This paper reviews the literature and assesses the effects of antitrust policy and enforcement on consumer welfare. We find no evidence that antitrust policy in the areas of monopolization, collusion, and mergers has provided much benefit to consumers and, in some instances, we find evidence that it may have lowered consumer welfare. We also do not find any evidence that antitrust policy has deterred firms from engaging in actions that could harm consumers. We identify various reasons for the apparent ineffectiveness of antitrust policy, offer preliminary policy recommendations, and suggest ways in which economists could more fully assess antitrust policy.

Does Antitrust Policy Improve Consumer Welfare? Assessing the Evidence: Response

Antitrust law consists primarily of three federal laws: The Sherman Act (1890) prohibits conspiracies to create monopolies and anticompetitive conduct. The Clayton Act (1914) regulates mergers (Hylton). The Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) created the Federal Trade Commission and regulates advertising and other interstate competition (DOJ). Cases related to these laws are either decided using the “reasonable rule” which requires the plaintiff prove that defendants’ actions created an “unreasonable” restriction of competition in the market; or by the per se rule which infers the conduct and intent of the defendant based on their actions’ result (Hovenkamp).

I. Antitrust Law

Over the past twenty years, Europe has deregulated many industries, protected consumer welfare, and created strongly independent regulators. These policies represent a stark departure from historical traditions in continental Europe. How and why did this turnaround happen? We build a political economy model of market regulation and we compare the design of national and supra-national regulators. We show that countries in a single market willingly promote a supranational regulator that enforces free markets beyond the preferences of any individual country. We test and confirm the predictions of the model. European institutions are indeed more independent and enforce competition more strongly than any individual country ever did. Countries with ex-ante weaker institutions benefit more from the delegation of competition policy to the EU level.

/pdf/how-eu-markets-became-more-competitive-than-us-markets-a-178rl84kvb.pdf

How EU Markets Became More Competitive Than US Markets: A Study of Institutional Drift

Abstract This selective compilation of Department of Justice (DOJ) materials serves as a starting point for researchers; it is not intended to be exhaustive. The authors begin with a handy list of “Most Frequently Asked Research Questions,” as compiled by librarians at the DOJ. Following the list are eleven charts and two appendices which comprise the bulk of this document, namely, a guide to DOJ resources on the Internet. The resources are arranged into the following charts and appendices: I. Legislation; II. Regulations; III. Decisions and Other Administrative Issuances; IV. Briefs; V. Links to Publications Web Pages; VI. Forms, Handbooks and Manuals; VII. Annual Reports; VIII. Archived Speeches, Press/News Releases and Testimony; IX. Statistical Reports and Studies; X. Policy and Procedures Statements, Manuals, Memoranda and Guidances; XI. Directories; Appendix A: Contacts (by Agency); Appendix B: Libraries and Other Information Centers; and Appendix C: List of Abbreviations. Each chart is organized into the following four headings: Document Type, URL, Scope/Content, and Search Tips/Comments/Contacts.

Department of Justice: A Selective Compilation of Internet Resources

After arguing that collusion by software programs which choose pricing rules without any human intervention is not a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the paper offers a path toward making collusion by autonomous artificial agents unlawful.

Developing competition law for collusion by autonomous artificial agents

This paper provides a survey of European antitrust law enforcement since its foundation in the Treaty of Rome of 1957 up to and including 2004. We present a complete overview and statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty. We report a range of summary statistics concerning report route, investigation duration, length of the decision, decision type, imposed fines, number of parties, sector classification, nationality, and Commissioner and Director General responsible. The statistics are linked to changes in legislation and administrative implementation, thereby providing an historical overview that summarizes the Commission’s work in the area of antitrust. One or more appeals were filed with respect to 161 of the 538 decisions. We estimate the determinants of the size of the imposed fine and probability of appeal when an infringement has been found.

European antitrust policy 1957–2004 : an analysis of commission decisions

/pdf/european-antitrust-policy-1957-2004-an-analysis-of-5f5bzsk4ay.pdf

European antitrust policy 1957-2004: An analysis of Commission decisions

List of figures Acknowledgements Table of legislation Table of equivalences List of abbreviations 1. Introduction 2. Horizontal constraints 3. Abuse of dominance 4. Licensing 5. Vertical restrictions 6. Joint ventures and alliances 7. Decisions addressed to Member States pursuant to Article 106 FEU Treaty 8. Mergers and acquisitions Annex: 1. Decisions related to procedural issues 2. Table of landmark decisions described in the book 3. Table of mergers blocked by the European Commission 4. Table of merger decisions described in the book in alphabetical order 5. Table of all European Commission decisions on antitrust in alphabetical order Bibliography Index.

/pdf/european-commission-decisions-on-competition-economic-3sdp9qb6tm.pdf

European Commission Decisions on Competition: Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases

http://static.squarespace.com/static/531afe04e4b0b17f973f5962/t/531b79c7e4b00720a47544c6/1394309575933/Antitrust_AndreaGuensterMathijsvanDijk_August2012.pdf

The Impact of European Antitrust Policy: Evidence from the Stock Market

Competition policy is both an active and much debated area of government intervention in market processes. This paper surveys European antitrust policy since the grounds for its implementation were laid down by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. To that end, it provides a statistical analysis of European antitrust enforcement based on information collected from the Official Journal. The data cover all antitrust decisions by the European Commission up till 2002. A range of summary statistics concerning report route, duration, length of the decision, economic rationale, imposed fines, number of parties sector classification and Commissioner responsible are presented for the total of five hundred cases. We investigate the determinants of the probability of infringement for notified cases and the probability of appeal to the ECJ for infringement cases.

Andrea Günster

Papers

European antitrust policy 1957–2004 : an analysis of commission decisions

European antitrust policy 1957-2004: An analysis of Commission decisions

European Commission Decisions on Competition: Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases

The Impact of European Antitrust Policy: Evidence from the Stock Market

European antitrust policy : an analysis of commission decisions during 1964-2002