Showing papers on "Skeptical theism published in 2016"
TL;DR: Reformed epistemology, roughly defined as the thesis that religious belief can be rational without argument as discussed by the authors, is the belief that belief in a belief system can be justified without argument.
Abstract: Reformed epistemology, roughly, is the thesis that religious belief can be rational without argument. After providing some background, I present Plantinga's defense of reformed epistemology and its influence on religious debunking arguments. I then discuss three objections to Plantinga's arguments that arise from the following topics: skeptical theism, cognitive science of religion, and basicality. I then show how reformed epistemology has recently been undergirded by a number of epistemological theories, including phenomenal conservatism and virtue epistemology. I end by noting that a good objection to reformed epistemology must criticize either a substantive epistemological theory or the application of that theory to religious belief; I also show that the famous Great Pumpkin Objection is an example of the former.
14 citations
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01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God as discussed by the authors, and many theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access), epistemic appearances, "gratuitous" evils, "levering" evidence, and the representativeness of goods.
Abstract: The problem of evil is the most prominent argument against the existence of God. Skeptical theists contend that it is not a good argument. Their reasons for this contention vary widely, involving such notions as CORNEA (Condition Of ReasoNable Epistemic Access), epistemic appearances, ‘gratuitous’ evils, ‘levering’ evidence, and the representativeness of goods. This chapter aims to dispel some confusions about these notions, in particular by clarifying their roles within a probabilistic epistemology. In addition, the chapter develops new responses to the problem of evil from both the phenomenal conception of evidence and the knowledge-first view of evidence.
13 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore van Inwagen's conception of miracles and the implications of this conception for the viability of his version of the natural law defense, and argue that given van INVW's account of miraculous divine action and its parallel to free human action, it is implausible to think that God did not prevent natural evil in our world for the reasons van INwagen proposes.
Abstract: In this paper I explore Peter van Inwagen’s conception of miracles and the implications of this conception for the viability of his version of the natural law defense. I argue that given his account of miraculous divine action and its parallel to free human action, it is implausible to think that God did not prevent natural evil in our world for the reasons van Inwagen proposes. I conclude by suggesting that on the grounds he provides for “epistemic humility” about modal claims and value judgments “unrelated to the concerns of everyday life,” the theist should simply embrace skeptical theism and not further attempt to construct a defense of God’s permission of evil.
3 citations
01 Jan 2016
TL;DR: This paper argued that skeptical theism is not a logical standpoint for the theist to take, as it cannot pose a compelling response to the problem of evil without quickly leading to a level of skepticism that undercuts theism.
Abstract: The evidential problem of evil has become an important topic within the philosophy of religion. This formulation of the problem of evil states that it is unlikely that God exists given the existence of pointless suffering. In response, many theists have taken a position known as skeptical theism, which argues that one cannot make any reasonable judgments about such cases of suffering, as humans are not omniscient and therefore cannot know whether there may be goods attached that could justify the inherent evil of the suffering. This paper argues that skeptical theism as a response to the evidential problem of evil undermines the rest of theism, as it forces skepticism about all other tenets of religious faith. In addition, this paper argues that skeptical theism makes any relationship with the divine, a core tenant of most theistic religions, impossible. Given these reasons, skeptical theism is not a logical standpoint for the theist to take, as it cannot pose a compelling response to the problem of evil without quickly leading to a level of skepticism that undercuts theism. Rowe’s Formulation of the Evidential Problem of Evil and the Response of Skeptical