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Showing papers on "Purchasing power published in 1968"


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: In a perfectly competitive economy, the judgment that the quantity and distribution of a certain commodity are inadequate can be interpreted to mean that there is a different, better distribution of purchasing power as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The public believes that economists know that one basic cause of the "shortage" is the operation of a large collective monopoly that restricts entry into medical practice and enforces price discrimination. But public dissatisfaction with health services would not be eradicated solely by increases of professional numbers. We discuss possible sources of the "shortage" and how their role might be assessed. Previous research, with a few brilliant exceptions,' slighted the spatial variation in rates of training, practice, and quality of service available across the nation. We have begun analysis of this variation. Our objectives are a better description of this variation and a better understanding of the operation of markets for health services. In a perfectly competitive economy, the judgment that the quantity and distribution of a certain commodity are inadequate can be interpreted to mean that there is a different, better distribution of purchasing power. The judgment is supplied on extra-economic grounds, and the preferred distribution is achieved by ideal taxes and transfers that do not impair optimality. Its consequences are the reallocation of resources to the production of greater quantities of the commodity judged to be deficient, and the reallocation of consumption toward the commodity. Could such a redistribution of income remedy the expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity and distribution of health services? Not entirely, because of the characteristics of the demand for and supply of health services. Many premature deaths and medically unncessarily long illnesses of the poor could have been avoided if they had had greater pur

8 citations


01 Jan 1968
TL;DR: In this article, the authors discuss the impact of the URBAN INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH on the land use in the United States, and present a survey of the factors that contribute to this.
Abstract: DURING THE PERIOD OF 1950 TO 1965, THE URBAN INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, IN THIS INSTANCE, THE PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES, EXPERIENCED THEIR GREATEST GROWTH IN HISTORY - GROWTH IN TERMS OF STUDENTS, STAFF AND FACILITIES. MOST OF THE INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH HAS HAD A STRONG INFLUENCE ON LAND USE WITHIN, AS DISCUSSED HERE, THE BOSTON METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY AND/OR HAS BEEN INFLUENCED IN TURN BY COMMUNITY LAND USES. TEN FACTORS HAVE BEEN SELECTED TO ANALYZE THE IMPACT OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH, AND, WHERE APPROPRIATE, ITS EFFECT UPON URBAN LAND USE. THE POSITIVE FACTORS: (1) PURCHASING POWER - STUDENTS, STAFF AND INSTITUTIONAL, (2) JOBS - FACULTY, STAFF AND SERVICE EMPLOYEES, (3) CONSTRUCTION - CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES, (4) NEW BUSINESSES - CREATION OF NEW INSTITUTIONALLY RELATED BUSINESSES, (5) CULTURAL/SOCIAL - UPGRADING OF COMMUNITY LIVING STANDARDS. THE QUESTIONABLE FACTORS ARE: (1) CAMPUS EXPANSION - ADDITIONAL LAND USE DEMANDS, (2) HOUSING - FACULTY, STUDENTS AND STAFF, OVERBURDENING OF EXISTING HOUSING. THE NEGATIVE FACTORS ARE: (1) TRAFFIC AND PARKING - TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND LACK OF PARKING AREA, (2) COMMUNITY SERVICES - ADDITIONAL DEMANDS UPON FIRE, POLICE, REFUSE DISPOSAL, ETC. (3) TAX STRUCTURE - INCREASE IN TAX-EXEMPT PROPERTIES AND UNEQUAL TAX BURDEN. THESE FACTORS ARE ALL DISCUSSED IN DETAIL. MOST CITIES AND TOWNS WANT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AS PART OF THEIR COMMUNITY. THE COMMUNITY REALIZES THE ADVANTAGES THAT AN INSTITUTION CAN BRING, BUT AT THE SAME TIME THE COMMUNITY OFTEN FAILS TO REALIZE THIS WHEN IT COMES TO THE LAND USE NEEDS OF AN INSTITUTION AND THE RESULTING EFFECTS UPON THE LOCAL PROPERTY TAX STRUCTURE. THE BOSTON AREA INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IS MUCH THE SAME AS ELSEWHERE - A GROWING NEED AND NO SIMPLE INEXPENSIVE WAY (IF THERE IS A WAY) TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY LAND FOR EXPANSION. PROPERTIES ADJACENT TO THE URBAN INSTITUTION ARE INCREASINGLY BEING SOUGHT FOR INSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION. SUCH CHANGES INEVITABLY, THROUGH THEIR CHAIN REACTIONS, CREATE COMMUNITY-WIDE PROBLEMS, PARTICULARLY IN PARKING AND TRAFFIC REQUIREMENTS AND LEAD TO FURTHER CHANGES ON THE REAL ESTATE PROPERTY TAX FRONT. UNTIL THE COMMUNITY, THE INSTITUTION AND PRIVATE INTEREST ALL WORKING TOGETHER, CAN FACE WHAT ARE COMMON PROBLEMS, RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL INTEREST PROBLEMS, THE PARTICULAR PROBLEMS OF INSTITUTIONAL GROWTH AND ESPECIALLY THEIR EFFECTS ON URBAN LAND USE, WILL CONTINUE TO MULTIPLY TO WHERE ANY REASONABLE AND ECONOMIC SOLUTION WILL BE ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE.

2 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
01 Jun 1968
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the social and economic implications of technological progress with particular reference to electric power generation, the iron and steel industry and transportation, and suggest what might be achieved if, by more modern economic policies, redundant resources were to be transformed into national assets and increased gross national product.
Abstract: The paper is in three parts. The first concerns the social and economic implications of technological progress with particular reference to electric power generation, the iron and steel industry and transportation.The second part relates to the fundamental principles of money as a means of payment and a measure of value; also explains the controlling factors which regulate the purchasing power of money.In the third part the author suggests what might be achieved if, by more modern economic policies, redundant resources were to be transformed into national assets and increased gross national product.

2 citations


Journal ArticleDOI
TL;DR: The differences between Professor Chambers and myself undoubtedly result from differences in the definition and measurement of income as mentioned in this paper, and the differences between these two definitions of income can be seen as a direct consequence of the fact that they are different.
Abstract: The differences between Professor Chambers and myself undoubtedly result, as he points out in his most recent contribution to the debate,' from differences in the definition and measurement of income. The particular point at issue is the extent to which changes in the general purchasing power of money should be reflected in the income of an individual firm. In my earlier paper,2 I argued that the full distribution of income as defined and measured in Chambers' system would have the effect of maintaining residual equity in terms of general purchasing power, but that, to the extent that the specific price increase in respect of nonmonetary assets (Nr) exceeds the change in general purchasing power of the residual equity (Rp), the residual equity at the end of the period no longer commands the same quantity of operating assets N at their new prices N(1 + r). Chambers endeavored to refute this proposition by means of the following arithmetical example:

2 citations