We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

Substantial constituency influence over the lower house of Congress is commonly thought to be both a normative principle and a factual truth of American government. From their draft constitution we may assume the Founding Fathers expected it, and many political scientists feel, regretfully, that the Framers' wish has come all too true. Nevertheless, much of the evidence of constituency control rests on inference. The fact that our House of Representatives, especially by comparison with the House of Commons, has irregular party voting does not of itself indicate that Congressmen deviate from party in response to local pressure. And even more, the fact that many Congressmen feel pressure from home does not of itself establish that the local constituency is performing any of the acts that a reasonable definition of control would imply. Control by the local constituency is at one pole of both the great normative controversies about representation that have arisen in modern times. It is generally recognized that constituency control is opposite to the conception of representation associated with Edmund Burke. Burke wanted the representative to serve the constituency's interest but not its will, and the extent to which the representative should be compelled by electoral sanctions to follow the “mandate” of his constituents has been at the heart of the ensuing controversy as it has continued for a century and a half.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1952717.pdf

Constituency Influence in Congress

In this paper we estimate ADA (Americans for Democratic Action) scores for major media outlets such as the New York Times, USA Today, Fox News Special Report, and all three network television news shows. Our estimates allow us to answer such questions as Is the average article in the New York Times more liberal than the average speech by Tom Daschle? or Is the average story on Fox News more conservative than the average speech by Bill Frist? To compute our measure, we count the times that a media outlet cites various think tanks and other policy groups. We compare this with the times that members of Congress cite the same groups in their speeches on the floor of the House and Senate. By comparing the citation patterns we construct an ADA score. As a simplified example, imagine that there were only two think tanks, and suppose that the New York Times cited the first think tank twice as often as the second. Our method asks: What is the typical ADA score of members of Congress who exhibit the same frequency (2:1) in their speeches? This is the score that we would assign to the New York Times. Our results show a strong liberal bias. All of the news outlets except Fox News Special Report and the Washington Times received a score to the left of the average member of Congress. Consistent with many conservative critics, CBS Evening News and the New York Times received a score far left of center. Outlets such as USA Today, NPRs Morning Edition, NBCs Nightly News and ABCs World News Tonight were moderately left. The most centrist outlets (but still left-leaning) by our measure were the Newshour with Jim Lehrer, CNNs NewsNight with Aaron Brown, and ABCs Good Morning America. Fox News Special Report, while right of center, was closer to the center than any of the three major networks evening news broadcasts. All of our findings refer strictly to the news stories of the outlets. That is, we omitted editorials, book reviews, and letters to the editor from our sample.

/pdf/a-measure-of-media-bias-4hxjoajni5.pdf

A Measure of Media Bias

▪ Abstract In keeping with traditional sociological concerns about order and disorder, this essay addresses the dark side of organizations. To build a theoretical basis for the dark side as an integrated field of study, I review four literatures in order to make core ideas of each available to specialists in the others. Using a Simmelian-based case comparison method of analogical theorizing, I first consider sociological constructs that identify both the generic social form and the generic origin of routine nonconformity: how things go wrong in socially organized settings. Then I examine three types of routine nonconformity with adverse outcomes that harm the public: mistake, misconduct, and disaster produced in and by organizations. Searching for analogies and differences, I find that in common, routine nonconformity, mistake, misconduct, and disaster are systematically produced by the interconnection between environment, organizations, cognition, and choice. These patterns amplify what is known about so...

THE DARK SIDE OF ORGANIZATIONS: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster

Does a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents’ electoral performance and roll-call support for their party—controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors—through a series of tests of the 1956–1996 elections. The tests produce
three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in
each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member’s probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members.

/pdf/out-of-step-out-of-office-electoral-accountability-and-house-2nh8svtgv6.pdf

Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting

It is important for university decision makers to carefully scrutinize empirical data concerning the impacts of college athletics on the university as a whole in formulating strategies for athletic programs. This paper reviews and extends existing statistical work on the effects of college athletics using basic concepts from economics as guideposts. Current evidence indicates that success, and at times merely participation, in college athletics provides several benefits including direct financial gain and such indirect benefits as increased university exposure and, in turn, increased financial contributions and increased student applications and enrollment. Evidence concerning negative exposure from events such as NCAA sanctions is sparse but suggests opposite effects of smaller magnitude.

Effects of university athletics on the university: a review and extension of empirical assessment.

In this paper, we show that current statistical measures of legislator's shirking are implicitly based on the electoral concept of a unique majority rule equilibrium point in the policy space where elections are contested. We note that such equilibria do not exist generically and present statistical results showing that cross-sectional regressions where legislators' voting indices are predicted by district average demograhic and economic data are mis-specified. We also discuss a weaker equilibrium construct, the uncovered set, and present statistical evidence showing that differences in voting behavior between Senators from the same state are positively related to the heterogeneity of the electorate. We argue that current evidence alleged to show shirking by Senators is equally consistent with Senators who perfectly represent an idiosyncratic constituency that cannot be represented by district average data.

On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking

This paper treats racial integration as an innovation in economic process in which economic entities find it advantageous to utilize potentially more productive inputs previously unavailable due to law, custom, or managerial discretion. Data on the racial integration of Major League Baseball and Atlantic Coast Conference basketball are employed to address this issue. The central question examined is which type of team integrated first—losers or winners? The results strongly support the idea that entrepreneurship trumps competitive rivalry; that is, winning teams led the process of racial integration. (JEL LI, J7) One of the watershed events in U.S. history is the struggle to achieve a racially integrated society. While the civil rights laws and court rulings in the 195O's, 196O's, and 197O's are among the major changes in public policy that gradually led to a breakdown of Jim Crow rule in the American South, other changes in law and custom also motivated the process of racial integration across time and place. Indeed, segregation was not limited to the South but was a prominent feature of many national organizations and markets. Despite the extensive commentary on these events from various perspectives, there has been very little economic analysis of the actual process of racial integration.' Economists have focused their efforts on the economics of discriminatio n while the actual process by which individuals, firms, and

/pdf/racial-integration-as-an-innovation-empirical-evidence-from-1afdi9tf5o.pdf

Racial integration as an innovation: Empirical evidence from sports leagues

Intercollegiate sports is an enterprise that annually grosses over $1 billion in income. Some schools may receive more than $20 million from athletic programs, perhaps as much as $10 million simply from the sale of football tickets. Drawing on nontechnical economic data, the authors present a persuasive case that the premier sports organization of colleges and universities in the United States--the NCAA--is a cartel, its members engaged in classically defined restrictive practices for the sole purpose of jointly maximizing their profits. This fresh perspective on the NCAA offers explanations of why illicit payments to athletes persist, why non-NCAA organizations have not flourished, and why members have readily agreed on certain suspect rules. Tracing the historical development of this institutional behavior, the authors argue that the major football powers in the early 1950s were able to gain control of the internal processes of NCAA enforcement. Over time--as other schools' teams improved and began to win on the playing field--the more powerful institutions applied pressure to bring the newcomers under NCAA investigation and, ultimately, to place them on probation. By carefully managing NCAA enforcement regulations, major schools blunted the threat to their continued growth presented by other teams. Offering a valuable case study for sports analysts and students of economics and cartel behavior, this book is a revealing glimpse inside the embattled NCAA.

The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Study in Cartel Behavior

Preface. 1. Government Regulation and Economics. 2. Understanding Regulation's Macro Effects. 3. A Tour of the Regulatory Sprawl. 4. Regulation Versus Other Government Policies. 5. Past Studies of Regulation's Macro Effects. 6. An Index of Regulation. 7. The Regulatory Index and Macro Performance. 8. Why Regulation? Index.

Brian L. Goff

Papers

Effects of university athletics on the university: a review and extension of empirical assessment.

On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking

Racial integration as an innovation: Empirical evidence from sports leagues

The National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Study in Cartel Behavior

Regulation and macroeconomic performance