative for his idea of philosophy, which differed in basic respects from that of the early Brentano. In the latter’s PES of 1874, philosophy is the same thing as psychology, which is in turn conceived of in a natural scientific sense. Thus, philosophy = genetic psychology.1 Toward the end of the 1880’s, Brentano’s views on this matter underwent a change, and descriptive psychology came to the fore as an autonomous science. The heart of philosophy now lay in a descriptive clearing up of the fundamental concepts of the normative sciences (aesthetics, logic, ethics). The normative pronouncements of these sciences, which are made on the basis of their fundamental concepts, thereby receive a firm foundation.