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Showing papers on "Philosophy of computer science published in 1977"



Book
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: In this paper, Brown outlines the transition between the logical empiricist tradition and the more historical and process-oriented approach he calls the "new philosophy of science." Examining the two together, he describes the very transition between them as an example of the kind of change in historical tradition with which the new philosophy concerns itself.
Abstract: With originality and clarity, Harold Brown outlines first the logical empiricist tradition and then the more historical and process-oriented approach he calls the "new philosophy of science." Examining the two together, he describes the very transition between them as an example of the kind of change in historical tradition with which the new philosophy of science concerns itself. "I would recommend it to every historian of science and to every philosopher of science...I found it clear, readable, accurate, cogent, insightful, perceptive, judicious, and full of original ideas." --Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Isis "The best and most original aspect of the book is its overall conception." --Thomas S. Kuhn Harold I. Brown is professor of philosophy at Northern Illinois University.

146 citations


Book
01 Jan 1977

113 citations



Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: This article argued that theories develop and change structure with time, that (like biological species) they are historical entities, and that both the identification and the evaluation of theories are essentially historical in character.
Abstract: History of science, it has been argued, has benefited philosophers of science primarily by forcing them into greater contact with "real science." In this paper I argue that additional major benefits arise from the importance of specifically historical considerations within philosophy of science. Loci for specifically historical investigations include: (1) making and evaluating rational reconstructions of particular theories and explanations, (2) estimating the degree of support earned by particular theories and theoretical claims, and (3) evaluating proposed philosophical norms for the evaluation of the degree of support for theories and the worth of explanations. More generally, I argue that theories develop and change structure with time, that (like biological species) they are historical entities. Accordingly, both the identification and the evaluation of theories are essentially historical in character.

80 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In the last twenty years an enormous literature has grown up around the question, what is the nature of social science? Two positions have dominated these discussions, the naturalist view which holds that social science involves no essential differences from the natural sciences, and the humanist view that social life cannot adequately be studied "scientifically".
Abstract: During the last twenty years an enormous literature has grown up around the question, what is the nature of social science? Two positions have dominated these discussions, the ’naturalist’ view which holds that social science involves no essential differences from the natural sciences, and the ’humanist’ view which holds that social life cannot adequately be studied ’scientifically’. Whole models of social science have been propounded that argue for one position and view the other as

57 citations




Book
01 Jan 1977

29 citations




Book
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: A meta computer science approach to the science of computation based on McCarthy's pioneering studies and evidence in support of Turing's thesis.
Abstract: Part One: Meta computer science. The abstract machine approach. The limitations of computer science. The functional or programming approach. Evidence in support of Turing's thesis. Part Two: Towards a science of computation. McCarthy's pioneering studies. Making programs reliable. Questions of meaning.

Journal ArticleDOI
06 Jan 1977-Nature
TL;DR: The aim of science is to improve knowledge, not of truth per se, but rather of valuable truth -truth that is useful or of interest in some way as discussed by the authors. But this view is untenable.
Abstract: Modern science is seriously harmed by a widespread attempt to make science conform to a wholly inadequate philosophy of science— one which misrepresents the basic intellectual aims of science. It is widely taken for granted by scientists that the aim of science is to improve knowledge of factual truth – nothing being presupposed about the truth. But this view is untenable. Quite properly, science aims to improve knowledge, not of truth per se, but rather of valuable truth – truth that is useful or of interest in some way. At once it is clear that the aim of science is problematic, and needs to be subjected to sustained imaginative and critical discussion, in an attempt to improve it. We need to put into scientific practice a new conception of science which recognizes three domains of scientific discussion: evidence, theory and aims.



Journal ArticleDOI
02 Feb 1977
TL;DR: I will discuss certain mathematical ideas which naturally arise in computer science courses and cite relevant examples which will hopefully convince the reader that these ideas are worthy of formal study and suggest their inclusion in the four-year computer science curriculum.
Abstract: Although there is not universal agreement on a definition of computer science, I believe that it is the inclusion of a quantitative (mathematical) approach to our discipline that distinguishes “computer science” from “computer programming”. Mathematics provides both an established language with which to precisely define terms and established methods for problem solving. For example, the rather vague statement that “algorithm A is better than algorithm B” may be formulated unambiguously and verified or refuted with respect to certain performance measurements using the formalism of algorithm analysis (l). Mathematical methods also point toward the possibility of proving that an algorithm provides acceptable performance for large classes of inputs, a conclusion which often cannot be supported on the basis of case-by-case testing (5).I will now discuss certain mathematical ideas which naturally arise in computer science courses and cite relevant examples which will hopefully convince the reader that these ideas are worthy of formal study. Suggestions are then offered regarding the inclusion of these studies in the four-year computer science curriculum.

Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: One way in which the Computer Society, using part of the dues the authors each pay each year along with a great amount of volunteer effort, has been addressing the current and future needs of society members is presented.
Abstract: A question often asked of those closely associated with the affairs of the Computer Society is, "What can the society do for me?" Occasionally I have asked the same question In these introductory comments, I would like to present one way in which our society, using part of the dues we each pay each year along with a great amount of volunteer effort, has been addressing the current and future needs of society members The effort has to do with education in computer science and engineering; the results are partly evidenced by the ten solicited articles of this special supplement, which present the results of the Computer Society's Model Curriculum Subcommittee Report, A Curriculum in Computer Science and Engineering (EHOI 19-8)


Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the speech act theory of language use which in fact presupposes a theory of communication, in the same sense that a conceptual structure presupposes conceptual infrastructure.
Abstract: Communication is one of the principal criteria for describing activity that is human. The nature and function of language as Man’s chief vehicle of communication occupies a focal position in the human sciences, particularly in philosophy. Human communication is problematic from the beginning, because the term is at once a nominative description for varying states of affair, and yet, the term suggests an explanation for the process nature of speech as an activity. Now the shape of a problem emerges. We are faced with an antinomy. Is the apparent happy relationship between the nature and function of language actually contradictory? Or to reformulate the question, is ‘communication’ a name for both the nature (description) and function (explanation) of language use in human behavior exchange? This is the basic question that the present study seeks to answer. Thus, the focus of the investigation proceeds to focus explicitly on the speech act theory of language use which in fact presupposes a theory of communication, in the same sense that a conceptual structure presupposes a conceptual infrastructure.1

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: The concept of matter is one of the fundamental concepts of scientific and philosophical knowledge as mentioned in this paper, and it has been widely used in science and philosophy, including in the computer science domain.
Abstract: 1. The concept of matter is one of the fundamental concepts of scientific and philosophical knowledge.



Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: The sole aim of this paper is to attempt to bridge the gulf between the computer field and mathematics and logic, and to provide such mathematical definitions as would be very relevant to computers and to their languages, and even more, to their development and design.
Abstract: Some clarifications and mathematical definitions which are concerned with the many fundamental concepts of computability theory based directly on the computer field, are presented. The sole aim of this paper is to attempt to bridge the gulf between the computer field on the one hand, and mathematics and logic on the other. The particular concepts are presented here for justification only: and therefore almost no theorems are included. (Fortunately there is no employer who could press me to prove the theorems!). The intention is to provide such mathematical definitions as would be very relevant to computers and to their languages, and even more, to their development and design.

Journal ArticleDOI

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: This article found that non-Marxist philosophy has been failing to pull its weight or even to make any organized effort to regenerate itself and that it has become ingrown and disconnected from the wellsprings of new ideas.
Abstract: As we found in Chapter 6, recent Western non-Marxist philosophy has propelled itself into such an unhappy state as to warrant Popper’s grave indictment: ‘Apart from some Marxists, most professional philosophers seem to have lost touch with reality.’ And we noted Lukacs’ challenging assertion that a resuscitation of Western non-Marxist philosophy would be impossible ‘on the soil of bourgeois society’. Far from responding to that challenge, non-Marxist philosophy has been failing to pull its weight or even to make any organized effort to regenerate itself. It has become ingrown and disconnected from the wellsprings of new ideas.

Book ChapterDOI
01 Jan 1977
TL;DR: Whitehead's philosophy of nature is largely presented in his books An Enquiry concerning Natural Knowledge (PNK) and The Concept of Nature (CN), and to some extent in The Principle of Relativity (P of R), although the latter is also concerned with his theory of relativity.
Abstract: Whitehead’s philosophy of nature is largely presented in his books An Enquiry concerning Natural Knowledge (PNK) and The Concept of Nature (CN), and to some extent in The Principle of Relativity (P of R), although the latter is also concerned with his theory of relativity. One of the reasons for the neglect of these works in recent years is that philosophers of science have tended to be interested in other types of problems than those discussed by Whitehead there. They have been primarily taken up with questions relating to the linguistic analysis of science and with models of scientific theories. It is a little ironical to reflect that this approach is probably due to the influence of mathematical logic, of which Whitehead was one of the pioneers. In his philosophy of nature Whitehead, however, was concerned with a very different sort of problem, which he would have considered more fundamental, namely, the relating of the abstract notions of physics to our sense-experience.