The present article presents an integrative theoretical framework to explain and to predict psychological changes achieved by different modes of treatment. This theory states that psychological procedures, whatever their form, alter the level and strength of self-efficacy. It is hypothesized that expectations of personal efficacy determine whether coping behavior will be initiated, how much effort will be expended, and how long it will be sustained in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences. Persistence in activities that are subjectively threatening but in fact relatively safe produces, through experiences of mastery, further enhancement of self-efficacy and corresponding reductions in defensive behavior. In the proposed model, expectations of personal efficacy are derived from four principal sources of information: performance accomplishments, vicarious experience, verbal persuasion, and physiological states. The more dependable the experiential sources, the greater are the changes in perceived selfefficacy. A number of factors are identified as influencing the cognitive processing of efficacy information arising from enactive, vicarious, exhortative, and emotive sources. The differential power of diverse therapeutic procedures is analyzed in terms of the postulated cognitive mechanism of operation. Findings are reported from microanalyses of enactive, vicarious, and emotive modes of treatment that support the hypothesized relationship between perceived self-efficacy and behavioral changes. Possible directions for further research are discussed.

Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change.

https://dradamvolungis.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/self-efficacy-unifying-theory-of-behavioral-change-bandura-1977.pdf

Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change☆☆☆

Publisher Summary
This chapter outlines the two basic routes to persuasion. One route is based on the thoughtful consideration of arguments central to the issue, whereas the other is based on the affective associations or simple inferences tied to peripheral cues in the persuasion context. This chapter discusses a wide variety of variables that proved instrumental in affecting the elaboration likelihood, and thus the route to persuasion. One of the basic postulates of the Elaboration Likelihood Model—that variables may affect persuasion by increasing or decreasing scrutiny of message arguments—has been highly useful in accounting for the effects of a seemingly diverse list of variables. The reviewers of the attitude change literature have been disappointed with the many conflicting effects observed, even for ostensibly simple variables. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) attempts to place these many conflicting results and theories under one conceptual umbrella by specifying the major processes underlying persuasion and indicating the way many of the traditionally studied variables and theories relate to these basic processes. The ELM may prove useful in providing a guiding set of postulates from which to interpret previous work and in suggesting new hypotheses to be explored in future research.

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The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion

Many prominent theorists have argued that accurate perceptions of the self, the world, and the future are essential for mental health. Yet considerable research evidence suggests that overly positive selfevaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism are characteristic of normal human thought. Moreover, these illusions appear to promote other criteria of mental health, including the ability to care about others, the ability to be happy or contented, and the ability to engage in productive and creative work. These strategies may succeed, in large part, because both the social world and cognitive-processing mechanisms impose niters on incoming information that distort it in a positive direction; negative information may be isolated and represented in as unthreatening a manner as possible. These positive illusions may be especially useful when an individual receives negative feedback or is otherwise threatened and may be especially adaptive under these circumstances. Decades of psychological wisdom have established contact with reality as a hallmark of mental health. In this view, the well-adjusted person is thought to engage in accurate reality testing, whereas the individual whose vision is clouded by illusion is regarded as vulnerable to, if not already a victim of, mental illness. Despite its plausibility, this viewpoint is increasingly difficult to maintain (cf. Lazarus, 1983). A substantial amount of research testifies to the prevalence of illusion in normal human cognition (see Fiske& Taylor, 1984;Greenwald, 1980; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Sackeim, 1983; Taylor, 1983). Moreover, these illusions often involve central aspects of the self and the environment and, therefore, cannot be dismissed as inconsequential. In this article, we review research suggesting that certain illusions may be adaptive for mental health and well-being. In particular, we examine evidence that a set of interrelated positive illusions—namely, unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control or mastery, and unrealistic optimism—can serve a wide variety of cognitive, affective, and social functions. We also attempt to resolve the following para

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Illusion and well-being: a social psychological perspective on mental health

In Experiment 1, subjects read a persuasive message from a likable or unlikable communicator who presented six or two arguments concerning one of two topics. High response involvement subjects anticipated discussing the message topic at a future experimental session, whereas low involvement subjects anticipated discussing a different topic. For high involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater given six arguments but was unaffected by communicator likability. For low involvement subjects, opinion change was significantly greater given a likable communicator but was unaffected by the arguments manipulation. In Experiment 2, high issue involvement subjects showed slightly greater opinion change when exposed to five arguments from an unlikable (vs. one argument from a likable) communicator, whereas low involvement subjects exhibited significantly greater persuasion in response to one argument from a likable (vs. five arguments from an unlikable) communicator. These findings support the idea that high involvement leads message recipients to employ a systematic information processing strategy in which message-based cognitions mediate persuasion, whereas low involvement leads recipients to use a heuristic processing strategy in which simple decision rules mediate persuasion. Support was also obtained for the hypothesis that content-mediated (vs. source-mediated) opinion change would shower greater persistence.

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Heuristic versus systematic information processing and the use of source versus message cues in persuasion.

Nisbett's (1972) model of obesity implies that individual differences in relative deprivation (relative to set-point weight) within obese and normal weight groups should produce corresponding within-group differences in eating behavior. Normal weight subjects were separated into hypothetically deprived (high restraint) and non-deprived (low restraint) groups. The expectation that high restraint subjects' intake would vary directly with preload size while low restraint subjects would eat in inverse proportion to preload size, was confirmed. It was concluded that relative deprivation rather than obesity per se may be the cirtical determinant of individual differences in eating behavior. Consideration was given to the concept of "restraint" as an important behavioral mechanism affecting the expression of physiologically-based hungar.

Restrained and unrestrained eating

Anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa have emerged as the predominant eating disorders. We review the recent research evidence pertaining to the development of these disorders, including sociocultural factors (e.g., media and peer influences), family factors (e.g., enmeshment and criticism), negative affect, low self-esteem, and body dissatisfaction. Also reviewed are cognitive and biological aspects of eating disorders. Some contributory factors appear to be necessary for the appearance of eating disorders, but none is sufficient. Eating disorders may represent a way of coping with problems of identity and personal control.

Causes of Eating Disorders

It was hypothesized that individual differences in eating behavior based on the distinction between obese and normal subjects could be demonstrated within a population of normal subjects classified as to the extent of restraint chronically exercised with respect to eating. Restrained subjects resembled the obese behaviorally, and unrestrained subjects resembled normals. This demonstration was effected in the context of a test .of the psychosomatic hypothesis of obesity. The results indicated that although some individuals may eat more when anxious, there is little empirical support for the notion that eating serves to reduce anxiety. An explanation for this apparent inconsistency was offered. The role of anxiety as a possible causal agent in obesity has recently been subjected to experimental analysis. Schachter, Goldman, and Gordon (1968) hypothesized that although anxiety would decrease eating in normal-weight subjects by inhibiting gastric contractions and releasing sugar into the bloodstream, it would have little if any effect on the obese, who do not eat on the basis of internal physiological state. These predictions were confirmed, with normal-weight subjects eating substantially less (34%) when anxious and the obese eating nonsignificantly more (15%). Schachter et al. (1968) concluded that the psychosomatic hypothesis of obesity —that the obese in effect confuse hunger with negative affect (Bruch, 1961) and thus overeat in response to aversive emotional states (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1957)— had failed to find confirmation. Obese subjects did not eat more when anxious and did not exhibit significant anxiety reduction as a consequence of eating.

Anxiety, restraint, and eating behavior.

The authors review the effect of the presence of others on food intake. In social facilitation studies, people tend to eat more in groups than when alone. In modeling studies, the presence of others may facilitate or inhibit intake, depending on how much these other people eat. Studies of impression management demonstrate that people tend to eat less in the presence of others than when alone. The authors attempt to reconcile these divergent literatures by reference to a model of inhibitory norms that govern eating. In the presence of palatable food, and in the absence of clear signals of satiety, people look outward to cues from the environment to determine when to stop eating. Socially derived inhibitory norms can account for either increased or decreased intake in the presence of others, depending on how much the others eat and the extent to which one is eager to impress them.

Effects of the presence of others on food intake: a normative interpretation

https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/11060/1/nq27924.pdf

C. Peter Herman

Papers

Restrained and unrestrained eating

Causes of Eating Disorders

Anxiety, restraint, and eating behavior.

Effects of the presence of others on food intake: a normative interpretation

The effect of pre-exposure to food cues on the eating behavior of restrained and unrestrained eaters