Benjamin A. T. Graham

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that foreign investors differ in their sensitivity to information voids based on their own private information and their flexibility in responding rapidly to change and predict that foreign banks will be least hampered by information void, due to their privileged access to private information about local conditions and ability to adapt quickly to new information.

TL;DR: In this paper, a new global dataset of political power sharing institutions, 1975-2010, is introduced, disaggregated these along three institutional dimensions: inclusive, dispersive, and constraining.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors identify three types of powersharing, i.e., inclusive, dispersive, and constraining, and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation, concluding that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the effect of political institutions and domestic politics on governments' ability to collect these two types of rent and showed that while veto-player-type political constraints diminish expropriation risk, transfer risk is much less affected: even constrained governments impose transfer restrictions.

TL;DR: In this paper, an understudied and contested form of government taking, transfer restriction, has been analyzed, which has supplanted expropriation as the most ubiquitous and costly type of international government taking.