After two decades of research and development, elliptic curve cryptography now has widespread exposure and acceptance. Industry, banking, and government standards are in place to facilitate extensive deployment of this efficient public-key mechanism. Anchored by a comprehensive treatment of the practical aspects of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this guide explains the basic mathematics, describes state-of-the-art implementation methods, and presents standardized protocols for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key establishment. In addition, the book addresses some issues that arise in software and hardware implementation, as well as side-channel attacks and countermeasures. Readers receive the theoretical fundamentals as an underpinning for a wealth of practical and accessible knowledge about efficient application. Features & Benefits: * Breadth of coverage and unified, integrated approach to elliptic curve cryptosystems * Describes important industry and government protocols, such as the FIPS 186-2 standard from the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology * Provides full exposition on techniques for efficiently implementing finite-field and elliptic curve arithmetic* Distills complex mathematics and algorithms for easy understanding* Includes useful literature references, a list of algorithms, and appendices on sample parameters, ECC standards, and software toolsThis comprehensive, highly focused reference is a useful and indispensable resource for practitioners, professionals, or researchers in computer science, computer engineering, network design, and network data security.

https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/cryptography/Hankerson,%20Menezes,%20Vanstone.%20Guide%20to%20elliptic%20curve%20cryptography%20(Springer,%202004)(ISBN%20038795273X)(332s)_CsCr_.pdf

Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705,
and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document
also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

This document specifies Version 1.1 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over
the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to
communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

/pdf/the-transport-layer-security-tls-protocol-version-1-1-3yudpg3osg.pdf

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1

Many cryptographic schemes and protocols, especially those based on public-keycryptography, have basic or so-called "textbook crypto" versions, as these versionsare usually the subjects for many textbooks on cryptography This book takes adifferent approach to introducing cryptography: it pays much more attention tofit-for-application aspects of cryptography It explains why "textbook crypto" isonly good in an ideal world where data are random and bad guys behave nicelyIt reveals the general unfitness of "textbook crypto" for the real world by demonstratingnumerous attacks on such schemes, protocols and systems under variousreal-world application scenarios This book chooses to introduce a set of practicalcryptographic schemes, protocols and systems, many of them standards or de factoones, studies them closely, explains their working principles, discusses their practicalusages, and examines their strong (ie, fit-for-application) security properties, oftenwith security evidence formally established The book also includes self-containedtheoretical background material that is the foundation for modern cryptography

Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol aims to provide confidentiality and integrity of data in transit across untrusted networks. TLS has become the de facto secure protocol of choice for Internet and mobile applications. DTLS is a variant of TLS that is growing in importance. In this paper, we present distinguishing and plaintext recovery attacks against TLS and DTLS. The attacks are based on a delicate timing analysis of decryption processing in the two protocols. We include experimental results demonstrating the feasibility of the attacks in realistic network environments for several different implementations of TLS and DTLS, including the leading OpenSSL implementations. We provide countermeasures for the attacks. Finally, we discuss the wider implications of our attacks for the cryptographic design used by TLS and DTLS.

/pdf/lucky-thirteen-breaking-the-tls-and-dtls-record-protocols-3npri4yio0.pdf

Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the TLS and DTLS Record Protocols

Simple password authentication is often used e.g. from an email software application to a remote IMAP server. This is frequently done in a protected peer-to-peer tunnel, e.g. by SSL/TLS.

/pdf/password-interception-in-a-ssl-tls-channel-3hs7t7pgzc.pdf

Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel

Simple password authentication is often used e.g. from an email software application to a remote IMAP server. This is frequently done in a protected peer-to-peer tunnel, e.g. by SSL/TLS. At Eurocrypt'02, Vaudenay presented vulnerabilities in padding schemes used for block ciphers in CBC mode. He used a side channel, namely error information in the padding verification. This attack was not possible against SSL/TLS due to both unavailability of the side channel (errors are encrypted) and premature abortion of the session in case of errors. In this paper we extend the attack and optimize it. We show it is actually applicable against latest and most popular implementations of SSL/TLS (at the time this paper was written) for password interception. We demonstrate that a password for an IMAP account can be intercepted when the attacker is not too far from the server in less than an hour in a typical setting. We conclude that these versions of the SSL/TLS implementations are not secure when used with block ciphers in CBC mode and propose ways to strengthen them. We also propose to update the standard protocol.

Brice Canvel

Papers

Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel

Password interception in a SSL/TLS channel