After two decades of research and development, elliptic curve cryptography now has widespread exposure and acceptance. Industry, banking, and government standards are in place to facilitate extensive deployment of this efficient public-key mechanism. Anchored by a comprehensive treatment of the practical aspects of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), this guide explains the basic mathematics, describes state-of-the-art implementation methods, and presents standardized protocols for public-key encryption, digital signatures, and key establishment. In addition, the book addresses some issues that arise in software and hardware implementation, as well as side-channel attacks and countermeasures. Readers receive the theoretical fundamentals as an underpinning for a wealth of practical and accessible knowledge about efficient application. Features & Benefits: * Breadth of coverage and unified, integrated approach to elliptic curve cryptosystems * Describes important industry and government protocols, such as the FIPS 186-2 standard from the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology * Provides full exposition on techniques for efficiently implementing finite-field and elliptic curve arithmetic* Distills complex mathematics and algorithms for easy understanding* Includes useful literature references, a list of algorithms, and appendices on sample parameters, ECC standards, and software toolsThis comprehensive, highly focused reference is a useful and indispensable resource for practitioners, professionals, or researchers in computer science, computer engineering, network design, and network data security.

https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/cryptography/Hankerson,%20Menezes,%20Vanstone.%20Guide%20to%20elliptic%20curve%20cryptography%20(Springer,%202004)(ISBN%20038795273X)(332s)_CsCr_.pdf

Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography

This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate
over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 4492, 5705,
and 6066 and it obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document
also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

This document specifies Version 1.1 of the Transport Layer Security
(TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over
the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to
communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK]

/pdf/the-transport-layer-security-tls-protocol-version-1-1-3yudpg3osg.pdf

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1

Many cryptographic schemes and protocols, especially those based on public-keycryptography, have basic or so-called "textbook crypto" versions, as these versionsare usually the subjects for many textbooks on cryptography This book takes adifferent approach to introducing cryptography: it pays much more attention tofit-for-application aspects of cryptography It explains why "textbook crypto" isonly good in an ideal world where data are random and bad guys behave nicelyIt reveals the general unfitness of "textbook crypto" for the real world by demonstratingnumerous attacks on such schemes, protocols and systems under variousreal-world application scenarios This book chooses to introduce a set of practicalcryptographic schemes, protocols and systems, many of them standards or de factoones, studies them closely, explains their working principles, discusses their practicalusages, and examines their strong (ie, fit-for-application) security properties, oftenwith security evidence formally established The book also includes self-containedtheoretical background material that is the foundation for modern cryptography

Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice

A mobile communication device with security mechanisms is provided for enabling wireless personal information transfer with increased security. In another embodiment of the invention, a mobile communication device is used to confirm a transaction.

Apparatus and method for increased security of wireless transactions

Simple password authentication is often used e.g. from an email software application to a remote IMAP server. This is frequently done in a protected peer-to-peer tunnel, e.g. by SSL/TLS.

/pdf/password-interception-in-a-ssl-tls-channel-3hs7t7pgzc.pdf

Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel

Simple password authentication is often used e.g. from an email software application to a remote IMAP server. This is frequently done in a protected peer-to-peer tunnel, e.g. by SSL/TLS. At Eurocrypt'02, Vaudenay presented vulnerabilities in padding schemes used for block ciphers in CBC mode. He used a side channel, namely error information in the padding verification. This attack was not possible against SSL/TLS due to both unavailability of the side channel (errors are encrypted) and premature abortion of the session in case of errors. In this paper we extend the attack and optimize it. We show it is actually applicable against latest and most popular implementations of SSL/TLS (at the time this paper was written) for password interception. We demonstrate that a password for an IMAP account can be intercepted when the attacker is not too far from the server in less than an hour in a typical setting. We conclude that these versions of the SSL/TLS implementations are not secure when used with block ciphers in CBC mode and propose ways to strengthen them. We also propose to update the standard protocol.

Password interception in a SSL/TLS channel

The invention relates to a method of performing user authentication in a network system ( 10 ) that comprises a client ( 22 ) in communication via a first network ( 14 ) with a server infrastructure ( 16 ) including an entrance point of a second network and an application server in the second network. The client ( 22 ) has access via a user-controllable card reader ( 24 ) to a smart card ( 26 ). A first authentication key is associated with the smart card ( 26 ) and a second authentication key is associated with the card reader ( 24 ). In a first step user authentication is performed in context with an encryption process between the client ( 22 ) and the server infrastructure ( 16 ) using the first authentication key. A second user authentication step is performed between the client ( 22 ) and the application server using both the first authentication key and the second authentication key. Data authentication (secure signing) can be performed in addition to the user authentication described above.

Secure user authentication over a communication network

The invention relates to a method of performing user and data authentication over a client ( 22 ) in communication via a network ( 14 ) with a server infrastructure ( 16 ). The client ( 22 ) has access via a user-controllable card reader ( 24 ) to a smart card ( 26 ) on which at least one signature key is stored. The method comprises a user authentication step which includes displaying by the card reader ( 24 ) an authentication context, controlling the card reader to request the user for signature approval, and, in the case of signature approval, submitting a challenge, if required together with context data, or data derived therefrom to the smart card ( 26 ) for signing. The method further comprises a data authentication step which includes displaying by the card reader ( 24 ) the data to be authenticated, controlling the card reader ( 24 ) to request the user for signature approval, and, in the case of signature approval, submitting the data to be authenticated, or data derived therefrom, to the smart card ( 26 ) for signing.

Secure user and data authentication over a communication network

In recent years attacks on Internet banking services have evolved from rather simple credential stealing attacks to advanced content-manipulation attacks by means of malicious software seeded on the client end-devices. This paper presents the risk mitigation approach of secure beneficiary confirmation on a trusted device combined with multi-level whitelist management to selectively authenticate transactions. Furthermore, two real-world implementations offering unique properties with regards to convenience and mobility while maintaining the highest level of security are described, along with practical results gained from deployment to a large user population.

/pdf/secure-confirmation-of-sensitive-transaction-data-in-modern-3a7ne2md83.pdf

Hiltgen Alain P

Papers

Password Interception in a SSL/TLS Channel

Password interception in a SSL/TLS channel

Secure user authentication over a communication network

Secure user and data authentication over a communication network

Secure confirmation of sensitive transaction data in modern Internet banking services