Showing papers by "Adam Wagstaff published in 2016"

Encouraging Health Insurance for the Informal Sector: A Cluster Randomized Experiment in Vietnam

Abstract: Subsidized voluntary enrollment in government-run health insurance schemes is often proposed as a way of increasing coverage among informal sector workers and their families. We report the results of a cluster randomized experiment, in which 3000 households in 20 communes in Vietnam were randomly assigned at baseline to a control group or one of three treatments: an information leaflet about Vietnam's government-run scheme and the benefits of health insurance, a voucher entitling eligible household members to 25% off their annual premium, and both. At baseline, the four groups had similar enrollment rates (4%) and were balanced on plausible enrollment determinants. The interventions all had small and insignificant effects (around 1 percentage point or ppt). Among those reporting sickness in the 12 months prior to the baseline survey the subsidy-only intervention raised enrollment by 3.5 ppts (p = 0.08) while the combined intervention raised enrollment by 4.5 ppts (p = 0.02); however, the differences in the effect sizes between the sick and non-sick were just shy of being significant. Our results suggest that information campaigns and subsidies may have limited effects on voluntary health insurance enrollment in Vietnam and that such interventions might exacerbate adverse selection. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Effects of Price, Information, and Transactions Cost Interventions to Raise Voluntary Enrollment in a Social Health Insurance Scheme: A Randomized Experiment in the Philippines.

Abstract: A cluster randomized experiment was undertaken testing two sets of interventions encouraging enrollment in the Individually Paying Program (IPP), the voluntary component of the Philippines' social health insurance program. In early 2011, 1037 unenrolled IPP-eligible families in 179 randomly selected intervention municipalities were given an information kit and offered a 50% premium subsidy valid until the end of 2011; 383 IPP-eligible families in 64 control municipalities were not. In February 2012, the 787 families in the intervention sites who were still IPP-eligible but had not enrolled had their vouchers extended, were resent the enrollment kits and received SMS reminders. Half the group also received a 'handholding' intervention: in the endline interview, the enumerator offered to help complete the enrollment form, deliver it to the insurer's office in the provincial capital, and mail the membership cards. The main intervention raised the enrollment rate by 3 percentage points (ppts) (p = 0.11), with an 8 ppt larger effect (p < 0.01) among city-dwellers, consistent with travel time to the insurance office affecting enrollment. The handholding intervention raised enrollment by 29 ppts (p < 0.01), with a smaller effect (p < 0.01) among city-dwellers, likely because of shorter travel times, and higher education levels facilitating unaided completion of the enrollment form. Copyright © The World Bank Health Economics © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Scheme on Prescription Quality in Rural China.

Abstract: In this prospective study, conducted in China where providers have traditionally been paid fee-for-service, and where drug spending is high and irrational drug prescribing common, township health centers in two counties were assigned to two groups: in one fee-for-service was replaced by a capitated global budget (CGB); in the other by a mix of CGB and pay-for-performance. In the latter, 20% of the CGB was withheld each quarter, with the amount returned depending on points deducted for failure to meet performance targets. Outcomes studied included indicators of rational drug prescribing and prescription cost. Impacts were assessed using differences-in-differences, because political interference led to non-random assignment across the two groups. The combination of capitated global budget and pay-for-performance reduced irrational prescribing substantially relative to capitated global budget but only in the county that started above the penalty targets. Endline rates were still appreciable, however, and no effects were found in either county on out-of-pocket spending. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

How Useful Is Inequality of Opportunity as a Policy Construct

Abstract: In policy and political discourse, “equality of opportunity” is the new motherhood and apple pie. It is often contrasted with equality of outcomes, with the latter coming off worse. Equality of outcomes is seen variously as Utopian, as infeasible, as detrimental to incentives, and even as inequitable if outcomes are the result of differing efforts. Equality of opportunity, on the other hand, is interchangeable with phrases such as ‘leveling the playing field’, ‘giving everybody an equal start’ and ‘making the most of inherent talents.’ In its strongest form, the position is that equality of outcomes should be irrelevant to policy; what matters is equality of opportunity.