Mobile Edge Computing, Fog et al.: A Survey and Analysis of Security Threats and Challenges

As the explosive growth of smart devices and the advent of many new applications, traffic volume has been growing exponentially. The traditional centralized network architecture cannot accommodate such user demands due to heavy burden on the backhaul links and long latency. Therefore, new architectures, which bring network functions and contents to the network edge, are proposed, i.e., mobile edge computing and caching. Mobile edge networks provide cloud computing and caching capabilities at the edge of cellular networks. In this survey, we make an exhaustive review on the state-of-the-art research efforts on mobile edge networks. We first give an overview of mobile edge networks, including definition, architecture, and advantages. Next, a comprehensive survey of issues on computing, caching, and communication techniques at the network edge is presented. The applications and use cases of mobile edge networks are discussed. Subsequently, the key enablers of mobile edge networks, such as cloud technology, SDN/NFV, and smart devices are discussed. Finally, open research challenges and future directions are presented as well.

A Survey on Mobile Edge Networks: Convergence of Computing, Caching and Communications

Im Jahre 1977 wurde der „Data Encryption Algorithm“ (DEA) vom „National Bureau of Standards“ (NBS, später „National Institute of Standards and Technology“ – NIST) zum amerikanischen Verschlüsselungsstandard für Bundesbehörden erklärt [NBS_77]. 1981 folgte die Verabschiedung der DEA-Spezifikation als ANSI-Standard „DES“ [ANSI_81]. Die Empfehlung des DES als StandardVerschlüsselungsverfahren wurde auf fünf Jahre befristet und 1983, 1988 und 1993 um jeweils weitere fünf Jahre verlängert. Derzeit liegt eine Neufassung des NISTStandards vor [NIST_99], in dem der DES für weitere fünf Jahre übergangsweise zugelassen sein soll, aber die Verwendung von Triple-DES empfohlen wird: eine dreifache Anwendung des DES mit drei verschiedenen Schlüsseln (effektive Schlüssellänge: 168 bit) [NIST_99]. Der DES basiert auf einer von Horst Feistel bei IBM entwickelten Blockchiffre („Lucipher“) mit einer Schlüssellänge von 128 bit. Da die amerikanische „National Security Agency“ (NSA) dafür gesorgt hatte, daß der DES eine Schlüssellänge von lediglich 64 bit besitzt, von denen nur 56 bit relevant sind, und spezielle Substitutionsboxen (den „kryptographischen Kern“ des Verfahrens) erhielt, deren Konstruktionskriterien von der NSA nicht veröffentlicht wurden, war das Verfahren von Beginn an umstritten. Kritiker nahmen an, daß es eine geheime „Trapdoor“ in dem Verfahren gäbe, die der NSA eine OnlineEntschlüsselung auch ohne Kenntnis des Schlüssels erlauben würde. Zwar ließ sich dieser Verdacht nicht erhärten, aber sowohl die Zunahme von Rechenleistung als auch die Parallelisierung von Suchalgorithmen machen heute eine Schlüssellänge von 56 bit zum Sicherheitsrisiko. Zuletzt konnte 1998 mit einer von der „Electronic Frontier Foundation“ (EFF) entwickelten Spezialmaschine mit 1.800 parallel arbeitenden, eigens entwickelten Krypto-Prozessoren ein DES-Schlüssel in einer Rekordzeit von 2,5 Tagen gefunden werden. Um einen Nachfolger für den DES zu finden, kündigte das NIST am 2. Januar 1997 die Suche nach einem „Advanced Encryption Standard“ (AES) an. Ziel dieser Initiative ist, in enger Kooperation mit Forschung und Industrie ein symmetrisches Verschlüsselungsverfahren zu finden, das geeignet ist, bis weit ins 21. Jahrhundert hinein amerikanische Behördendaten wirkungsvoll zu verschlüsseln. Dazu wurde am 12. September 1997 ein offizieller „Call for Algorithm“ ausgeschrieben. An die vorzuschlagenden symmetrischen Verschlüsselungsalgorithmen wurden die folgenden Anforderungen gestellt: nicht-klassifiziert und veröffentlicht, weltweit lizenzfrei verfügbar, effizient implementierbar in Hardund Software, Blockchiffren mit einer Blocklänge von 128 bit sowie Schlüssellängen von 128, 192 und 256 bit unterstützt. Auf der ersten „AES Candidate Conference“ (AES1) veröffentlichte das NIST am 20. August 1998 eine Liste von 15 vorgeschlagenen Algorithmen und forderte die Fachöffentlichkeit zu deren Analyse auf. Die Ergebnisse wurden auf der zweiten „AES Candidate Conference“ (22.-23. März 1999 in Rom, AES2) vorgestellt und unter internationalen Kryptologen diskutiert. Die Kommentierungsphase endete am 15. April 1999. Auf der Basis der eingegangenen Kommentare und Analysen wählte das NIST fünf Kandidaten aus, die es am 9. August 1999 öffentlich bekanntmachte: MARS (IBM) RC6 (RSA Lab.) Rijndael (Daemen, Rijmen) Serpent (Anderson, Biham, Knudsen) Twofish (Schneier, Kelsey, Whiting, Wagner, Hall, Ferguson).

Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).

VANet security challenges and solutions: A survey

As a powerful tool, the vehicular network has been built to connect human communication and transportation around the world for many years to come. However, with the rapid growth of vehicles, the vehicular network becomes heterogeneous, dynamic, and large scaled, which makes it difficult to meet the strict requirements, such as ultralow latency, high reliability, high security, and massive connections of the next-generation (6G) network. Recently, machine learning (ML) has emerged as a powerful artificial intelligence (AI) technique to make both the vehicle and wireless communication highly efficient and adaptable. Naturally, employing ML into vehicular communication and network becomes a hot topic and is being widely studied in both academia and industry, paving the way for the future intelligentization in 6G vehicular networks. In this article, we provide a survey on various ML techniques applied to communication, networking, and security parts in vehicular networks and envision the ways of enabling AI toward a future 6G vehicular network, including the evolution of intelligent radio (IR), network intelligentization, and self-learning with proactive exploration.

Future Intelligent and Secure Vehicular Network Toward 6G: Machine-Learning Approaches

VANET aims to improve safety for all road users. Vehicles exchange safety messages over wireless communication links which are prone to multiple attacks. To enhance the existing security of V2V communications, we propose in this paper a security framework based on vehicles behavior analysis. We define a Hybrid Trust Model (HTM) and a misbehavior detection system (MDS) where a trust metric is assigned to every vehicle depending on its behavior. Using this trust metric, a classification of the vehicles into malicious or honest is done. HTM is based on-the-fly group formation which helps to manage the communication between vehicles and the back-end system by selecting the most trustworthy node as group leader (GL). Vehicles and GL will cooperate with each other within the group and with the back-end system to detect the malicious node and to notify the Misbehavior Authority. The latter takes appropriate actions to limit the consequences of the malicious behaving node. Performance evaluation of HTM and MDS is carried out using Groovenet Simulator. Results show the efficiency of the proposed model to select the trustworthy vehicles and to monitor their behaviors, as well as to classify them and to deactivate the malicious ones.

Trust model for secure group leader-based communications in VANET

In this paper, we consider a Trust Model with Group Leader (GL)-based communication in VANET. This model is used to classify vehicles based on their trustworthiness and elect potential GLs. We propose a security risk assessment methodology and we apply it to our Trust Model. This methodology is used for identifying threats, assessing the risk involved, and defining approaches to mitigate them. The risk assessment includes assessment of the impact and likelihood of occurrence of attacks relevant to the identified threats, evaluation of the Trust Model design principles, validation of the built-in security, and the mitigation actions of attacks. Based on this assessment, we demonstrated the resiliency of the Trust Model to resist to many security attacks.

Security Risk Analysis of a Trust Model for Secure Group Leader-Based Communication in VANET

In this paper, we investigate a security architecture for V2V communication that ensure integrity, confidentiality, anonymity, authenticity and non-repudiation. Based on IEEE 1609.2 Standard, we propose group-based V2V authentication and communication for safety message dissemination with lightweight solution, decentralized via group leaders (GLs), efficient, economical and applicable in real mode. We simulate the existing security solutions using "Estinet" simulator and we show that our group-based authentication proposal performs better than other schemes.

Group-based authentication in V2V communications

Security and privacy become mandatory requirements for VoIP communications that needs security services such as confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-replay and non- repudiation. The available solutions are generic and do not respect voice specificities and constraints. Thus, QoS of the voice is affected by delay, jitter, and packet loss. New security solutions must take into account the real-time constraint of voice service and their mechanisms should address possible attacks and overhead associated with it. Nowadays, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) is considered the strongest security solutions for communications over IP networks. Most VPN solutions are implemented to tunnel data traffic while the trend toward a converged data and voice network, however, places new demands on VPNs to support real time traffic. In this paper we compare the VPN security protocols presenting their advantage and drawbacks. Then we present our new solution to secure voice over IPSec VPNs while guaranteeing the performance and quality of services, without reducing the effective bandwidth. We use the AVISPA model to analyze the security vulnerabilities of exchange messages to initiate session and establish VPN.

Carole Bassil

Papers

VANet security challenges and solutions: A survey

Trust model for secure group leader-based communications in VANET

Security Risk Analysis of a Trust Model for Secure Group Leader-Based Communication in VANET

Group-based authentication in V2V communications

VPN Analysis and New Perspective for Securing Voice over VPN Networks