Mathematica--A System for Doing Mathematics by Computer.

The Internet of Things (IoT) envisages a future in which digital and physical things or objects (e.g., smartphones, TVs, cars) can be connected by means of suitable information and communication technologies, to enable a range of applications and services. The IoT’s characteristics, including an ultra-large-scale network of things, device and network level heterogeneity, and large numbers of events generated spontaneously by these things, will make development of the diverse applications and services a very challenging task. In general, middleware can ease a development process by integrating heterogeneous computing and communications devices, and supporting interoperability within the diverse applications and services. Recently, there have been a number of proposals for IoT middleware. These proposals mostly addressed wireless sensor networks (WSNs), a key component of IoT, but do not consider RF identification (RFID), machine-to-machine (M2M) communications, and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), other three core elements in the IoT vision. In this paper, we outline a set of requirements for IoT middleware, and present a comprehensive review of the existing middleware solutions against those requirements. In addition, open research issues, challenges, and future research directions are highlighted.

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Middleware for Internet of Things: A Survey

Concrete mathematics, a foundation for computer science, by Ronald L. Graham, Donald E. Knuth and Oren Patashnik. Pp 625. £24·95. 1989. ISBN 0-201-14236-8 (Addison-Wesley)

Permissionless blockchains allow the execution of arbitrary programs (called smart contracts), enabling mutually untrusted entities to interact without relying on trusted third parties. Despite their potential, repeated security concerns have shaken the trust in handling billions of USD by smart contracts. To address this problem, we present Securify, a security analyzer for Ethereum smart contracts that is scalable, fully automated, and able to prove contract behaviors as safe/unsafe with respect to a given property. Securify's analysis consists of two steps. First, it symbolically analyzes the contract's dependency graph to extract precise semantic information from the code. Then, it checks compliance and violation patterns that capture sufficient conditions for proving if a property holds or not. To enable extensibility, all patterns are specified in a designated domain-specific language. Securify is publicly released, it has analyzed >18K contracts submitted by its users, and is regularly used to conduct security audits by experts. We present an extensive evaluation of Securify over real-world Ethereum smart contracts and demonstrate that it can effectively prove the correctness of smart contracts and discover critical violations.

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Securify: Practical Security Analysis of Smart Contracts

This paper presents S2E, a platform for analyzing the properties and behavior of software systems. We demonstrate S2E's use in developing practical tools for comprehensive performance profiling, reverse engineering of proprietary software, and bug finding for both kernel-mode and user-mode binaries. Building these tools on top of S2E took less than 770 LOC and 40 person-hours each.S2E's novelty consists of its ability to scale to large real systems, such as a full Windows stack. S2E is based on two new ideas: selective symbolic execution, a way to automatically minimize the amount of code that has to be executed symbolically given a target analysis, and relaxed execution consistency models, a way to make principled performance/accuracy trade-offs in complex analyses. These techniques give S2E three key abilities: to simultaneously analyze entire families of execution paths, instead of just one execution at a time; to perform the analyses in-vivo within a real software stack--user programs, libraries, kernel, drivers, etc.--instead of using abstract models of these layers; and to operate directly on binaries, thus being able to analyze even proprietary software.Conceptually, S2E is an automated path explorer with modular path analyzers: the explorer drives the target system down all execution paths of interest, while analyzers check properties of each such path (e.g., to look for bugs) or simply collect information (e.g., count page faults). Desired paths can be specified in multiple ways, and S2E users can either combine existing analyzers to build a custom analysis tool, or write new analyzers using the S2E API.

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S2E: a platform for in-vivo multi-path analysis of software systems

Ethereum is a distributed blockchain platform, serving as an ecosystem for smart contracts: full-fledged inter-communicating programs that capture the transaction logic of an account. Unlike programs in mainstream languages, a gas limit restricts the execution of an Ethereum smart contract: execution proceeds as long as gas is available. Thus, gas is a valuable resource that can be manipulated by an attacker to provoke unwanted behavior in a victim's smart contract (e.g., wasting or blocking funds of said victim). Gas-focused vulnerabilities exploit undesired behavior when a contract (directly or through other interacting contracts) runs out of gas. Such vulnerabilities are among the hardest for programmers to protect against, as out-of-gas behavior may be uncommon in non-attack scenarios and reasoning about it is far from trivial. In this paper, we classify and identify gas-focused vulnerabilities, and present MadMax: a static program analysis technique to automatically detect gas-focused vulnerabilities with very high confidence. Our approach combines a control-flow-analysis-based decompiler and declarative program-structure queries. The combined analysis captures high-level domain-specific concepts (such as "dynamic data structure storage" and "safely resumable loops") and achieves high precision and scalability. MadMax analyzes the entirety of smart contracts in the Ethereum blockchain in just 10 hours (with decompilation timeouts in 8% of the cases) and flags contracts with a (highly volatile) monetary value of over $2.8B as vulnerable. Manual inspection of a sample of flagged contracts shows that 81% of the sampled warnings do indeed lead to vulnerabilities, which we report on in our experiment.

https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/3276486

MadMax: surviving out-of-gas conditions in Ethereum smart contracts

The rise of modern blockchains has facilitated the emergence of smart contracts: autonomous programs that live and run on the blockchain Smart contracts have seen a rapid climb to prominence, with applications predicted in law, business, commerce, and governance 
Smart contracts are commonly written in a high-level language such as Ethereum's Solidity, and translated to compact low-level bytecode for deployment on the blockchain Once deployed, the bytecode is autonomously executed, usually by a %Turing-complete virtual machine As with all programs, smart contracts can be highly vulnerable to malicious attacks due to deficient programming methodologies, languages, and toolchains, including buggy compilers At the same time, smart contracts are also high-value targets, often commanding large amounts of cryptocurrency Hence, developers and auditors need security frameworks capable of analysing low-level bytecode to detect potential security vulnerabilities 
In this paper, we present Vandal: a security analysis framework for Ethereum smart contracts Vandal consists of an analysis pipeline that converts low-level Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode to semantic logic relations Users of the framework can express security analyses in a declarative fashion: a security analysis is expressed in a logic specification written in the \souffle language We conduct a large-scale empirical study for a set of common smart contract security vulnerabilities, and show the effectiveness and efficiency of Vandal Vandal is both fast and robust, successfully analysing over 95\% of all 141k unique contracts with an average runtime of 415 seconds; outperforming the current state of the art tools---Oyente, EthIR, Mythril, and Rattle---under equivalent conditions

Vandal: A Scalable Security Analysis Framework for Smart Contracts

Souffle is an open source programming framework that performs static program analysis expressed in Datalog on very large code bases, including points-to analysis on OpenJDK7 (1.4M program variables, 350K objects, 160K methods) in under a minute. Souffle is being successfully used for Java security analyses at Oracle Labs due to (1) its high-performance, (2) support for rapid program analysis development, and (3) customizability. Souffle incorporates the highly flexible Datalog-based program analysis paradigm while exhibiting performance results that are on-par with manually developed state-of-the-art tools. In this tool paper, we introduce the Souffle architecture, usage and demonstrate its applicability for large-scale code analysis on the OpenJDK7 library as a use case.

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Soufflé: On Synthesis of Program Analyzers

The rise of smart contractsThe rise of smart contracts–autonomous applications running on blockchains–has led to a growing number of threats, necessitating sophisticated program analysis. However, smart contracts, which transact valuable tokens and cryptocurrencies, are compiled to very low-level bytecode. This bytecode is the ultimate semantics and means of enforcement of the contract. We present the Gigahorse toolchain. At its core is a reverse compiler (i.e., a decompiler) that decompiles smart contracts from Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into a highlevel 3-address code representation. The new intermediate representation of smart contracts makes implicit data- and controlflow dependencies of the EVM bytecode explicit. Decompilation obviates the need for a contract’s source and allows the analysis of both new and deployed contracts. Gigahorse advances the state of the art on several fronts. It gives the highest analysis precision and completeness among decompilers for Ethereum smart contracts–e.g., Gigahorse can decompile over 99.98% of deployed contracts, compared to 88% for the recently-published Vandal decompiler and under 50% for the state-of-the-practice Porosity decompiler. Importantly, Gigahorse offers a full-featured toolchain for further analyses (and a "batteries included" approach, with multiple clients already implemented), together with the highest performance and scalability. Key to these improvements is Gigahorse’s use of a declarative, logic-based specification, which allows high-level insights to inform low-level decompilation.autonomous applications running on blockchains---has led to a growing number of threats, necessitating sophisticated program analysis. However, smart contracts, which transact valuable tokens and cryptocurrencies, are compiled to very low-level bytecode. This bytecode is the ultimate semantics and means of enforcement of the contract. We present the Gigahorse toolchain. At its core is a reverse compiler (i.e., a decompiler) that decompiles smart contracts from Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into a high-level 3-address code representation. The new intermediate representation of smart contracts makes implicit data- and control-flow dependencies of the EVM bytecode explicit. Decompilation obviates the need for a contract's source and allows the analysis of both new and deployed contracts. Gigahorse advances the state of the art on several fronts. It gives the highest analysis precision and completeness among decompilers for Ethereum smart contracts---e.g., Gigahorse can decompile over 99.98\% of deployed contracts, compared to 88\% for the recently-published Vandal decompiler and under 50\% for the state-of-the-practice Porosity decompiler. Importantly, Gigahorse offers a full-featured toolchain for further analyses (and a ``batteries included'' approach, with multiple clients already implemented), together with the highest performance and scalability. Key to these improvements is Gigahorse's use of a declarative, logic-based specification, which allows high-level insights to inform low-level decompilation.

Gigahorse: thorough, declarative decompilation of smart contracts

For irregular architectures global register allocation is still a challenging problem that has not been successfully solved so far. The graph-coloring analogy of traditional approaches does not match the needs of register allocation for such architectures which feature non-orthogonal instruction sets and small register files. This work proposes a fundamentally new approach to global register allocation for irregular architectures. Our approach formulates global allocation as a partitioned boolean quadratic optimization problem (PBQP) that allows generic modeling of processors peculiarities. Because PBQP is NP-complete we present a heuristic that exhibits a nearly linear run-time complexity.We integrated our register allocator with the Infineon Carmel C Compiler which is based on the Open Compiler Environment from Atair Software. A DSP benchmark suite was used to compare the performance of our register allocator with a graph-coloring approach and with an optimal allocation. The experiments show that our new approach performs better than a traditional graph coloring approach for irregular architectures.

Bernhard Scholz

Papers

MadMax: surviving out-of-gas conditions in Ethereum smart contracts

Vandal: A Scalable Security Analysis Framework for Smart Contracts

Soufflé: On Synthesis of Program Analyzers

Gigahorse: thorough, declarative decompilation of smart contracts

Register allocation for irregular architectures