A DNA test to sex most birds.

Child psychiatrists, pediatricians, and other child clinicians need to have a solid understanding of child language development. There are at least four important reasons that make this necessary. First, slowing, arrest, and deviation of language development are highly associated with, and complicate the course of, child psychopathology. Second, language competence plays a crucial role in emotional and mood regulation, evaluation, and therapy. Third, language deficits are the most frequent underpinning of the learning disorders, ubiquitous in our clinical populations. Fourth, clinicians should not confuse the rich linguistic and dialectal diversity of our clinical populations with abnormalities in child language development. The challenge for the clinician becomes, then, how to get immersed in the captivating field of child language acquisition without getting overwhelmed by its conceptual and empirical complexity. In the past 50 years and since the seminal works of Roger Brown, Jerome Bruner, and Catherine Snow, child language researchers (often known as developmental psycholinguists) have produced a remarkable body of knowledge. Linguists such as Chomsky and philosophers such as Grice have strongly influenced the science of child language. One of the major tenets of Chomskian linguistics (known as generative grammar) is that children’s capacity to acquire language is “hardwired” with “universal grammar”—an innate language acquisition device (LAD), a language “instinct”—at its core. This view is in part supported by the assertion that the linguistic input that children receive is relatively dismal and of poor quality relative to the high quantity and quality of output that they manage to produce after age 2 and that only an advanced, innate capacity to decode and organize linguistic input can enable them to “get from here (prelinguistic infant) to there (linguistic child).” In “Constructing a Language,” Tomasello presents a contrasting theory of how the child acquires language: It is not a universal grammar that allows for language development. Rather, human cognition universals of communicative needs and vocal-auditory processing result in some language universals, such as nouns and verbs as expressions of reference and predication (p. 19). The author proposes that two sets of cognitive skills resulting from biological/phylogenetic adaptations are fundamental to the ontogenetic origins of language. These sets of inherited cognitive skills are intentionreading on the one hand and pattern-finding, on the other. Intention-reading skills encompass the prelinguistic infant’s capacities to share attention to outside events with other persons, establishing joint attentional frames, to understand other people’s communicative intentions, and to imitate the adult’s communicative intentions (an intersubjective form of imitation that requires symbolic understanding and perspective-taking). Pattern-finding skills include the ability of infants as young as 7 months old to analyze concepts and percepts (most relevant here, auditory or speech percepts) and create concrete or abstract categories that contain analogous items. Tomasello, a most prominent developmental scientist with research foci on child language acquisition and on social cognition and social learning in children and primates, succinctly and clearly introduces the major points of his theory and his views on the origins of language in the initial chapters. In subsequent chapters, he delves into the details by covering most language acquisition domains, namely, word (lexical) learning, syntax, and morphology and conversation, narrative, and extended discourse. Although one of the remaining domains (pragmatics) is at the core of his theory and permeates the text throughout, the relative paucity of passages explicitly devoted to discussing acquisition and proBOOK REVIEWS

Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition

ION, GENERAL CONCEPTIONS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, MENTAL INDIVIDUALITY. It would be very difficult for any one with even much more knowledge than I possess, to determine how far animals exhibit any traces of these high mental powers. This difficulty arises from the impossibility of judging what passes through the mind of an animal; and again, the fact that writers differ to a great extent in the meaning which they attribute to the above terms, causes a further difficulty. If one may judge from various articles which have been published lately, the greatest stress seems to be laid on the supposed entire absence in animals of the power of abstraction, or of forming general concepts. But when a dog sees another dog at a distance, it is often clear that he perceives that it is a dog in the abstract; for when he gets nearer his whole manner suddenly changes, if the other dog be a friend. A recent writer remarks, that in all such cases it is a pure assumption to assert that the mental act is not essentially of the same nature in the animal as in man. If either refers what he perceives with his senses to a mental concept, then so do both. (44. Mr. Hookham, in a letter to Prof. Max Muller, in the 'Birmingham News,' May, 1873.) When I say to my terrier, in an eager voice (and I have made the trial many times), "Hi, hi, where is it?" she at once takes it as a sign that something is to be hunted, and generally first looks quickly all around, and then rushes into the nearest thicket, to scent for any game, but finding nothing, she looks up into any neighbouring tree for a squirrel. Now do not these actions clearly shew that she had in her mind a general idea or concept that some animal is to be discovered and hunted? It may be freely admitted that no animal is self-conscious, if by this term it is implied, that he reflects on such points, as whence he comes or whither he will go, or what is life and death, and so forth. But how can we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of imagination, as shewn by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures or pains in the chase? And this would be a form of self-consciousness. On the other hand, as Buchner (45. 'Conferences sur la Theorie Darwinienne,' French translat. 1869, p. 132.) has remarked, how little can the hardworked wife of a degraded Australian savage, who uses very few abstract words, and cannot count above four, exert her self-consciousness, or reflect on the nature of her own existence. It is generally admitted, that the higher animals possess memory, attention, association, and even some imagination and reason. If these powers, which differ much in different animals, are capable of improvement, there seems no great improbability in more complex faculties, such as the higher forms of abstraction, and selfconsciousness, etc., having been evolved through the development and combination of the simpler ones. It has been urged against the views here maintained that it is impossible to say at what point in the ascending scale animals become capable of abstraction, etc.; but who can say at what age this occurs in our young children? We see at least that such powers

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ase1887/22/257/22_257_458/_pdf

The descent of man and selection in relation to sex

How the mind works

The aim of this review is to consider variation in mating preferences among females. We define mating preferences as the sensory and behavioural properties that influence the propensity of individuals to mate with certain phenotypes. Two properties of mating preferences can be distinguished: (1) "preference functions'-the order with which an individual ranks prospective mates and (2) "choosiness'-the effort an individual is prepared to invest in mate assessment. Patterns of mate choices can be altered by changing the costs of choosiness without altering the preference function. We discuss why it is important to study variation in female mating behaviour and identify five main areas of interest: Variation in mating preferences and costs of choosiness could (1) influence the rate and direction of evolution by sexual selection, (2) provide information about the evolutionary history of female preferences, (3) help explain inter-specific differences in the evolution of secondary sexual characteristics, (4) provide information about the level of benefits gained from mate choice, (5) provide information about the underlying mechanisms of mate choice. Variation in mate choice could be due to variability in preference functions, degree of choosiness, or both, and may arise due to genetic differences, developmental trajectories or proximate environmental factors. We review the evidence for genetic variation from genetic studies of heritability and also from data on the repeatability of mate-choice decisions (which can provide information about the upper limits to heritability). There can be problems in interpreting patterns of mate choice in terms of variation in mating preferences and we illustrate two main points. First, some factors can lead to mate choice patterns that mimic heritable variation in preferences and secondly other factors may obscure heritable preferences. These factors are divided into three overlapping classes, environmental, social and the effect of the female phenotype. The environmental factors discussed include predation risk and the costs of sampling; the social factors discussed include the effect of male-male interactions as well as female competition. We review the literature which presents data on how females sample males and discuss the number of cues females use. We conclude that sexual-selection studies have paid far less attention to variation among females than to variation among males, and that there is still much to learn about how females choose males and why different females make different choices. We suggest a number of possible lines for future research.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DB79D853FB764ADB3C114417B7012081/S0006323196005014a.pdf/div-class-title-variation-in-mate-choice-and-mating-preferences-a-review-of-causes-and-consequences-div.pdf

Variation in mate choice and mating preferences: a review of causes and consequences.

Variation in pitch, amplitude and rhythm adds crucial paralinguistic information to human speech. Such prosodic cues can reveal information about the meaning or emphasis of a sentence or the emotional state of the speaker. To examine the hypothesis that sensitivity to prosodic cues is language independent and not human specific, we tested prosody perception in a controlled experiment with zebra finches. Using a go/no-go procedure, subjects were trained to discriminate between speech syllables arranged in XYXY patterns with prosodic stress on the first syllable and XXYY patterns with prosodic stress on the final syllable. To systematically determine the salience of the various prosodic cues (pitch, duration and amplitude) to the zebra finches, they were subjected to five tests with different combinations of these cues. The zebra finches generalized the prosodic pattern to sequences that consisted of new syllables and used prosodic features over structural ones to discriminate between stimuli. This strong sensitivity to the prosodic pattern was maintained when only a single prosodic cue was available. The change in pitch was treated as more salient than changes in the other prosodic features. These results show that zebra finches are sensitive to the same prosodic cues known to affect human speech perception.

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rspb.2014.0480

Zebra finches are sensitive to prosodic features of human speech

ing syntactic rules is critical to human language learning. It is debated whether this ability, already present in young infants, is human- and language specific or can also be found in non-human animals, indicating it may arise from more general cognitive mechanisms. Current studies are often ambiguous and few have directly compared rule learning by humans and non-human animals. In a series of discrimination experiments, we presented zebra finches and human adults with comparable training and tests with the same artificial stimuli consisting of XYX and XXY structures, in which X and Y were zebra finch song elements. Zebra finches readily discriminated the training stimuli. Some birds also discriminated novel stimuli when these were composed of familiar element types, but none of the birds generalized the discrimination to novel element types. We conclude that zebra finches show evidence of simple rule abstraction related to positional learning, suggesting stimulus-bound generalization, but found no evidence for a more abstract rule generalization. This differed from the human adults, who categorized novel stimuli consisting of novel element types into different groups according to their structure. The limited abilities for rule abstraction in zebra finches may indicate what the precursors of more complex abstraction as found in humans may have been like.

Artificial grammar learning in zebra finches and human adults: XYX versus XXY

Sympatric occurrence of two closely related species is expected to lead to diverging or converging shifts in signal characteristics of one or both species. We examined signal characteristics in the vinaceous dove Streptopelia vinacea and the ring-necked dove S. capicola, two sister species that are mainly allopatric but occur in sympatry in northwestern Uganda. Vocal characteristics of the birds in sympatry were compared with those of an adjacent and a distant allopatric population of each species. The sympatric population showed intermediate values between the allopatric populations from Uganda. However, within each species there is little geographic variation between distant allopatric populations. Since vocal differences between dove species have a genetic base, the convergence in vocal characteristics is most likely explained by hybridization. Probably, the two species came into secondary contact relatively recently. Climatic changes during the last several thousand years and recent habitat changes caused by the growing human population, may have allowed Streptopelia capicola to extend its range in the northern direction.

Diverge or merge? The effect of sympatric occurrence on the territorial vocalizations of the vinaceous dove Streptopelia vinacea and the ring-necked dove S. capicola

From the early stages of life, learning the regularities associated with specific objects is crucial for making sense of experiences. Through filial imprinting, young precocial birds quickly learn the features of their social partners by mere exposure. It is not clear though to what extent chicks can extract abstract patterns of the visual and acoustic stimuli present in the imprinting object, and how they combine them. To investigate this issue, we exposed chicks (Gallus gallus) to three days of visual and acoustic imprinting, using either patterns with two identical items or patterns with two different items, presented visually, acoustically or in both modalities. Next, chicks were given a choice between the familiar and the unfamiliar pattern, present in either the multimodal, visual or acoustic modality. The responses to the novel stimuli were affected by their imprinting experience, and the effect was stronger for chicks imprinted with multimodal patterns than for the other groups. Interestingly, males and females adopted a different strategy, with males more attracted by unfamiliar patterns and females more attracted by familiar patterns. Our data show that chicks can generalize abstract patterns by mere exposure through filial imprinting and that multimodal stimulation is more effective than unimodal stimulation for pattern learning.

Spontaneous generalization of abstract multimodal patterns in young domestic chicks

Perceptual biases can shape the evolution of signal form. Understanding the origin and direction of such biases is therefore crucial for understanding signal evolution. Many animals learn about species-specific signals. Discrimination learning using simple stimuli varying in one dimension (e.g. amplitude, wavelength) can result in perceptual biases with preferences for specific novel stimuli, depending on the stimulus dimensions. We examine how this translates to discrimination learning involving complex communication signals; birdsongs. Zebra finches (Taeniopygia guttata) were trained to discriminate between two artificial songs, using a Go/No-Go procedure. The training songs in experiment 1 differed in the number of repeats of a particular element. The songs in experiment 2 differed in the position of an odd element in a series of repeated elements. We examined generalization patterns by presenting novel songs with more or fewer repeated elements (experiment 1), or with the odd element earlier or later in the repeated element sequence (experiment 2). Control birds were trained with only one song. The generalization curves obtained from (i) control birds, (ii) experimental birds in experiment 1, and (iii) experimental birds in experiment 2 showed large and systematic differences from each other. Birds in experiment 1, but not 2, responded more strongly to specific novel songs than to training songs, showing ‘peak shift’. The outcome indicates that learning about communication signals may give rise to perceptual biases that may drive signal evolution.

/pdf/song-discrimination-learning-in-zebra-finches-induces-highly-1hkdo1rfvq.pdf

Carel ten Cate

Papers

Zebra finches are sensitive to prosodic features of human speech

Artificial grammar learning in zebra finches and human adults: XYX versus XXY

Diverge or merge? The effect of sympatric occurrence on the territorial vocalizations of the vinaceous dove Streptopelia vinacea and the ring-necked dove S. capicola

Spontaneous generalization of abstract multimodal patterns in young domestic chicks

Song discrimination learning in zebra finches induces highly divergent responses to novel songs.