Ágnes Pintér

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an experimental study where they analyze three well-known matching mechanisms (the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms) in different informational settings.

TL;DR: In this paper, three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admission problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings, and the TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.

TL;DR: In this paper, the role of information in individual decision-making was analyzed in the context of college admission, and two well-known matching mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley and the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) were compared in three different informational settings.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a selection principle called equity (EQ), which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest money payoff, if only one such equilibrium exists.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a selection principle called equity (EQ), which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest money payoff, if only one such equilibrium exists.