Brian Kelleher Richter

TL;DR: For example, the authors found that firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year, while individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

TL;DR: For example, this paper found that firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year, while individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying-induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify the empirical facts about lobbying which are generally agreed upon in the literature and discuss challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provide examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification and casual inference.

TL;DR: In this paper, a review identifies empirical facts about lobbying that are generally agreed upon in the literature and discusses challenges to empirical research in lobbying and provides examples of empirical methods that can be employed to overcome these challenges with an emphasis on statistical measurement, identification, and casual inference.

TL;DR: This paper introduced item response theory (IRT) to management and strategy research, which explicitly models firms' and individuals' observable actions in order to measure unobserved, latent characteristics, and showed how the method improves upon a key measure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate social performance (CSP), the KLD Index, by creating what they termed D-SOCIAL-KLD scores, and associated estimates of their accuracy, from the underlying data.