Access control is the process of mediating every request to resources and data maintained by a system and determining whether the request should be granted or denied. The access control decision is enforced by a mechanism implementing regulations established by a security policy. Different access control policies can be applied, corresponding to different criteria for defining what should, and what should not, be allowed, and, in some sense, to different definitions of what ensuring security means. In this chapter we investigate the basic concepts behind access control design and enforcement, and point out different security requirements that may need to be taken into consideration. We discuss several access control policies, and models formalizing them, that have been proposed in the literature or that are currently under investigation.

Access control : Policies, models, and mechanisms

This paper describes security issues for data warehousing and data mining. It first provides an overview of data warehousing and security issues for data warehouses. Then a discussion of data mining , security implications of data mining, as well as data mining as a tool to handle security problems are given.

Database Security

: Attacks on the nation's computer infrastructures are a serious problem. Over the past 12 years, the growing number of computer security incidents on the Internet has reflected the growth of the Internet itself. Because most deployed computer systems are vulnerable to attack, intrusion detection (ID) is a rapidly developing field. Intrusion detection is an important technology business sector as well as an active area of research. Vendors make many claims for their products in the commercial marketplace so separating hype from reality can be a major challenge. A goal of this report is to provide an unbiased assessment of publicly available ID technology. We hope this will help those who purchase and use ID technology to gain a realistic understanding of its capabilities and limitations. The report raises issues that we believe are important for ID system (IDS) developers to address as they formulate product strategies. The report also points out relevant issues for the research community as they formulate research directions and allocate funds.

/pdf/state-of-the-practice-of-intrusion-detection-technologies-48wz8x4oz0.pdf

State of the Practice of Intrusion Detection Technologies

Using traditional and emerging access control approaches to develop secure applications for the Web.

Security models for web-based applications

From the Publisher:
Active rules provide a new and important method for developing database applications, and the subject is seeing an increasing amount of attention from commercial database companies. This book provides a timely survey of the field from the point of view of some of the subject's most active researchers. Database researchers and developers will find this book provides a valuable overview of the design and use of active database systems.

Active Rules in Database Systems

is of course necessary to take steps to prevent attacks from succeeding. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that not all attacks can be averted at the outset. Attacks that succeed to some degree are unavoidable, and comprehensive support for identifying and responding to attacks is required [1]. Information warfare defense must consider the whole process of attack, response, and recovery. This requires a recognition of the multiple phases of the information warfare process. Prevention is just one phase; we explain others and then focus on the oft-Recent exploits by hackers have drawn attention to the importance of defending against potential information warfare. Defense and civil institutions rely so heavily on their information systems and networks that attacks that disable them could be devastating. Yet, as hacker attacks have demonstrated , protective mechanisms are fallible. Features and services that must be in place to carry out needed, legitimate functions can be abused by being used in unexpected ways to provide an avenue of attack. Further, an attacker who penetrates one system can use its relationships with other systems on the network to compromise them as well. Experiences of actual attacks have led to the recognition of the need to detect and react to attacks that succeed in breaching a system's protective mechanisms. Prevention and detection receive most of the attention, but recovery is an equally important phase of information warfare defense.

Trusted recovery

System protection mechanisms such as access controls can be fooled by authorized but malicious users, masqueraders, and misfeasors. Intrusion detection techniques are therefore used to supplement them. However, damage could have occurred before an intrusion is detected. In many computing systems the requirement for a high degree of soundness of intrusion reporting can yield poor performance in detecting intrusions and cause long detection latency. As a result, serious damage can be caused either because many intrusions are never detected or the average detection latency is too long. The process of bounding the damage caused by intrusions during intrusion detection is referred to as intrusion confinement. We justify the necessity for intrusion confinement during detection by using a probabilistic analysis model, and propose a general solution to achieve intrusion confinement. The key idea of the solution is to isolate likely suspicious actions before a definite determination of intrusion is reported. We also present two concrete isolation protocols in the database and file system contexts, respectively, to evaluate the feasibility of the general solution, which can be applied to many types of information systems.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-0-387-35508-5_1.pdf

Intrusion confinement by isolation in information systems

Since 1990, transaction processing in multilevel secure database management systems (DBMSs) has been receiving a great deal of attention from the security community. Transaction processing in these systems requires modification of conventional scheduling algorithms and commit protocols. These modifications are necessary because preserving the usual transaction properties when transactions are executing at different security levels often conflicts with the enforcement of the security policy. Considerable effort has been devoted to the development of efficient, secure algorithms for the major types of secure DBMS architectures: kernelized, replicated, and distributed. An additional problem that arises uniquely in multilevel secure DBMSs is that of secure, correct execution when data at multiple security levels must be written within one transaction. Significant progress has been made in a number of these areas, and a few of the techniques have been incorporated into commercial trusted DBMS products. However, there are many open problems remain to be explored. This paper reviews the achievements to date in transaction processing for multilevel secure DBMSs. The paper provides an overview of transaction processing needs and solutions in conventional DBMSs as background, explains the constraints introduced by multilevel security, and then describes the results of research in multilevel secure transaction processing. Research results and limitations in concurrency control, multilevel transaction management, and secure commit protocols are summarized. Finally, important new areas are identified for secure transaction processing research.

Multilevel secure transaction processing

The past few years have seen governmental, military, and commercial organizations widely adopt Web-based commercial technologies because of their convenience, ease of use, and ability to take advantage of rapid advances in the commercial market. With this increasing reliance on internetworked computer resources comes an increasing vulnerability to information warfare. In today's heavily networked environment, safety demands protection from both obvious and subtle intrusions that can delete or corrupt vital data. Traditionally, information systems security focuses primarily on prevention: putting controls and mechanisms in place that protect confidentiality, integrity, and availability by stopping users from doing bad things. Moreover, most mechanisms are powerless against misbehavior by legitimate users who perform functions for which they are authorized. The paper discusses traditional approaches and their limitations.

Catherine D. McCollum

Papers

Trusted recovery

Intrusion confinement by isolation in information systems

Multilevel secure transaction processing

Surviving information warfare attacks

Intrusion Confinement by Isolation in Information Systems