Showing papers by "Alexander Peysakhovich published in 2019"

PyTorch-BigGraph: A Large-scale Graph Embedding System

Abstract: Graph embedding methods produce unsupervised node features from graphs that can then be used for a variety of machine learning tasks. Modern graphs, particularly in industrial applications, contain billions of nodes and trillions of edges, which exceeds the capability of existing embedding systems. We present PyTorch-BigGraph (PBG), an embedding system that incorporates several modifications to traditional multi-relation embedding systems that allow it to scale to graphs with billions of nodes and trillions of edges. PBG uses graph partitioning to train arbitrarily large embeddings on either a single machine or in a distributed environment. We demonstrate comparable performance with existing embedding systems on common benchmarks, while allowing for scaling to arbitrarily large graphs and parallelization on multiple machines. We train and evaluate embeddings on several large social network graphs as well as the full Freebase dataset, which contains over 100 million nodes and 2 billion edges.

Pytorch-BigGraph: A Large Scale Graph Embedding System.

Abstract: Graph embedding methods produce unsupervised node features from graphs that can then be used for a variety of machine learning tasks. Modern graphs, particularly in industrial applications, contain billions of nodes and trillions of edges, which exceeds the capability of existing embedding systems. We present PyTorch-BigGraph (PBG), an embedding system that incorporates several modifications to traditional multi-relation embedding systems that allow it to scale to graphs with billions of nodes and trillions of edges. PBG uses graph partitioning to train arbitrarily large embeddings on either a single machine or in a distributed environment. We demonstrate comparable performance with existing embedding systems on common benchmarks, while allowing for scaling to arbitrarily large graphs and parallelization on multiple machines. We train and evaluate embeddings on several large social network graphs as well as the full Freebase dataset, which contains over 100 million nodes and 2 billion edges.

Learning Existing Social Conventions via Observationally Augmented Self-Play

Abstract: In order for artificial agents to coordinate effectively with people, they must act consistently with existing conventions (e.g. how to navigate in traffic, which language to speak, or how to coordinate with teammates). A group's conventions can be viewed as a choice of equilibrium in a coordination game. We consider the problem of an agent learning a policy for a coordination game in a simulated environment and then using this policy when it enters an existing group. When there are multiple possible conventions we show that learning a policy via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) is likely to find policies which achieve high payoffs at training time but fail to coordinate with the real group into which the agent enters. We assume access to a small number of samples of behavior from the true convention and show that we can augment the MARL objective to help it find policies consistent with the real group's convention. In three environments from the literature - traffic, communication, and team coordination - we observe that augmenting MARL with a small amount of imitation learning greatly increases the probability that the strategy found by MARL fits well with the existing social convention. We show that this works even in an environment where standard training methods very rarely find the true convention of the agent's partners.

Discovering Context Effects from Raw Choice Data

Abstract: Many applications in preference learning assume that decisions come from the maximization of a stable utility function. Yet a large experimental literature shows that individual choices and judgements can be affected by "irrelevant" aspects of the context in which they are made. An important class of such contexts is the composition of the choice set. In this work, our goal is to discover such choice set effects from raw choice data. We introduce an extension of the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, called the context dependent random utility model (CDM), which allows for a particular class of choice set effects. We show that the CDM can be thought of as a second-order approximation to a general choice system, can be inferred optimally using maximum likelihood and, importantly, is easily interpretable. We apply the CDM to both real and simulated choice data to perform principled exploratory analyses for the presence of choice set effects.

Computing Large Market Equilibria using Abstractions

Abstract: Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design (e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for all items) and compute power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying a method used for solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction of a given market, solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting the prices and allocations back to the original market. We show how to bound important quantities such as regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto optimality, and maximin share when the abstracted prices and allocations are used in place of the real equilibrium. We then study two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in real data allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed from even very coarse abstractions.

Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems

Abstract: Decision makers in health, public policy, technology, and social science are increasingly interested in going beyond 'one-size-fits-all' policies to personalized ones. Thus, they are faced with the problem of estimating heterogeneous causal effects. Unfortunately, estimating heterogeneous effects from randomized data requires large amounts of statistical power and while observational data is often available in much larger quantities the presence of unobserved confounders can make using estimates derived from it highly suspect. We show that under some assumptions estimated heterogeneous treatment effects from observational data can preserve the rank ordering of the true heterogeneous causal effects. Such an approach is useful when observational data is large, the set of features is high-dimensional, and our priors about feature importance are weak. We probe the effectiveness of our approach in simulations and show a real-world example in a large-scale recommendations problem.

Scalable Fair Division for 'At Most One' Preferences

Abstract: Allocating multiple scarce items across a set of individuals is an important practical problem. In the case of divisible goods and additive preferences a convex program can be used to find the solution that maximizes Nash welfare (MNW). The MNW solution is equivalent to finding the equilibrium of a market economy (aka. the competitive equilibrium from equal incomes, CEEI) and thus has good properties such as Pareto optimality, envy-freeness, and incentive compatibility in the large. Unfortunately, this equivalence (and nice properties) breaks down for general preference classes. Motivated by real world problems such as course allocation and recommender systems we study the case of additive `at most one' (AMO) preferences - individuals want at most 1 of each item and lotteries are allowed. We show that in this case the MNW solution is still a convex program and importantly is a CEEI solution when the instance gets large but has a `low rank' structure. Thus a polynomial time algorithm can be used to scale CEEI (which is in general PPAD-hard) for AMO preferences. We examine whether the properties guaranteed in the limit hold approximately in finite samples using several real datasets.

Fair Division Without Disparate Impact

Abstract: We consider the problem of dividing items between individuals in a way that is fair both in the sense of distributional fairness and in the sense of not having disparate impact across protected classes. An important existing mechanism for distributionally fair division is competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). Unfortunately, CEEI will not, in general, respect disparate impact constraints. We consider two types of disparate impact measures: requiring that allocations be similar across protected classes and requiring that average utility levels be similar across protected classes. We modify the standard CEEI algorithm in two ways: equitable equilibrium from equal incomes, which removes disparate impact in allocations, and competitive equilibrium from equitable incomes which removes disparate impact in attained utility levels. We show analytically that removing disparate impact in outcomes breaks several of CEEI's desirable properties such as envy, regret, Pareto optimality, and incentive compatibility. By contrast, we can remove disparate impact in attained utility levels without affecting these properties. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the tradeoffs between efficiency, equity, and disparate impact in a recommender-system based market.

Robust Multi-agent Counterfactual Prediction

Abstract: We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. Existing methods (e.g. structural estimation, inverse reinforcement learning) assume that agents' behavior comes from optimizing some utility or that the system is in equilibrium. They make counterfactual predictions by using observed actions to learn the underlying utility function (a.k.a. type) and then solving for the equilibrium of the counterfactual environment. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as the rationality of the agents being observed and a correct model of the environment and agents' utility functions. We propose a method for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactual conclusions to violations of these assumptions, which we call robust multi-agent counterfactual prediction (RMAC). We provide a first-order method for computing RMAC bounds. We apply RMAC to classic environments in market design: auctions, school choice, and social choice.

The Good, the Bad, and the Unflinchingly Selfish: Pro-sociality can be Well Predicted Using Payoffs and Three Behavioral Types

Abstract: The human willingness to pay costs to benefit anonymous others is often explained by social preferences: rather than only valuing their own material payoff, people also include the payoffs of others in their utility function. But how successful is this concept of outcome-based social preferences for actually predicting out-of-sample behavior? We investigate this question by having 1,067 participants each make 20 Dictator Game decisions with randomized parameters (e.g., outcomes for the self, for the other, benefit/cost ratio of pro-sociality). We then use machine learning to try to predict behavior by each participant in each decision. A representative agent model (a small, shared, set of parameters) predicts better than random but still quite poorly (AUC = 0.69). Allowing for full heterogeneity across individuals in the mapping from decision-parameters to outcome yields good predictive performance (AUC = 0.89). However, this heterogeneous model is complicated and unwieldy, thus we also investigate whether a simpler model can yield similar performance. We find that the vast majority of the predictive power (AUC = 0.88) is achieved by a model that allows for three behavioral types. Finally, we show that cannot be well proxied for by other measures in psychology. This final analysis adds further evidence to the literature that human “cooperative phenotypes” are indeed meaningful, relatively orthogonal person-level traits.

Discovering Context Effects from Raw Choice Data

Abstract: Many applications in preference learning assume that decisions come from the maximization of a stable utility function. Yet a large experimental literature shows that individual choices and judgements can be affected by "irrelevant" aspects of the context in which they are made. An important class of such contexts is the composition of the choice set. In this work, our goal is to discover such choice set effects from raw choice data. We introduce an extension of the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, called the context dependent random utility model (CDM), which allows for a particular class of choice set effects. We show that the CDM can be thought of as a second-order approximation to a general choice system, can be inferred optimally using maximum likelihood and, importantly, is easily interpretable. We apply the CDM to both real and simulated choice data to perform principled exploratory analyses for the presence of choice set effects.

Reinforcement Learning and Inverse Reinforcement Learning with System 1 and System 2

Abstract: Inferring a person's goal from their behavior is an important problem in applications of AI (e.g. automated assistants, recommender systems). The workhorse model for this task is the rational actor model - this amounts to assuming that people have stable reward functions, discount the future exponentially, and construct optimal plans. Under the rational actor assumption techniques such as inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) can be used to infer a person's goals from their actions. A competing model is the dual-system model. Here decisions are the result of an interplay between a fast, automatic, heuristic-based system 1 and a slower, deliberate, calculating system 2. We generalize the dual system framework to the case of Markov decision problems and show how to compute optimal plans for dual-system agents. We show that dual-system agents exhibit behaviors that are incompatible with rational actor assumption. We show that naive applications of rational-actor IRL to the behavior of dual-system agents can generate wrong inference about the agents' goals and suggest interventions that actually reduce the agent's overall utility. Finally, we adapt a simple IRL algorithm to correctly infer the goals of dual system decision-makers. This allows us to make interventions that help, rather than hinder, the dual-system agent's ability to reach their true goals.

Computing large market equilibria using abstractions

Abstract: Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design (e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for all items) and compute power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying a method used for solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction of a given market, solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting the prices and allocations back to the original market. We show how to bound important quantities such as regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto optimality, and maximin share when the abstracted prices and allocations are used in place of the real equilibrium. We then study two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in real data allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed from even very coarse abstractions.

Robust Market Equilibria with Uncertain Preferences.

Abstract: The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences, have a budget of real or fake currency, and a set of prices for items and allocations is computed that sets demand equal to supply. An important real world issue with such mechanisms is that individual valuations are often only imperfectly known. In this paper, we show how concepts from classical market equilibrium can be extended to reflect such uncertainty. We show that in linear, divisible Fisher markets a robust market equilibrium (RME) always exists; this also holds in settings where buyers may retain unspent money. We provide theoretical analysis of the allocative properties of RME in terms of envy and regret. Though RME are hard to compute for general uncertainty sets, we consider some natural and tractable uncertainty sets which lead to well behaved formulations of the problem that can be solved via modern convex programming methods. Finally, we show that very mild uncertainty about valuations can cause RME allocations to outperform those which take estimates as having no underlying uncertainty.

Robust Multi-agent Counterfactual Prediction

Abstract: We consider the problem of using logged data to make predictions about what would happen if we changed the `rules of the game' in a multi-agent system. This task is difficult because in many cases we observe actions individuals take but not their private information or their full reward functions. In addition, agents are strategic, so when the rules change, they will also change their actions. Existing methods (e.g. structural estimation, inverse reinforcement learning) make counterfactual predictions by constructing a model of the game, adding the assumption that agents' behavior comes from optimizing given some goals, and then inverting observed actions to learn agent's underlying utility function (a.k.a. type). Once the agent types are known, making counterfactual predictions amounts to solving for the equilibrium of the counterfactual environment. This approach imposes heavy assumptions such as rationality of the agents being observed, correctness of the analyst's model of the environment/parametric form of the agents' utility functions, and various other conditions to make point identification possible. We propose a method for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactual conclusions to violations of these assumptions. We refer to this method as robust multi-agent counterfactual prediction (RMAC). We apply our technique to investigating the robustness of counterfactual claims for classic environments in market design: auctions, school choice, and social choice. Importantly, we show RMAC can be used in regimes where point identification is impossible (e.g. those which have multiple equilibria or non-injective maps from type distributions to outcomes).

Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems

Abstract: Decision makers in health, public policy, technology, and social science are increasingly interested in going beyond ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies to personalized ones. Thus, they are faced with the problem of estimating heterogeneous causal effects. Unfortunately, estimating heterogeneous effects from randomized data requires large amounts of statistical power and while observational data is often available in much larger quantities the presence of unobserved confounders can make using estimates derived from it highly suspect. We show that under some assumptions estimated heterogeneous treatment effects from observational data can preserve the rank ordering of the true heterogeneous causal effects. Such an approach is useful when observational data is large, the set of features is high-dimensional, and our priors about feature importance are weak. We probe the effectiveness of our approach in simulations and show a real-world example in a large-scale recommendations problem.