Canice Prendergast

TL;DR: In this article, a review of existing work on the provision of incentives for workers is presented, and the authors evaluate this literature in the light of a growing empirical literature on compensation from two perspectives: first, an underlying assumption of this literature is that individuals respond to contracts that reward performance.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees, and they argue that parts of the existing empirical literature are better explained through this lens than with the standard model.

TL;DR: The authors argue that the existing literature fails to account for an important effect of uncertainty on incentives through the allocation of responsibility to employees, and propose a negative trade-off between risk and incentives.

TL;DR: This article examined individual decision-making when decisions reflect on people's ability to learn and showed that in an effort to appear as a fast learner, the manager will exaggerate his own information; but ultimately, he becomes too conservative, being unwilling to change his investments on the basis of new information.

TL;DR: In this article, the intrinsic motivation of bureaucrats is investigated, and three primary results are shown: they should be biased, sometimes this bias takes the form of advocating for their clients more than would their principal, while in other cases they are more hostile to their interests.