The Economic Effects of Constitutions. By Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003. 320p. $35.00.Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini have produced the most ambitious study yet that attempts to identify and estimate the effects of constitutional design on economic outcomes. They draw on data from more than 80 countries and control for demographic, historical, regional, and economic characteristics. The purpose is to determine whether the shape of political institutions has measurable impact on economic policies (e.g., fiscal balance, social welfare spending), on government performance (e.g., corruption indices, protection of property rights), and on direct measures of economic performance (e.g., productivity of capital and labor). The political institutions that draw the most attention are constitutional regime type and the method of electing legislators.

The Economic Effects of Constitutions

Religion and Brazilian Democracy

Political parties shape electoral outcomes by determining who stands for election and what campaign resources they have at their disposal. The introduction of gender quotas have led party leaders t...

Political parties and campaign resource allocation: Gender gaps in Brazilian elections:

Do politicians’ answers to voting advice applications reflect their sincere beliefs? Comparing publicly and confidentially stated ideological positions in a candidate-centred electoral context

Elected officials routinely do not reflect the racial diversity of the citizenry. In Latin America, these descriptive gaps are particularly pronounced. A growing number of studies investigate the c...

Cameron Sells

Papers

Less is more: The paradox of choice in voting behavior

Race and Campaign Resources: Candidate Identification Numbers in Brazil