Showing papers on "Sign (semiotics) published in 1973"

Information concepts and their utility

Abstract: The concept of information is examined within the framework of the Mathematical Theory of Communication and semiotics, the study of signs and sign systems. The implications of these theories for the better understanding of information as we deal with this concept in the context of information systems are discussed.

A Western Apache Writing System: The Symbols of Silas John

Abstract: At the outset of this article, it was observed that the adequacy of an etic typology of written symbols could be judged by its ability to describe all the emic distinctions in all the writing systems of the world. In conclusion, we should like to return to this point and briefly examine the extent to which currently available etic concepts can be used to describe the distinctions made by Western Apaches in relation to the writing system of Silas John. Every symbol in the Silas John script may be classified as a phonetic-semantic sign. Symbols of this type denote linguistic expressions that consist of one or more words and contrast as a class with phonetic-nonsemantic signs, which denote phonemes (or phoneme clusters), syllables (or syllable clusters), and various prosodic phenomena ( 2 , pp. 2, 248). Phonetic semantic signs are commonly partitioned into two subclasses: alogographs (which denote single words) and phraseographs (which denote on or more words). Although every symbol in the Silas John script can be assigned to one or the other of these categories, such an exercise is without justification ( 21 ). We have no evidence to suggest that Western Apaches classify symbols according to the length or complexity of their linguistic referents, and therefore the imposition of distinctions based on these criteria would be inappropriate and misleading. A far more useful contrast, and one we have already employed, is presented in most etic typologies as an opposition between compound (composite) and noncompound (noncomposite) symbols. Used to break down the category of phonetic-semantic signs, these two concepts enable us to describe more or less exactly the distinction Apaches draw between "symbol elements put together" ( ke?escin ledidilgoh ) and "symbol elements standing alone" ( ke?- escin doledidildaahi ). The former may now be defined as consisting of compound phonetic-semantic signs, while the latter is composed of noncompound phonetic-semantic signs. Up to this point, etic concepts have served us well. However, a deficiency appears when we search for a terminology that allows us to describe the distinction between "symbols that tell what to say" and "symbols that tell what to do." As far as we have been able to determine, standard typologies make no provision for this kind of contrast, apparently because their creators have tacitly assumed that systems composed of phonetic-semantic signs serve exclusively to communicate linguistic information. Consequently, the possibility that these systems might also convey nonlinguistic information seems to have been ignored. This oversight may be a product of Western ethnocentrism; after all, it is. we who use alphabets who most frequently associate writing with language ( 22 ). On the other hand, it may simply stem from the fact that systems incorporating symbols with kinesic referents are exceedingly rare and have not yet been reported. In any case, it is important to recognize that the etic inventory is not complete. Retaining the term "phonetic sign" as a label for written symbols. that denote linguistic phenomena, we propose that the term "kinetic sign" be introduced to label symbols that denote sequences of nonverbal behavior. Symbols of the latter type that simultaneously denote some unit of language may be classified as "phonetic-kinetic" signs. With these concepts, the contrast between " symbols that tell what to say" and "symbols that tell what to do" can be rephrased as one that distinguishes phonetic signs (by definition nonkinetic) from phonetic-kinetic signs. Purely kinetic signs—symbols that refer solely to physical gestures—are absent from the Silas John script. The utility of the kinetic sign and the phonetic-kinetic sign as comparative concepts must ultimately be judged on the basis of their capacity to clarify and describe emic distinctions in other systems of writing. However, as we have previously pointed out, ethnographic studies of American Indian systems that address themselves to the identification of these distinctions—and thus provide the information necessary to evaluate the relevance and applicability of etic concepts—are in very short supply. As a result, meaningful comparisons cannot be made. At this point, we simply alack the data with which to determine whether the kinetic component so prominen in the Silas John script is unique or whether it had counterparts else-where in North America. The view is still prevalent among anthropologists and linguists that the great majority of American Indian writing systems conform to one or two global "primitive" types. Our study of the Silas John script casts doubt upon this position, for it demonstrates that fundamental emic distinctions remain to be discovered and that existing etic frameworks are less than adequatelyequipped to describe them. The implications of these findings are clear. On the one hand, we must acknowledge the possibility that several structurally distinct forms of writing were developed by North America9s Indian cultures. Concomitantly, we must be prepared to aabandon traditional ideas of typological similarity and simplicity among thes systems in favor of those that take into account variation and complexity.

On the Reading and Meaning of GANA2

Abstract: Recent Sumerological literature indicates that the reading g a n a g for the sign GANA2 in Old Sumerian texts is on its way to becoming a standard and accepted reading. It will be submitted here that the evidence does not support this; this study will 1) suggest that the evidence supports the reading a s ax or a s a gx, i.e., / a a G /, for the sign GANA2 in the meanings "field" and "area of land" and 2) to try to tentatively indicate where the distinction lies between the words a ? a g and g a n a. Beyond the purely philological interest of this problem is the circumstance that it touches upon 1) the question of to what degree the orthography of Proto-Ea and later lexical texts reflects the orthoggraphy of the third millennium and 2) the interpretation of certain Sumerian agricultural practices.

Darwin, Teleology and Taxonomy

Abstract: Darwinism is 'much more than a theory', said the German botanist Albert Wigand in i875; 'it is a frame of mind which dominates thought, a resuscitated "Naturphilosophie", in which the terms "Polarity", "Totality", "Subject", "Object" are replaced by terms such as "Struggle for Existence", "Inheritance", "Selection", and so on.'1 Subsequent events have indicated that Wigand had a point. But it is not clear to us yet what exactly the point is. Interest in Man's Place in Nature, and in his alleged biological uniqueness as a language-user and tool-maker, is as great now as it was in i87I when Darwin's Descent of Man was first published. We now have access to well over a hundred years' worth of material sparked off by The Origin of Species, linking Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection to almost every field under the sun. Yet the precise status of his theory is still the subject of vigorous controversy in philosophy of science. One source of lingering perplexity is the concept of 'purpose in nature', which is connected to the idea of 'natural progress'. It strikes one as paradoxical that, on the one hand, the theory says there is no need to appeal to purposes when explaining evolutionary developments, and, on the other, the language inwhich the theoryis expressed is chock-a-blockwith references to purposes. One of the main aims of a recent best-selling book2 is to provide a solution to what the author calls this 'flagrant epistemological contradiction'. Secondly, it is tempting to say that there is no possible animal or plant that natural selection could not claim to explain. Is this a sign that it is one of the greatest scientific generalizations of all time, or a sign that it is a tautology, and so not an empirical hypothesis at all? Third, and most important of all perhaps, the theory claims that man is subject to natural selection like the rest of nature. But man invents culture. Does Darwin's theory imply that there is such a thing as 'cultural evolution' which proceeds in accordance with the law of natural selection? These are three large questions. They are made additionally complex by the fact that the theory is itself a landmark of scientific progress. It has

Pratiques signifiantes et sociologie : en guise de conclusion

Abstract: The authors are trying to review the pertinent sociological questions that might arise in the analyses presented in this issue of « Social Compass ». First of all, they examine the implications of a linguistic procedure in comparison with the sociology of culture. The merit of linguistics and semiotics is to awaken the sociology of culture by helping it to reformulate its theoretical object. But the use of linguistic models assumes that the sociologist takes a distance from them and also assumes a critical work beforehand. In addition, it assumes the use of a conceptual apparatus capable of making an analysis of the imminence of speech come out in order to make the sociological significance (sign ification) appear.