A DNA test to sex most birds.

Child psychiatrists, pediatricians, and other child clinicians need to have a solid understanding of child language development. There are at least four important reasons that make this necessary. First, slowing, arrest, and deviation of language development are highly associated with, and complicate the course of, child psychopathology. Second, language competence plays a crucial role in emotional and mood regulation, evaluation, and therapy. Third, language deficits are the most frequent underpinning of the learning disorders, ubiquitous in our clinical populations. Fourth, clinicians should not confuse the rich linguistic and dialectal diversity of our clinical populations with abnormalities in child language development. The challenge for the clinician becomes, then, how to get immersed in the captivating field of child language acquisition without getting overwhelmed by its conceptual and empirical complexity. In the past 50 years and since the seminal works of Roger Brown, Jerome Bruner, and Catherine Snow, child language researchers (often known as developmental psycholinguists) have produced a remarkable body of knowledge. Linguists such as Chomsky and philosophers such as Grice have strongly influenced the science of child language. One of the major tenets of Chomskian linguistics (known as generative grammar) is that children’s capacity to acquire language is “hardwired” with “universal grammar”—an innate language acquisition device (LAD), a language “instinct”—at its core. This view is in part supported by the assertion that the linguistic input that children receive is relatively dismal and of poor quality relative to the high quantity and quality of output that they manage to produce after age 2 and that only an advanced, innate capacity to decode and organize linguistic input can enable them to “get from here (prelinguistic infant) to there (linguistic child).” In “Constructing a Language,” Tomasello presents a contrasting theory of how the child acquires language: It is not a universal grammar that allows for language development. Rather, human cognition universals of communicative needs and vocal-auditory processing result in some language universals, such as nouns and verbs as expressions of reference and predication (p. 19). The author proposes that two sets of cognitive skills resulting from biological/phylogenetic adaptations are fundamental to the ontogenetic origins of language. These sets of inherited cognitive skills are intentionreading on the one hand and pattern-finding, on the other. Intention-reading skills encompass the prelinguistic infant’s capacities to share attention to outside events with other persons, establishing joint attentional frames, to understand other people’s communicative intentions, and to imitate the adult’s communicative intentions (an intersubjective form of imitation that requires symbolic understanding and perspective-taking). Pattern-finding skills include the ability of infants as young as 7 months old to analyze concepts and percepts (most relevant here, auditory or speech percepts) and create concrete or abstract categories that contain analogous items. Tomasello, a most prominent developmental scientist with research foci on child language acquisition and on social cognition and social learning in children and primates, succinctly and clearly introduces the major points of his theory and his views on the origins of language in the initial chapters. In subsequent chapters, he delves into the details by covering most language acquisition domains, namely, word (lexical) learning, syntax, and morphology and conversation, narrative, and extended discourse. Although one of the remaining domains (pragmatics) is at the core of his theory and permeates the text throughout, the relative paucity of passages explicitly devoted to discussing acquisition and proBOOK REVIEWS

Constructing a language: A usage-based theory of language acquisition

ION, GENERAL CONCEPTIONS, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, MENTAL INDIVIDUALITY. It would be very difficult for any one with even much more knowledge than I possess, to determine how far animals exhibit any traces of these high mental powers. This difficulty arises from the impossibility of judging what passes through the mind of an animal; and again, the fact that writers differ to a great extent in the meaning which they attribute to the above terms, causes a further difficulty. If one may judge from various articles which have been published lately, the greatest stress seems to be laid on the supposed entire absence in animals of the power of abstraction, or of forming general concepts. But when a dog sees another dog at a distance, it is often clear that he perceives that it is a dog in the abstract; for when he gets nearer his whole manner suddenly changes, if the other dog be a friend. A recent writer remarks, that in all such cases it is a pure assumption to assert that the mental act is not essentially of the same nature in the animal as in man. If either refers what he perceives with his senses to a mental concept, then so do both. (44. Mr. Hookham, in a letter to Prof. Max Muller, in the 'Birmingham News,' May, 1873.) When I say to my terrier, in an eager voice (and I have made the trial many times), "Hi, hi, where is it?" she at once takes it as a sign that something is to be hunted, and generally first looks quickly all around, and then rushes into the nearest thicket, to scent for any game, but finding nothing, she looks up into any neighbouring tree for a squirrel. Now do not these actions clearly shew that she had in her mind a general idea or concept that some animal is to be discovered and hunted? It may be freely admitted that no animal is self-conscious, if by this term it is implied, that he reflects on such points, as whence he comes or whither he will go, or what is life and death, and so forth. But how can we feel sure that an old dog with an excellent memory and some power of imagination, as shewn by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures or pains in the chase? And this would be a form of self-consciousness. On the other hand, as Buchner (45. 'Conferences sur la Theorie Darwinienne,' French translat. 1869, p. 132.) has remarked, how little can the hardworked wife of a degraded Australian savage, who uses very few abstract words, and cannot count above four, exert her self-consciousness, or reflect on the nature of her own existence. It is generally admitted, that the higher animals possess memory, attention, association, and even some imagination and reason. If these powers, which differ much in different animals, are capable of improvement, there seems no great improbability in more complex faculties, such as the higher forms of abstraction, and selfconsciousness, etc., having been evolved through the development and combination of the simpler ones. It has been urged against the views here maintained that it is impossible to say at what point in the ascending scale animals become capable of abstraction, etc.; but who can say at what age this occurs in our young children? We see at least that such powers

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/ase1887/22/257/22_257_458/_pdf

The descent of man and selection in relation to sex

How the mind works

The aim of this review is to consider variation in mating preferences among females. We define mating preferences as the sensory and behavioural properties that influence the propensity of individuals to mate with certain phenotypes. Two properties of mating preferences can be distinguished: (1) "preference functions'-the order with which an individual ranks prospective mates and (2) "choosiness'-the effort an individual is prepared to invest in mate assessment. Patterns of mate choices can be altered by changing the costs of choosiness without altering the preference function. We discuss why it is important to study variation in female mating behaviour and identify five main areas of interest: Variation in mating preferences and costs of choosiness could (1) influence the rate and direction of evolution by sexual selection, (2) provide information about the evolutionary history of female preferences, (3) help explain inter-specific differences in the evolution of secondary sexual characteristics, (4) provide information about the level of benefits gained from mate choice, (5) provide information about the underlying mechanisms of mate choice. Variation in mate choice could be due to variability in preference functions, degree of choosiness, or both, and may arise due to genetic differences, developmental trajectories or proximate environmental factors. We review the evidence for genetic variation from genetic studies of heritability and also from data on the repeatability of mate-choice decisions (which can provide information about the upper limits to heritability). There can be problems in interpreting patterns of mate choice in terms of variation in mating preferences and we illustrate two main points. First, some factors can lead to mate choice patterns that mimic heritable variation in preferences and secondly other factors may obscure heritable preferences. These factors are divided into three overlapping classes, environmental, social and the effect of the female phenotype. The environmental factors discussed include predation risk and the costs of sampling; the social factors discussed include the effect of male-male interactions as well as female competition. We review the literature which presents data on how females sample males and discuss the number of cues females use. We conclude that sexual-selection studies have paid far less attention to variation among females than to variation among males, and that there is still much to learn about how females choose males and why different females make different choices. We suggest a number of possible lines for future research.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/DB79D853FB764ADB3C114417B7012081/S0006323196005014a.pdf/div-class-title-variation-in-mate-choice-and-mating-preferences-a-review-of-causes-and-consequences-div.pdf

Variation in mate choice and mating preferences: a review of causes and consequences.

Responding of individuals outside the conspecific range has been largely explained by biases in sensory or cognitive systems toward particular traits or trait values. More recently, it has been shown that such responses might occur if individuals still respond to signal traits that have been lost over time. However, empirical evidence remains scarce. We report a case supporting the latter mechanism. Phylogenetic analysis suggests that the collared dove, Streptopelia decaocto, had lost the trilled vocalization present in most congeneric taxa. We tested whether males retained the ability to respond to these trills in the context of territory defense. We synthesized trilled songs by inserting trills from the sister species S. roseogrisea into S. decaocto songs. We show that trilled songs yielded higher responses than did natural conspecific songs, and that the intensity of the response depended on the number of trilled elements. We also show that trilled songs elicited as strong reactions as frequency modulated coos, which are stronger releasers of territorial response than are nonmodulated coos, but are not produced by every males. Additional tests suggest that the frequency pattern is the most important feature of the trill used by males. However, it is still unknown whether reactions to trilled and frequency modulated coos have the same perceptual basis. To our knowledge, this study is the first report of a strongly deviating signal that is still effective in vocal intrasexual communication in birds. (Less)

/pdf/to-trill-or-not-to-trill-territorial-response-to-a-4d6dp79v7a.pdf

To trill or not to trill? Territorial response to a heterospecific vocal trait in male collared doves, Streptopelia decaocto

The European Union requires member states to achieve or maintain good environmental status for their marine territorial waters and explicitly mentions potentially adverse effects of underwater sound. In this study, we focused on producing maps of underwater sound from various natural and anthropogenic origins in the Dutch North Sea. The source properties and sound propagation are simulated by mathematical methods. These maps could be used to assess and predict large-scale effects on behavior and distribution of underwater marine life and therefore become a valuable tool in assessing and managing the impact of underwater sound on marine life.

Mapping Underwater Sound in the Dutch Part of the North Sea.

Mechanisms of Perceptual Categorization in Birds

Anthropogenic sounds come in different forms, varying not only in amplitude and frequency spectrum but also in temporal structure. Although fish are sensitive to the temporal characteristics of sound, little is known about how their behavior is affected by anthropogenic sounds of different temporal patterns. We investigated this question using groups of Dicentrarchus labrax (European sea bass) in an outdoor basin. Our data revealed that the temporal pattern of sound exposure is important in noise impact assessments.

Carel ten Cate

Papers

To trill or not to trill? Territorial response to a heterospecific vocal trait in male collared doves, Streptopelia decaocto

Mapping Underwater Sound in the Dutch Part of the North Sea.

Mechanisms of Perceptual Categorization in Birds

Noise Impact on European Sea Bass Behavior: Temporal Structure Matters

Music for animal welfare: a critical review & conceptual framework