A
Adam O'Neill
Researcher at University of Massachusetts Amherst
Publications - 66
Citations - 4782
Adam O'Neill is an academic researcher from University of Massachusetts Amherst. The author has contributed to research in topics: Encryption & Cryptography. The author has an hindex of 26, co-authored 62 publications receiving 4386 citations. Previous affiliations of Adam O'Neill include Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica & Boston University.
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Book ChapterDOI
Order-Preserving Symmetric Encryption
TL;DR: The notion of order-preserving symmetric encryption (OPE) was introduced by Agrawal et al. as mentioned in this paper, who showed that a straightforward relaxation of standard security notions for encryption such as indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) is unachievable by a practical OPE scheme.
Book ChapterDOI
Deterministic and efficiently searchable encryption
TL;DR: This work obtains as a consequence database encryption methods that permit fast database search while provably providing privacy that is as strong as possible subject to this fast search constraint.
Book ChapterDOI
Order-preserving encryption revisited: improved security analysis and alternative solutions
TL;DR: Boldyreva et al. as discussed by the authors showed that random order-preserving function (ROPF) can leak both the value of any plaintext and the distance between any two plaintexts to within a range of possibilities roughly the square root of the domain size.
Book ChapterDOI
On Notions of Security for Deterministic Encryption, and Efficient Constructions without Random Oracles
TL;DR: This work proposes a slightly weaker notion of security, saying that no partial information about encrypted messages should be leaked as long as each message is a-priori hard-to-guess given the others, and shows equivalence of this definition to single-message and indistinguishability-based ones, which are easier to work with.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Generic Attacks on Secure Outsourced Databases
TL;DR: This work proposes abstract models that capture secure outsourced storage systems in sufficient generality, and identifies two basic sources of leakage, namely access pattern and ommunication volume, and develops generic reconstruction attacks on any system supporting range queries where either access pattern or communication volume is leaked.